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

Milovan Djilas

GEORGE URBAN in a long conversation in Belgrade with the Yugoslav dissident, who reconsiders War & Revolution (and his own violent years), the twists & turns of the Cold War (Moscow's aspirations and the inanities of US foreign policy), the virtues & vices of his Euro-Communist friends, the prospects of a new society "beyond Capitalism & Socialism" (escaping traditional Left dogma), the old crimes of World War II "repatriations", the new totalitarian dangers, with an aside about ethics & religion (and certain personal visions of Christ). . . .

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Laurence Lerner

The Clocks

WHEN I WAS TWELVE I spent a week at my Uncle Sam's. He was already rich then, and the house was full of clocks. You sat down in the living-room, and they all ticked at you, softly insisting, the ticks overlapping in a blur of agitated sound. Or you looked up and there they were, enamelled faces, brass casings, the grand ones flanked by urns or shepherdesses, all gazing at you with their unwanted and varied information, ten to eleven, five past eleven, seven minutes past eleven. Always hurrying, always reminding.

Uncle Sam was so rich that when he saw a clock he simply bought it. He could be travelling through a French village, or entering an antique dealer's in New York expecting to be fleeced. He would see a clock with twisty legs and a crown on top, two enamel shepherdesses exposing themselves on each side; he would ask the price, and offer half. Or he would be drinking coffee in a little country hotel and notice a carriage clock immodestly showing its works, and insist on it being added to the bill. Not speaking French made it easier; he would go on pointing, and flourishing hundred franc notes, till the proprietress shrugged and gave in. Even in those days he was rich enough to buy whatever he wanted; by now I'm sure he has put brackets all over the dining room wall, filling all the spaces with urns and hurry.

Actually, it was Sam's wife I was related to. She was my favourite aunt, and even then I admired the way she handled him, never quite not listening, in the way one never quite not heard the ticking. Not that Sam's voice was anything like ticking: he was loud and emphatic, with a heavy South African accent, and strong defiant vowels. He was a Communist in those days. Or I suppose he was, though Communism has long been illegal in South Africa. He would sit in his rococo armchair insisting that capitalism was finished—or Christianity, or bourgeois democracy (a sham), or even white supremacy. The clocks would tick encouragingly as capitalism hastened to its doom. I listened, and raised mild protests. Aunt Rachel would say, Well, Sam, it might not be so simple, and he would say raucously, You don't understand the first thing about it, I tell you. He was always rude when arguing, but he adored her. He would predict their dispossession by the uprising workers with love and gusto.

Their son Alan was five years younger than me. He's always been five years younger, he never caught up. I found that humiliating, that I was always older than Alan, long after he had achieved all his distinctions and I was a half-successful journalist. He caught me up and overtook me but his age never caught up, he was always my young cousin Alan. There I was, in London, thousands of miles away: I often didn't even know what country Alan was in now, I hardly ever thought about him, but I knew that if I did think about him there he was, speaking all those languages, always wearing a suit, and five years younger than me.

At the age of 12 I didn't really expect companionship from a seven year old, but I thought admiration and deference would not be out of place. I found that Alan only wanted to practise his French on me, which he had just begun at school. When he found I knew no French, because I was not at a private school, and we learned only English and Afrikaans, his respect flagged; and when he found that I knew less Afrikaans than he did it disappeared altogether. Alan was already the young genius of the family. No one was surprised when he did so well at school, then at University, then in the diplomatic service, then

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finally became South African ambassador in London. Someone has to be South African ambassador, why not my cousin Alan?

SAM HAD MADE HIS MONEY in swimming pools. He was the first man in Cape Town to realise that no rich man's house was complete without a swimming pool. Why should they have to get in their cars and drive to the beach, he said loudly, cluttering the roads, knocking over black men? Let them swim quietly in their own gardens. If they want to swim at night, they can. If they want to swim in the nude, let them. The neighbours can join in.

"Swimming pools", I said, "are a sign of exploitation. You get a swimming pool if you exploit enough black men."

"Nonsense", said Sam. "A bit of water and chlorine, and a pump to put the air through. Where's the exploitation?"

"You have to be rich", I said. "How does anyone get rich in South Africa? How did you get rich?"

"I give employment", said Sam. "I'm working against the government. I'm helping the natives to rise in the world." In those days we still called them natives.

"You're helping to build capitalism", I said.

"Capitalism is a stage", said Sam. "It's all in Marx. You have to have the bourgeois phase, then comes the proletarian phase." He pronounced it "Boor-gwoyz", with a hard "g."

"Bourgeois", corrected Alan.

"It doesn't matter what you call it", said Sam. "It's the idea that counts. The quicker you pass through one phase, the quicker you get to the next."

"Well", said Rachel, "I hope they don't pass through this one till we're gone."

"It doesn't matter", said Sam smugly, waving his arm. "I'm willing to give it all away, when the time comes. Perfectly willing."

"When the time comes", said Rachel, "they won't ask you, they'll just take it."

"Why don't you just give it away now?" I asked. "You don't have to wait for the revolution. You could give some to the maid, and some to the gardener."

"If they want anything", said Rachel, "they only have to ask."

"You're too soft", said Alan, "both of you."

"Alan had a fight with the gardener's son", Rachel explained. "He thinks we ought to have punished him."

"After what he did", said Alan.

What he had done was to throw a stone through Alan's window. "Not on purpose surely", I asked.

"No", said Rachel, "he's a nice little boy, it was just high spirits."

"Little boy", said Alan darkly.

"He's the same age as you, lovey."

"It might have killed me", said Alan fiercely.

"What was he doing here?" I asked.

"He often comes", said Rachel, "he comes to play with Alan. But now Alan won't play with him."

"I might have been sitting by the window", said Alan doggedly.

"I'm sure he knew you weren't", said Rachel soothingly. "And I'm sure it was an accident."

"If he knew", said Alan triumphantly, "that shows he did it on purpose." He was a clever little boy, even then.

"Well I'm sure he's sorry. He's said so. You could start playing with him again."

"I won't play with him", said Alan contemptuously. "He's coloured."

"You be careful, my boy", said Sam. "Don't you go despising anyone just because he's coloured. Not in this house." Alan gave his father a sullen look. "This house", he said darkly, then he looked away, and said no more. Alan had come home from school a moment after the window was broken. He had come through the gate to see the gardener's son looking at the broken pane, with a helpless awareness of what he had done. "Ooh look", Alan had screamed, "look what you've gone and done." And he had hit him, immediately. "I never did that", the boy had said, but he had not hit back. "I never did nothing", he protested sullenly, when Alan hit him again, putting up his elbow half-heartedly.

"He's a liar too", Alan said to us. "If he hadn't done it, he wouldn't have let me hit him."

"Well", I said, "he's coloured and you're white. You couldn't expect him to hit back."

"He could have run away", said Alan.

"That's enough now, Alan", said his mother. "We didn't like you hitting him like that, he's at a disadvantage."

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"Not when it comes to throwing stones", said Alan.

He wouldn't give up. He was near to tears, and he wouldn't give up. "You ought to have taught him a lesson."

"I'll decide who I give a lesson to, thank you", boomed Sam. He wasn't a democrat within his family.

AND IF SAM HAD TAUGHT him a lesson? Would it have made any difference? Did Alan wonder, watching that other broken window, years later? Did he have time to?

The gardener's son was also called Alan. He was born a week after Alan, and his father had explained proudly to Sam that he'd instructed his wife to call their baby by the same name. If master doesn't mind, that is.

Rachel told me the story: she'd been lying in bed, her window giving on to the garden, and had overheard the whole conversation. "I was waiting to hear what Sam said", she told me. "I thought he might say that the child's mother should be asked."

"And did he?" I asked.

She gave a sad smile. "He slapped him on the back and said, well done, comrade. I appreciate the gesture, he said."

Sam was always calling people comrade. Not everyone: I don't think he ever called his customers comrade. He never called women comrade, and quite possibly not white men either. But his workmen, or the milkman, or the gardener, he would slap them on the back and call them comrade in a booming voice. I heard him do so that same afternoon. Rosie the maid came in while Rachel was pouring the tea. "Please missus, the gardener wants to speak to master."

"Master's just having his tea", said Rachel.

"That's all right", said Sam. "Tell him I'm coming." He stirred his tea violently, and slurped the first mouthful.

"Cut me a piece of cake, Rachel", said Sam.

"You'd better talk to the gardener first", said Rachel. "You can have it later."

"It's all right", said Sam, in a voice full of largesse. "It's all right, I'll have another piece later."

He had the other piece then, and two cups and two slices later he got up to go to the back door (the clocks seemed to fill the room with

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reproaches, but no one heard them except me). I sat on the edge of the chair desperately willing Sam to finish his tea and go to the door.

When Sam got up, still not hurrying, and went to the door the gardener was still there. "Well comrade", he said, banging him on the shoulders, "and how are you?"

"I'm very well thanks." The gardener did not call Sam comrade, though he refrained from calling him master. All the same he could not keep the deference out of his voice.

Rachel smiled at me. "Sam thinks he can keep them waiting", she said, "as long as he calls them comrade." She had said it: there was nothing more for me to say. But in her mouth it was not a reproach, she was simply amused.

"Don't these clocks drive you mad?" I asked her.

She shrugged. "It's Sam's hobby", she said.

"I mean, don't they make you think how quickly your life's passing."

"Sam never connects them with time passing. He just likes clocks."

"And you", I insisted fiercely, "what about you?"

She shrugged again. "I'm used to it", she said.

I have no idea how often the gardener called to see Sam over the next thirty years, how often he stood waiting at the back door, how many cups of tea Sam drank before he stepped outside and slapped him on the back. Nor how often the clocks ticked while Rachel said, Go and see him Sam, I'll pour you another cup of tea when he's gone. What I do know is that there was one time when he didn't go out at all, when the old man (as he must be now) stood on the doorstep and no one slapped him on the back. I know this because Rachel wrote to me about it, last week. After my letter of condolence that I had found so hard to write.

I HAVE ALMOST FORGOTTEN what Cape Town looks like by now. It's 30 years since I left, and I've long stopped looking up as I walk the streets, telling myself that it must be there, the pale grey mountain in the brittle air, leaning over us as we walk. I've stopped thinking it would be nice to walk the pipe track on Sunday, to go swimming at Muizenberg, to drive out to Constantia. I don't even walk up Regent Street to see the South African Airways photographs, I never think about the place. Three years ago I was walking through Trafalgar Square when I saw a group of demonstrators; Apartheid is Evil, their banners said, Down with White Fascism. Boycott Racist Governments. They were being noisy, and there were a lot of police present. I remember thinking why now, why here; I had quite forgotten that the bulky Whitehall-style building was South Africa House. Then I saw a big car was trying to pull away and some of the students were banging on the bonnet with the flat of their hand, others were shouting at the closed windows. There was some scuffling, a policeman's helmet was knocked off, one demonstrator was thrown into the road as the car began to move. It was all very mild by the standards of today, and I had shrugged and was walking on thinking, he must have had a job getting into the car, I suppose it was the ambassador, when I stopped with a jerk, realising that it must be Alan. He'd been appointed two months before. I'd seen it in the paper and wondered if I should write to Aunt Rachel to congratulate her, then I'd forgotten. I send them a Christmas card each year, otherwise we don't write. Alan I've long lost touch with, yet suddenly, picturing him behind the darkened windows of that Rolls (it may not even have been him. There must be a Deputy Ambassador, he must use the Rolls too sometimes, or it may have been Mr Vorster, incognito), I saw him vividly as he was 20 years ago, then 10 years before that, a clever child practising his French, furious with his parents for not punishing the gardener's son. "I might have been sitting behind the window, he might have killed me." And there he was now, behind a window, and a mob of demonstrators who might easily start throwing stones. I wondered if the windows were stone-proof. Bullet-proof, even.

For a moment Alan came back into my life. I thought, I'll write to him, I'll tell him I'm a journalist, I'll offer to interview him. I can run an interview with him and one of the black exiles, side by side, what a good idea. Like Alan Dudley, I could get an introduction to him. The two Alans, I would call it: and even then, the penny didn't drop.

No one threw a stone at the car. If someone had, if Alan had been hurt, if there'd been indignant articles in some papers (Politics or

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Hooliganism?) and tortured articles in others ("Although one can sympathise with the anti-Apartheid lobby") he might be alive today. For everything in politics changes the next thing: he'd have been the ambassador who got beaten up, he'd have been sent to Washington instead, or security would have been tightened, or the exiles would have acted sooner or not at all. Just one thing different, and there wouldn't have been a letter bomb, or not on that day, or it would have been detected, or killed the secretary or something—anything—would have been different.

But nothing was. Nothing ever is different. So Alan who (according to the papers) liked to open his own letters, the personal ones, didn't recognise the writing, or had never seen it, and the blast caught him full in the face. The secretary was hurt too, but she must have been bending over her desk, and her typewriter caught the worst of it. But nothing was in Alan's way. The window was blown out, and a passer-by was hurt (not badly) by the falling glass. He must have looked up when he heard the blast.

THAT PASSER-BY did the bombers more harm than anything. When they put out their statement they apologised to the British people for any damage unfortunately but inevitably caused in the course of their struggle. There must have been factions in the group, and the hardliners added the next sentences: "We cannot however consider the British wholly innocent, for Britain invests in the fascist and oppressive white minority régime. To walk past the South African Embassy can never be a wholly innocent act." I've never met anyone who read that last sentence who wasn't furious (perhaps I don't mix enough with the lunatic fringe nowadays). I don't know if it stimulated the police to look harder. Perhaps they'd have caught Alan Dudley anyway: he seemed to have been very careless, even boasting of the success among his fellow-exiles, some of whom were not in favour of bombs.

So for the first time in many years I wrote to Uncle Sam and Aunt Rachel, though it wasn't Christmas. It wasn't an easy letter to write, I couldn't pretend I'd cared much about Alan; but one can always work up feeling over terrorism, and I really had been very fond of Rachel, I felt I owed it to her and to my past. I knew she'd answer, but I wasn't prepared for the shock of what she said. It upset me far more than the bomb had done.

You do realise who it was who sent the bomb, she wrote. You must remember our gardener, Dudley—I looked up: there was no need to read further. I realised I'd always assumed Dudley was his christian name, then I realised that was stupid of me, coloured workmen only have one name to their employers, even to their Communist employers (and in this case their ex, their very ex Communist employer). The two Alans, I thought, why was I so idle, it would have been the most prophetic article of the decade. Then I thought no, it would have made a difference, the bomb wouldn't have been sent or sent by someone else.

No one ever found out the personal connection. In all the fuss, about whether bombs were ever justified, then the fuss about extradition, in all the protests and counter-indignation, no one knew that Alan Dudley had killed his father's employer's son. He never told them; and of course Sam and Rachel said nothing. Nor did I: why should I make their misery worse? They only wanted to sit in their house and forget. The garden would go to waste, the gardener would not come again. He would have knocked at the back door, and the maid would have come through to say the gardener's at the door, he wants to see master. This time Sam would not drink his tea first, he would get up straight away and speak to him. This time he would not call him comrade, he would not call him anything. He would look at him, trying to summon up hatred, then shake his head. The two old men would turn away from each other, Dudley would go down the steps and out of the gate, not even turning to take a last look at the dahlias; and Sam would go back to the living-room where Rachel sat among the clocks, not listening to their chatter, staring at their varied information: a quarter to twelve, five to twelve, one minute to twelve.

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Peter Scupham

The Tragedy Of

I

He lays a sudden anger on the table
To fester with the ink and scratchy feathers,
His treaties, proof against all our entreaties.
We dress by mirrors which contain the gardens,
But the civilities of grass and water
Are fractured by a peacock's uncouth cry,
And a slow mildew breaks the quicksilver
From that perfection which our faces claim.

The coinage rings false, the guards are doubled,
And the Fool's head sits oddly on his shoulders.
An official artist has been appointed
Who doodles wolves, devises cold insignia.

This royal daughter, unfit for the game,
Settles her face into its hurt silk look;
Gathers flowers, listens to the harsh birds.

II

Yes, things here have been tripped to motion.
The tethered trees pull the winds close about them,
And their impartial heads fly East and West
About our furious riding. Metal hulks
Groan into mud. We shall impress the scarecrows,
Leaving the seeded ground to rook and rain.
Colour drains bare, our thinning bannerets
Are rubbed sore by many fractious weathers.

Somewhere, walls are hung with noble silences,
Justice is benched beneath the apple boughs,
A green field sets clown and shepherd dancing
And herbs sleep in dreamy underworlds.

A rusty beggar sounds his call to alms
But a fresh post delays us with stale tactics.
Our lidless eyes grow bright with resolution.

III

We have scraped out support and front-line trenches
In the proud flesh; wit and wisdom thicken.
Our heads nod nothings to the duckboard floor;
The lion's teeth glaze in a last rictus.
Some mouths are swollen with a foolish gold,
Some sticky with the crumbs of creature comfort.
A Tertian Ague: we shall sweat it out—
There are no gifts which remain ungiven.

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Enter the giant sloth, a shroud of fur.
Death of brain-stem, cortex. Shall we move
Beyond the play of all our swords and cancers
Into a dust, a very valiant dust?

Lie, under the graveyard's airy gabble,
Careless of new command, the wheel of men,
The nimble flags which sprig about our graves?

D. M. Thomas

The Foetus

A foetus was heard to cry out
while it was being aborted behind screens
the foetus showed signs of being alive
apparently it was human
apparently it was alive
some women wept
the Minister has ordered/the Minister is disturbed

the foetus did not cry it cried out
it cried out once to the world
with a voice that was human
but it did not make sense
which disturbed the Minister
and the women who were infertile
and the hospital padre

a foetus was heard to cry out
while it was being aborted behind screens
it signalled once its existence
it touched the world for an instant
it was evidently alive
it was evidently human
unlike the foetuses who did not cry out
while they were being aborted behind screens
some women wept

the Minister is disturbed
abortions should not take place
where infertile women are gathered
there is already too much crying
too much crying out
it might disturb the other foetuses
the ones that do not cry out
to hear human cries

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GEORGE URBAN

A Conversation with Milovan Djilas

I. "Lenin's Best Disciple"

IF HE EVER enjoyed anything, Joseph Stalin would have enjoyed the 100th anniversary of his birth (21 December 1979). This may be an appropriate time to review Stalinism—past, present, and possibly future. You, Milovan Djilas, are one of the best-equipped witnesses to do so, having embraced it, worked with it, raised doubts about it, and finally fought, renounced, and denounced it in the course of a long, tempestuous career.

Let me start with a question which has exercised students of Communist affairs more than any other because it touches on the exposed nerve of Marxism: Does Stalinism naturally follow from some aspect of Marx's social or economic thinking? In other words, was some form of Stalinism bound to happen—or was Stalinism an abuse of Marxism? Was it, alternatively, perhaps neither, but a sui generis Russian phenomenon?—Or indeed a freakish development which cannot be explained in terms of either the Marxist or the Russian framework?

DJILAS: Stalinism is certainly not a natural, much less an unavoidable, product of Marxism. Nothing in Marx's theory foreshadows or legitimises the cult of the personality—even though the phrase was used by Marx.

It is of course true that the reception of Marx by the socialists of his time contained an element of hero-worship. Already some of these early Marxists had raised Marx's "scientific" prophecies to the status of dogma. Still, it is impossible to derive from Marx anything like a Stalinoid cult of the personality. Indeed, Marx is on record as having been totally opposed to any form of personalised leadership.

Leninism is quite another matter. The victory of the Bolsheviks under Lenin, their claim to the leadership of the World Proletariat and the role of Lenin as head of "the vanguard" implied and indeed demanded the rise of Stalinism of one kind or another. I am not saying that Lenin personally encouraged the cult of himself as a totalitarian leader. He didn't. Nevertheless, a cult of extraordinary proportions came into being even while Lenin was alive. Upon his death, *Pravda* immediately appointed him *leader* of the World Revolution and the World Proletariat, and Stalin—

MILOVAN DJILAS *was, until his fall from power in 1954, Vice-President of Yugoslavia, President of the Federal Parliament, and a Member of the Politburo and Central Committee. He was imprisoned under the Monarchy (1933–36), and under Tito (1956–61 and 1962–66). His publications include "The New Class", "Conversations with Stalin", "Land Without Justice", "The Unperfect Society", and "Wartime."*

GEORGE URBAN'S *conversations with prominent Communists, Euro-Communists, and Western historians, many of which first appeared in the pages of* ENCOUNTER, *are collected in his two recent books (both published by Temple Smith): "Euro-Communism" (1978), and "Communist Reformation" (1979).*

AS WE GO TO PRESS *it is not yet clear what the consequences will be of Djilas' latest altercation with the Yugoslav authorities. A fine of 10,000 dinars was imposed on him by a Belgrade court. He did not intend to pay it, for he does not recognise the legitimacy of governmental control over who should or should not edit or write, particularly for a literary magazine. But the court ordered that the fine be paid; he himself would have opted for prison. The official accusation, always accompanied by the old charge of "provocation", was his so-called "spiritual fathership" of a new mimeographed cultural review entitled 'Casovnik (The Clock)". The tiny publication was, of course, quickly denounced by "Politika" (19 October) under the headline* PROVOCATION IN "LITERARY" DISGUISE: *". . . Djilas has been warned several times about his anti-Yugoslav activities. However, despite all these warnings he has gone too far. . . . How long does Djilas intend to go on in defiance . . . ?"*

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much to Krupskaya's distress—delivered himself of his famous oath of fealty to the dead vizier: "We vow to thee, Comrade Lenin, that we shall honourably fulfil this thy commandment . . ." etc. The ideology of "the vanguard" was incomplete without a single leader.

—Lenin may not have favoured the cult of himself as a dictator but, writing in 1918, he made it clear that personal dictatorship was quite compatible with the Soviet type of socialism:

"There is . . . absolutely *no* contradiction in principle between Soviet (that is, socialist) democracy and the exercise of dictatorial powers by individuals."

DJILAS: Yes—Lenin, of course, surrounded the words you have quoted with qualifications explaining why the expression of the interests of the proletariat by a *single will* was necessary; and elsewhere he said that even a personalised dictatorship of the proletariat was a hundred times more democratic than that of the bourgeoisie. In that back-handed way he was, if you like, a democrat. And, indeed, he tolerated (until the 10th Party Congress) a certain amount of democracy, a spread of conflicting opinions, within the Party.

Yet the *dominant* streak in Lenin's character and political practice was a ruthless will to coerce, dictate, and subjugate. Stalin's terror and Stalin's tyranny are unmistakably foreshadowed by Leninism.

—But were these inevitable? Or might Leninism have taken a totally different course under different historical and cultural conditions?

DJILAS: No, they were not "inevitable"—but the cards were stacked strongly in their favour. Leninism provides the right milieu for some form of personalised despotism, but whether it does in fact arise depends on the political environment and the personality of the would-be dictator. In Stalin and his time the character of the dictator and the exigencies of the situation in Russia matched one another to perfection.

—This question has more than retrospective importance, because if some form of personal despotism is the ineluctable outcome of Leninism, then our reading of what the French, Spanish and even Italian Communist Parties are about in the 1970s and 1980s must be significantly different from what these parties are currently asking us to believe about their intentions.

You observed in 1971 that "Stalinism is Marxism realised in Russian conditions"—adding that "just as there is no, nor can there be, 'Stalinism' as perverted Marxism, there is no, nor can there be, liberal Communism . . . ."

Doesn't this rather contradict what you have just told me about the Leninist, rather than Marxist, provenance of Stalinism, equating (if I read you correctly) **every** *form of Communism with Marxism which you now repudiate?*

DJILAS: My reason for having written the words you have quoted would take our argument into the metapsychology of Communism (which we want to avoid if we can). Stated very briefly, it amounts to my belief that Marxist Communism is a self-enclosing system in *all* its varieties. It is immune to criticism, for it is a matter of faith rather than reason and analysis. It is especially immune to the "constructive" critiques of Leftist professors and "well-meaning" fellow-travellers: genuine Communists, with power and privileges to lose, regard these as fools.

What seems to me absolutely clear in 1979 is that "Stalinism" is a misnomer—there was, and is, no such thing. What there was, and is, is Leninism applied and further developed (if that is the right word) under Russia's peculiar conditions. When Lenin died, Communists had, broadly speaking, three roads to choose from: *(1)* Bukharin's programme for a more democratic and equitable Communist society; *(2)* the internationalist utopianism of Trotsky coupled with the prospect of a dictatorship even fiercer than Stalin's—and *(3)* the bureaucratic despotism of Stalin. Stalin's form of patrimonial tyranny was closest to Russian traditions and best attuned to the interests of the emerging new establishment.

I don't want to be misunderstood here: Lenin and Stalin were totally different from each other in their character, temperament and most of their policies. Nevertheless, the road from Lenin points to Stalin—much more clearly than it does to Trotsky or Bukharin—

—even though in 1925 Stalin protested with consummate hypocrisy that not one of Lenin's heirs was worthy of Lenin's mantle, and only as a collective could they aspire to leadership?

DJILAS: That was a diversionary move in Stalin's struggle with Zinoviev, Kamenev, and Trotsky—hypocritical, of course, with a vengeance.

For all these reasons I regard Stalinism as Leninism pushed to the limit of its awesome rationale.

—I take it you have some political reason for stressing the non-existence of any distinction between the two?

DJILAS: Yes—I want to demolish any notion (if indeed there is any left to be demolished . . . which I rather doubt) that the particular evils of Stalinism were due to shortcomings in Stalin's character—and other infantile and brazenly un-Marxist excuses of a similar nature put about by Soviet propaganda—

—Might I add, not only by Soviet propaganda. Even Roy Medvedev believes that "Stalinism cannot be regarded as Marxism-Leninism . . . . It is a phenomenon profoundly alien to Marxism-Leninism, it is a pseudo-communism and pseudo-socialism." And unless we think of Medvedev

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as "Moscow's licensed jester", or indeed "a covert Soviet propagandist", his view carries a certain weight—

DJILAS: Your "unless" implies my answer: Medvedev is, not to be too uncharitable about it, an opportunist of the first order.

Two further points may be relevant. When I last saw Stalin—in January 1948, on the eve of our Yugoslav conflict with the Russians—he made certain highly critical remarks about both Marx and Engels. "Yes, yes"—he said—these were our founders and we owe them every respect, but they are loaded down with an awful lot of German classical philosophy (meaning German Idealism). Fortunately, he went on, Lenin jettisoned this load for us and put everything in good order.

"Communism is especially immune to the 'constructive' critiques of Leftist professors and 'well-meaning' fellow-travellers. Genuine Communists, with power and privileges to lose, regard these as fools. . . .

"The United States in its present phase of guilt-ridden enfeeblement, snatching at illusory treaties and kowtowing to contemptible sheiks and terrorists, is hardly the country to put pressure on the Russians."

This approval of Lenin's revisionism told me a great deal about Stalin's own, and I regard it as yet another indication of the weak (not to say corrupt) link which connects Stalin with Marx, and the very strong one which binds him to Lenin.

Second: In Lenin's so-called *Testament* his unflattering observations about Stalin, and the reasons suggested for his removal as General Secretary, hinge on one point—Stalin's *personal* rudeness. Lenin proposes that another comrade be selected—"a man who, above all, would differ from Com. Stalin in *only* one quality, namely, greater tolerance, greater loyalty, greater kindness and more considerate attitude toward his comrades, less capricious temper, etc."

This is important, because Lenin also criticises other leading members of the Central Committee, but he does so on political or ideological grounds—Bukharin as too scholastic, Trotsky as too much of an administrator and a non-Bolshevik in his background, Pyatakov as a bureaucrat, and Kamenev and Zinoviev for having opposed the October Revolution. But in Stalin's case Lenin raises no *political* or *ideological* objection, only Stalin's personal failings as a crude and difficult man.

This point has been overlooked by Stalin's socialist critics. I want to give it all possible emphasis because I read it as incontestable proof that in all *political* respects Lenin looked upon Stalin as unexceptionable and the rightful heir to his heritage.

—There is truth, then, in the Stalinists' boast (coined on Stalin's 50th birthday) that "Stalin is the Lenin of today"—"Lenin's best disciple"?

DJILAS: Absolutely—

— . . . in which case we needn't, strictly speaking, bother with the centenary of Stalin's birth, for there is basically nothing in Stalin that wasn't there in Lenin?

DJILAS: That, in a sense, is my meaning. Arbitrarily, and with great single-mindedness, Lenin lifted from Marx those elements which best served his purpose—above all, the drive for Revolution and the justification of Violence. In Marx's writings these appear as one streak in a broad spectrum of possibilities—certainly not the only road socialism might take. For example, Marx noted that in countries such as England, Holland, and the USA, where the police apparatus was not repressive, the socialist transformation of society *might* be achieved without revolution. In other words, Marx's notion of revolution was not dogmatic. Lenin's was. And through Lenin the heritage of Russia has indelibly imprinted itself on Marxism and distorted it. Not, mind you, beyond recognition—because ideological intolerance and stridency of tone are amply present in Marx too. After all, Lenin's revision of Marx was the revision of Marxism. Stalin merely completed the job.

—Isn't it, then, surprising that the cohesion of the World Communist movement under Leninism/Stalinism lasted as long as it did—that for five decades out of just over six decades of Communist history the Western Communist Parties, too, were perfectly willing to take orders from Russo-Communism? Whatever allowances one may make for the threat of Nazism and Fascism and the rigours of Comintern membership, the servility of otherwise intelligent and often courageous men never ceases to astonish. Even men of the critical calibre of Bertram Wolfe and Ignazio Silone toed the line for a considerable number of years.

DJILAS: My own astonishment is not as great as yours for I was myself one of those who blindly believed in the rightness of Stalin's leadership—partly for the reasons you have hinted at, and partly for others too well known to need rehearsing. But what we can now see is that Communism, as we have so far known it, cannot survive Moscow's power to control the world communist movement. As soon as various Communist Parties achieve a measure of acceptance—whether in power or in opposition—the *national* characteristics gain ground and eventually determine the Party's whole ideology and programme. It is then that the Communist Parties experience the sobering but wholesome discovery that—whatever slogans they

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may have mouthed about "internationalism" while in illegality or in a state of obstructionist opposition—their day-to-day business in "real" life is with live Frenchmen, Italians and Spaniards, each with their own language, history, culture and traditions. And these are the factors that ultimately clinch the argument between Russo-Communism and the national variety. Whatever Marx may have written to the contrary, nations enjoy "a right of primogeniture" over class and economic determinants. Yugoslavia was an early example of the triumph of national communism. Others have followed or may yet follow.

—Your approval (if that's what it is) of national communism appears to be in conflict with a more sceptical view you expressed about it only a few years ago:

> **"National Communism cannot transform Communism and lead it to liberty. It can only break away from Moscow and construct an identical system."**

If we scan the world for evidence to support these words, Albania, Rumania, Cambodia, and China itself certainly bear out your pessimism. Why then, do you now take a more hopeful view?

DJILAS: "Identical" is too strong a word in my earlier statement. If I were to re-write those sentences today I would say:

> **"National Communism cannot transform Communism and lead it to liberty. It can only break away from Moscow and construct *another* Communist system."**

My emphasis was, and is, on the basic unchangeability of the Communist system—any Communist system. Communism is ideologically and structurally incapable of transforming itself into a democratic, parliamentary, pluralistic polity.

Any Communist social order rests on three planks: (*1*) monopoly of the physical means of power; (*2*) monopoly of the means of economic power; and (*3*) the exclusive right to determine what the individual may feel and think. Taken together, they guarantee the totalitarian character of Communism. Remove one of these elements and the whole system is threatened with destruction.

This does not mean that a Communist Party in power has to be savage at all times and in all places. Concrete domestic and international conditions can make for moderation. For example, not so many years ago it would have been impossible to imagine that the Soviet Union would exchange political prisoners for Russian spies arrested in the US. Any such thought would have been branded as "capitulation to Imperialism." But now, in their anxiety to get the SALT 2 treaty ratified by the US Senate, the Soviet leaders do not hesitate to engage in transparent tactics of this kind. Or take Poland. In response to pressures of an entirely different character, the Polish Communists have been obliged to permit, and to put a good face on, the Pope's pilgrimage to Poland—with all its unforeseeable consequences for their future.

It would, of course, be quite wrong for us to raise captious objections to concessions of this kind, because they certainly make life easier for millions of men and women in Communist societies. But let us be clear about one thing: if we are serious about wishing to see Communism ended, we cannot hope to do so without the use of force somewhere along the line. I do not, mind you, advocate revolution or civil war. On the other hand, pressures exerted by a disenfranchised population by means of strikes and demonstrations would seem to me highly legitimate—at least as legitimate as strikes and demonstrations organised by Communist parties and trade unions against *properly* elected Western governments.

—Would international pressure help or retard such a process?

DJILAS: It depends on what you mean by "international pressure." A shooting war might bring the system to its knees—but this is a contingency I would want to exclude from our considerations. Unwarlike pressure? Who, I ask you, would have the courage to exert it? The United States in its present phase of guilt-ridden enfeeblement—snatching at illusory treaties and kowtowing to contemptible sheiks and terrorists—is hardly the country to do so. Why, an American official, Mr Victor Utgoff of the National Security Council, speaking for the US Administration went on record not so many weeks ago with the following statement:

> **"Even if the United States could attain strategic superiority it would not be desirable because I suspect we would occasionally use it as a way of throwing our weight around in some risky ways . . . . It is in the US interest to allow the few remaining areas of strategic advantage to fade away."**

—You are implying the US has lost its world-political will. If so, why has it lost it?

DJILAS: Because Americans live in a mental universe of their own, and because they are still reeling under the shock of defeat in Viet Nam. At the same time they are anxious to do business with the whole world, including the Communist powers, even if that means supplying the proverbial rope with which the Communists say they will hang them. Worse, the Americans are exceptionally unimaginative and unhistorical in their international relations, and often dangerously ignorant to boot. A poll taken ten days before the SALT 2 treaty was signed in Vienna showed two-thirds of the American people incapable of naming the two countries engaged in the SALT negotiations! In 1939 the British and French people at least knew the name of Hitler before Chamberlain and Daladier made their trip to Munich. . . .

I will not labour the parallel.

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II. What's in a Name?

ALL IN ALL, THEN, a slow, ad hoc, piecemeal improvement under some form of National Communism is the most we can hope for in the present conditions.

But would you agree that, while National Communism would undoubtedly represent a signal change for the better for the peoples of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, it would have the opposite impact on the lives of Frenchmen, Spaniards, and Italians? For the essence of what you are saying is that all types of Communism are despotic and totalitarian ab ovo: **there is no acceptable type of Communism, only** *Communists* **who have, under the force of circumstances, been** *made* **to pursue acceptable policies. I take it, then, that you would not trust the conciliatory noises made by Euro-Communists in Italy, Spain, and France?**

DJILAS: That would depend on the country and the men involved. In France, for example, the Communist Party's new-fangled devotion to pluralism, freedom, and the like is the purest deception and is already on the retreat. The French Party has a Leninist/Stalinist background of long standing and has repeatedly shown its deep-seated unwillingness and inability to break with it—no matter what demagogic slogans to the contrary it may have pinned to its banner. Spain, on the other hand, gives one cause for a certain optimism. Carrillo and his leadership appear to have shed the legacy of Leninism, accepted the rules of parliamentary democracy, and voted for the new Constitution under the Monarchy—whatever private thoughts they might entertain on the latter.

—But isn't this precisely what Lenin would have done in Carrillo's place? One **says** *one thing while one is weak, barely restored to legitimacy and in opposition—and* **does** *quite another when in power or sharing power.*

DJILAS: No—I think the Spanish Communists mean what they say.

—We don't know yet, or do we?

DJILAS: In Lenin's case I would agree with you—we would have every reason to suspect that a Carrillo type of stance would be a tactical move to deceive opponents. But the Spanish Communists have now dropped just about everything that makes a party a Communist party. True, their programme includes references to the desirability of a classless society, but this is no more than any self-respecting social democratic party would have said—and did say—at the turn of the century. Remember, apropos your suspicion of Carrillo, that the early social democrats were also much mistrusted for the same kind of reason that puts you on your guard against the Spanish Communists—until, at the outbreak of the First World War, the social democrats hastened to abandon every pretence of internationalism, voted for the War both in Germany and France, and were mistrusted no longer.

—Would you want to see the Spanish Communists in power or sharing power?

DJILAS: As things are at the moment—yes, I would.

—Even though you said in 1971:

> **"Many Communists, and even entire groups and organisations of Communists . . . are seized by doubts and inspired by new visions of freedom. But there always remains one part of the Communists who remain dedicated to the original totalitarian doctrine and ready to use totalitarian methods. . . ."**

DJILAS: To the extent that the Spanish Communists are no longer Communists I'm willing to take a bet on them. You see, the great strength and lure of Communism lies in its completeness. It offers a single formula to the type of person who knows little but wants to explain much. The moment one Party separates itself from the fold, putting new explanations and motivations in the place of the old one, Communism begins to disintegrate both as an ideology and as a web of international political relationships. The Spanish Communists—following in the footsteps of the Yugoslavs, Hungarians, and Czechs, but taking their case a great deal further—have given a mighty push to the accelerating decline of totalitarian, monocentric communism. So mighty, indeed, was their push that it has carried them entirely outside the radius of the world communist movement. That is why I tend to approve of them.

Mind you, my bet on the Spanish Communists, too, is conditional. No blank cheques are advanced in politics. It assumes that they maintain and respect Spain's political institutions, its parliamentary system, civil service, judiciary, the police, and the armed forces.

Several months ago the BBC confronted me with a wordy representative of the British extreme Left, Paul Foot, who lectured me on the need to destroy parliamentary institutions. I tried to bring it home to him that, of course, parliaments may not be ideally equipped to deal with the speed and complications of life in the last quarter of the 20th century. By all means, I said, reform them and improve them—but *don't* throw them away, for you will be much worse served by whatever comes after. I don't think Mr Foot was persuaded—nor was I won over by him—but the Spanish Communists are a great deal wiser than the British Far Left appears to be.

On *current* form I incline to believe that Santiago Carrillo and the men around him intend to respect

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the ground rules of Spanish democracy.

—Your attitude to Euro-Communism seems ambivalent. While you deny that Communism can reform itself, the Euro-Communist type of reformation nevertheless appears to have a strange fascination for you. . . .

DJILAS: . . . We are witnessing the rise of a fundamental heresy. The old faith has been destroyed but the language and ceremonial survive. . . .

— . . . and while the heresy is fresh, sticking to the old liturgy has its uses.

DJILAS: It has, and we have to make the most of it. Rome wasn't built in a day, nor can totalitarian Communism be brought low at one fell swoop.

—Are you equally hopeful about the Italian Communists?

DJILAS: There again, Berlinguer, Amendola, and Napolitano form a group within the Party which would appear to deserve our trust. The Party as a whole is a very different matter, but the men around the Party leader are totally disillusioned with Leninism and the Soviet Union. Indeed they perceive in the Soviet State a latter-day variety of classical imperialism, wholly in line with the militarism, chauvinism, and bureaucratic élitism of Czarist Russia. What is more, they fully realise that any Soviet threat to Yugoslavia is a threat to Italy too. This is of special interest to us.

—Would you want to see the Italian Euro-Communists in office?

DJILAS: Not single-handed! As part of a coalition government, I probably would. I have no doubt that men like Berlinguer and Amendola would be patriotic and loyal members of any government they joined. Unfortunately they work cheek-by-jowl with others whose attitude is, shall we say, less clear.

Democratic reform in the West European Communist parties has three springs: (*1*) the tragic and repulsive legacy of Soviet domestic history; (*2*) the lessons drawn from Soviet imperialistic expansionism; and (*3*)—equally important though often neglected by socialist theoreticians—the rapidly changing nature of capitalism. The first two points need no comment. On the third, let me note

"I am for a 'Social Democracy of Modern Capitalism'. . . ."

very briefly that, under the impact of socialism, trade unionism, the post-War loss of colonies, and enlightened self-interest, capitalism has reformed itself to the point where it bears little resemblance to the classical variety Marx wrote about.

"Euro-Communists" in the broad definition divide into people who have understood and assimilated *some* of these points, or *all* of these points. The Italian Communist Party contains cadres who are willing enough to concede the first point, or the first and the second, but not the third, and vice versa. My contention is that only those who have fully internalised *all three factors* and have drawn the necessary practical conclusions from them are "Euro-Communists" in the narrow sense of the word, which is the one I prefer. I do not, therefore, trust a great many Italian Communists to carry out Berlinguer's policies. In many respects their attitudes are opaque, their judgments ambivalent, and their consistency questionable. They may under certain conditions (domestic or international) pull the Party in directions in which the Berlinguer leadership would not want to go—or indeed depose the Berlinguer leadership.

—Haven't the Americans, then, been right to warn against Communist participation in any Italian government?

DJILAS: The American attitude is too crude and undifferentiated. General Haig said the Italian Communists should not be *permitted* to join a coalition. Would he tell us how the US would prevent it from happening? No—the group now leading the Italian Communists deserves our qualified support. They should, if the political balance warrants, be given militarily non-sensitive posts in the government. I have no doubt that they will act with complete integrity—for *demagogic* reasons if for no other!

We mustn't lose sight of the fact that Communists can be staunch patriots who will stand up for their country, whatever they may have said in the past. For example, during the War and for a couple of years after the War, the Yugoslav Communists were more closely welded to the Soviet Communist Party than any I can think of. . . .

— . . . you were indeed in some ways more Stalinist than Stalin himself. . . .

DJILAS: . . . we were certainly an absolute dictatorship even though in cultural and economic matters we never quite matched the totalitarian Soviets. But in our ideology, political policies, and security arrangements there was not much to distinguish us from the Soviet Union.

And yet, after the 1948 Cominform affair, we broke with Moscow for reasons of Yugoslav independence and patriotism and gradually put a more and more significant distance between *all* our policies and those pursued by the Russians.

—With zig-zags or in a straight line of development?

DJILAS: The former—and this tells you something about the power of Ideology. It is one of the appalling curiosities of Yugoslav Communist history that

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we were more oppressive in the period immediately *following* our conflict with Moscow than we had been at the time of our struggle for power. For example, our disastrous move to collectivise agriculture was a *post*-Cominform policy. And why did we embark upon it? Because we were so afraid of showing "ideological weakness"—of providing Stalin and Zhdanov with ammunition—that we redoubled our ideological self-righteousness and increased the terror. We were desperate to show that we were principled Communists—no worse than the Soviet comrades.

—Why do you think that the Italian Communists would be less accident-prone than you were? Mightn't **they** *want to show ideological toughness* vis-à-vis *the Socialists (or other political enemies they fear), or indeed fall in with some Soviet Peace offensive or* Détente *offensive if the conditions were right? Mightn't they in certain circumstances make a bid for power and do unpleasant things to "fascists" of their own definition in order to convince themselves (as much as certain foreign comrades) that at heart they are ideologically uncontaminated?*

DJILAS: It is unlikely. First, the Italian Communists have never lived in such close and abject symbiosis with the Soviet Party—either in their political, economic, or ideological programmes—as we have. Second, they have not experienced the bitterly polarising and brutalising impact of a civil war within the Second World War, as we have; and, third, it is most unlikely that they will ever poll a majority in free elections. The latter is a guarantee that, so long as Italy's existing institutions—parliament, the courts, the army and the police—are safe from political interference, the Party's opportunities of abusing its contribution to government are strictly limited. Our tactic, therefore, should be to support the group around Berlinguer on the understanding that their respect for Italy's social order and existing institutions is unconditional.

—I'm confused. Only a few years ago you wrote that any idea of convergence between Communism and the bourgeois order is nonsensical. Technology, you said, may bring the two closer together and even "soften the rigidity of Communist structures." But, you concluded,

> **"Communism falls into its own kind of chaos, and in that measure people become freer, but it does not transform itself into democracy."**

Are you now saying that Berlinguer and his group have so drastically distanced themselves from the legacy of Communism that your analysis of what Communists might or might not do in office simply does not apply to them? You seem to be implying that Italian Communism **has,** *in fact, fallen "into its own kind of chaos" and to that extent the Italian people need not fear for their liberty.*

DJILAS: My support would be limited to reformist groups within the Party, not (as I've said) the Party as a whole, and on the condition that they drop Leninism, stop all talk about the dictatorship of "the proletariat" (which in reality means dictatorship by the Party), sever any remaining links with Moscow, and support existing institutions.

—In which case you have created (as, in your analysis, the Spanish Communists have already created) a Social Democratic Party and buried Communism.

DJILAS: Yes—I would regard that as a most desirable development: one might even coin a new name for this phenomenon and call it "the Social Democracy of Modern Capitalism"! For a time the Italian Communists would probably want to retain the present name of their Party, but I'm certain that in due course they would want to change that too.

—Into what, for example?

DJILAS: Well—"Socialist Workers' Party" or some other name with a similar ring to it would do very nicely. After all, neither the Hungarian nor the Polish Party calls itself a "Communist" Party. The Hungarian is a "Socialist Workers' Party"—in name, even if it is so in nothing else—and the Poles are a "United Workers' Party." Therefore the Italian Communists would have a "respectable" precedent for changing the name of their Party—to say nothing of their urgent need to match the new name with the reform of the Party's structure and constitution.

—Changing the name of the Italian Communist Party would be of quite exceptional significance because it was precisely on the issue of name that the Italian Socialists came under heavy fire from the Comintern at their 1921 Livorno Congress, and were eventually forced to split (under Point 17 in the Comintern's 21 conditions of admission), and gave birth to the "Communist" Party.

DJILAS: So be it. The Comintern is dead. Moscow's hegemony over what is left of the world Communist movement is dead. Communism as we have known it is dead—or ought to be. What, then, is in a name?

III. Ideology—Dead or Alive

IT IS AT LEAST an arguable proposition that Stalin himself was an early national Communist, for "Socialism in one country" implied the exceptional character of the Soviet Union, then of the proletariat, and ultimately of the nation which carried "socialism" to its first complete victory. A "first" in internationalism was quickly (1925–26) translated into a "first" in nationalism.

DJILAS: Stalin may have been an early "national" Communist, but his "national" Communism, too, derives from Lenin. Lenin's great emphasis on the primacy of the Bolsheviks and their Party, on Moscow as the centre of the World Revolution, and

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the Soviet Union as the fatherland of all revolutionaries—coupled as these were with the obeisance and adulation exacted from all the world's Communist Parties—foreshadowed Stalin's more straightforward despotism, still in the name of "the international working class" but fed more and more clearly by a sense of nationalism. All this, to be fair to Stalin, may not have been deliberate policy, but as Russia happened to be the scene of the triumph of Bolshevism, the national peculiarities of Russia impinged on everything the Soviet Communists did and said. Their demand that the Soviet model be universally followed was part of this Russian connection. . . .

— . . . until they ran into an equally determined and (dare one say it?) equally nationalistic Communist Party in Yugoslavia, in 1948, under Tito's and your own leadership, which dented the Soviet model.

DJILAS: We were, up to the time of our break with Moscow, far from being opposed to the Soviet Union, least of all for nationalistic reasons. If anything, we supported the Soviet Union with unbounded loyalty and enthusiasm. Nothing the Russians did was too absurd for us to rationalise and defend, including their claim that Soviet interests were "identical" with the universal interests of Communism.

—Didn't you yourself play a memorable part in this adulation?

DJILAS: Oh, I absolutely did. I *loved*, I sincerely loved the Soviet Union without hindthoughts or reservations. I would not say that I was more devoted to the Soviets than to my own people, but my devotion to the two moved on about the same level.

There was, therefore, no trace of anti-Sovietism in our attitude to Moscow, much less anything one could call "anti-Russianism." On the contrary, we felt a certain Slavic solidarity with the Russians, which to some extent survives in Yugoslavia to this day.

Our conflict with Stalin was solely due to Moscow's ambitious nationalism expressed in a form of imperialism under the guise of Communism. Without that I doubt whether we would have clashed with the Soviet leadership.

—In your conversations with Stalin in 1943–44, did he make you conscious of your junior status? Did he talk down to you? One gathers from your books that, even though you were, especially in your first encounter with Stalin, completely overawed by the great man's presence, you nevertheless expected to be recognised as a Communist leader who was making a revolution under his own steam.

DJILAS: Stalin didn't exactly talk down to me, but he made me feel unmistakably that his was the senior and stronger party. He (and even the Soviet ambassador) always made a point of impressing on us that we were small and dependent, and could enjoy no priority in Soviet thinking. For a long time Stalin was unwilling to recognise that we *had* made a revolution. He stuck to the formula that "the Yugoslav partisans have heroically fought the Occupation and achieved at the same time profound internal change. . . ." That was all.

—But wasn't this due to the Allies' recognition of the exiled Monarch and the Monarchy, and Stalin's reluctance to add trouble to his already turbulent relations with the British?

DJILAS: That did play a part, but Stalin's decisive motivation was his unwillingness to come to terms with the idea that the Soviet monopoly of having made a Communist revolution might be punctured. The whole and, at that time, very potent myth of Communism was *Russian* property. Stalin had no room for another autochthonous and—by implication—rival revolution, for, despite our fulsome praises of him and his country, we were clearly not under his control.

—Which may also account for Stalin's strange message to Churchill in October 1944, urging the British to land in the Northern Adriatic. If Stalin's purpose was to put Tito under pressure and remind him of his dependence on Soviet good will, this would have been one way of doing it.

DJILAS: Possibly so.

—Did you try to explain to Stalin that the dictatorship of the Communist Party in Yugoslavia was a fact, and that all the rest—your "alliance" with bourgeois parties and your relationship with the Monarchy—was window-dressing?

DJILAS: I did try to tell him that we had "Soviet power" in Yugoslavia; closely modelled, moreover, on the Russian example. But Stalin didn't want to know. He opined, to my amazement, that what we had achieved put us somewhere between the Soviet system and de Gaulle! This was blatant nonsense, for, as you know, by 1945 we had established the same monopoly and structure of power as we have today.

—Might he have been genuinely misinformed?

DJILAS: He may not have had the facts clearly put to him. His lieutenants may not have had the courage to tell him things he didn't want to hear, although he must have known of the establishment of Soviets in Montenegro and Herzegovina in 1942 because they had been repudiated by the Comintern. In any case, he never missed an opportunity of letting us know that we were not in the same league as he was, and that our job was to learn from "the Soviet example."

—Isn't this an old and very Russian story?

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DJILAS: Well, in the years immediately preceding the Second World War (and in the first years of the War itself) one influential stream of Continental European thinking repudiated nationalism and conservatism and began to stress "the common European destiny" of the nations of Europe. Russia has never been reached by that influence. The mental darkness and orthodoxy of Czarism and Leninism were intact in Stalin's Russia, exemplified in this case by Stalin's personal attitude to us. He was ensconced in an immovable and narrow ideology. Only the ikons were missing. If you look at the quarrels dividing the present Russian emigration, it is clear enough that some of the current generation of émigrés would also, if they could, install another nationalistic and orthodox order.

—You do not, then, agree with Solzhenitsyn that the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist system is an alien imposition?

DJILAS: No, I don't. It is very, very Russian—uniquely so, really.

—A great deal of the evidence coming out of Russia endorses what you say. Hedrick Smith in his excellent book on "The Russians" (1977) emphasises the Russian people's contempt for their present "permissive" leadership and their readiness to embrace another Stalin. Andrei Sinyavsky has recently written:

"There is a nostalgia for Stalin and at any moment the government can revert to the politics of Stalin's time."

And one might, with many qualifications, go back in Russian history to find peasant insurrectionists such as Bolotnikov and Pugachev rise to great popularity because they claimed to be the "true czars."

DJILAS: We have to see this in perspective. I would not go so far as to say that the Russian people want another *Stalin*, but they do want a strong man, someone quite unlike Brezhnev, whom they perceive as shilly-shallying and feeble. I don't think they want another reign of terror and Gulags; but a tough leader—alas, yes.

—Doesn't it surprise you that after so many years of terror (Eduard Goldstücker has recently observed that virtually the whole of Soviet history has been a reign of "red terror") the Russian people should have learnt so little?

DJILAS: No—it doesn't. They have learnt that they cannot do without an authoritarian, even autocratic ruler. Remember that the whole Western democratic framework—the tradition of free discussion, freedom of the press, pluralism, and so on—has no, or only extremely weak roots in Russian history. This, incidently, makes it easy to deride such embryonic spells of democratic experiment as Russia ever managed to attempt. For example, Solzhenitsyn speaks with mordant contempt of Russian democracy between February and October 1917. What he is not prepared to acknowledge is that this wasn't a democratic dispensation at all, but sheer anarchy. No one, of course, would want *that* kind of a democratic alternative, but democracy as *we* conceive it is a generally disciplined affair under the Rule of Law. Solzhenitsyn's inclination to identify democracy with chaos under the 1917 Provisional Government tells us more about Solzhenitsyn and the large (as I suspect) constituency he has in the Soviet Union, than about the merits and demerits of democracy.

"I **loved,** *I sincerely loved the Soviet Union without hindthoughts or reservations. . . .*

"The Soviet leaders' rule is anchored in ideology, as the divine right of kings was in Christianity, and therefore their imperialism, too, has to be ideological or else it commands no legitimacy. . . .

". . . it is an unsupportable American hope that the Kremlin may be pressured or humoured into a type of comprehensive détente *which would guarantee Soviet moderation. . . ."*

That said, it is wise to bear in mind that here and there Russian history does show examples of incipient democratic change. There was a nucleus of shared ownership and participatory decision-making in the traditional Russian *mir* (the old collectivistic agrarian community), and another possible basis for "liberal" development in the *zemstvo* local-government system created by Alexander II, and then largely rendered ineffective after his assassination. Even among the early Russian Marxists, men like Peter Struve rejected the revolutionary Jacobinist strain in Russian Marxism; and Georgi Plekhanov repudiated the idea of a conspiratorial vanguard of professional revolutionaries which Lenin had advocated in *What Is To Be Done?*. Herzen and his influence are too well known to need comment; and one can, of course, find earlier precedents, of admittedly doubtful comparability, such as the *Boyarska Duma* which existed even before the reign of Ivan the Terrible.

But, for all that, the dominant strain in Russian thinking is autocracy, orthodoxy, and nationalism.

—It is interesting to observe, though, that liberal critics of Russian radicalism at the turn of the century were already aware that the fiercest Marxist opponents of the Autocracy were themselves potential autocrats. Writing in 1909, Semen Frank, one of the authors of "Vekhi" ("Landmarks") remarked with brutal candour:

"With ascetic rigour towards itself and others, fanatical hatred for enemies and heretics, sectarian bigotry and an unlimited despotism fed on the awareness of its own infallibility, this monastic order labours to satisfy earthly, too 'human' concerns. . . ."

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DJILAS: Yes—but what you cannot say is that *Vekhi* became a significant popular influence. Under the Bolsheviks it did, of course, become censored reading. Indeed, as soon as it appeared in 1909, Lenin spoke of it as an encyclopaedia of liberal "renegadism", more harmful and dishonest than the worst of Pobedonostsev!

What I find fascinating is that Solzhenitsyn, Maximov, and other critics of the *present* Russian régime should echo the opinions which some of the authors of *Vekhi* (Berdyayev and Peter Struve for example) held of the socialist opponents of Czarism. Certainly *Vekhi* was remarkably prescient—and proved, all in all, remarkably ineffective.

—Coming back to the primacy of the Soviet Union and the Soviet people vis-à-vis *late-comers in the "socialist" family—Stalin made one thinly veiled reference, in a conversation with yourself, to the legitimacy of imposing, in the wake of a victorious War, the Soviet system as well as Russian power on the countries which had fallen or were then falling into Soviet hands. His remarks were couched in general terms to the effect that*

> **"whoever occupies a territory also imposes on it his own social system . . . as far as his army can reach."**

Was Stalin, in fact, saying that he regarded the Second World War as the Russian people's **"jihad"** *(Holy War) on behalf of Bolshevism?*

DJILAS: I believe this was what he was implying. But whether he was thinking of the Russian people's war on behalf of Bolshevism, or Bolshevism's war on behalf of Russian nationalism, is another matter. Stalin told us repeatedly that Communism was to be spread by Soviet power—there was no other reliable or even desirable means. He had a missionary feeling about this, but at heart he was motivated by Russian Nationalism. Only the slogans that he used to deceive the simple-minded—and those who *wanted* to be deceived—were socialist and internationalist.

—Didn't Dimitrov express a similar view?

DJILAS: Yes, he did—he told me on one occasion that the principal agency in the expansion of Communism was the Soviet Union and the Red Army. His confidence in the inherent magnetism of a Communist society—like Stalin's—was, shall we say, very modest.

But let me say another word here about slogans. The importance of ideology for the Soviet leadership—*any* Soviet leadership—is seldom understood in the West. For an American or Englishman "imperialism" and "expansionism" have to do with financial investment, technology, raw materials, and the like. Not so for the Soviet leaders. Their rule is anchored in Ideology, as the divine right of kings was in Christianity; and therefore their imperialism, too, has to be ideological or else it commands no legitimacy. This is why the men in the Kremlin can lose no territory once acquired, why they cannot abandon friends and allies no matter how objectively burdensome they may have become to them (can you imagine the USSR ratting on the Shah of Iran?), or admit alternative interpretations of the true faith. This is also why it is an unsupportable American hope that the Kremlin may be pressured or humoured into a type of comprehensive *détente* which would guarantee Soviet moderation in Africa and Asia as part of a SALT settlement, or any settlement. No Soviet leader can do that without abdicating his title to leadership and jeopardising the justification of Soviet rule.

Ideology in the Soviet Union is both *dead*—and very much *alive*! Dead at the level of faith, alive as an indispensable rationale of policy.

IV. Earlier Perspectives

YOU WILL, I'm sure, not hold it against me if I remind you of your own spirited support of the expansion of Soviet rule before the War and throughout the War. For example: In 1939 you approved of the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact because

> **"we had . . . absolute confidence in the Soviet Union. . . . We saw no fundamental difference between Hitler's Germany and the Western Democracies."**

You were, in the same year, opposed to the mobilisation of the Yugoslav forces because you thought it was

> **"conducted under pressure from London and Paris, and to satisfy national aspirations. Besides, Germany and the Soviet Union were acting in concert. . . ."**

In the Yugoslav Communist Party's (1939) "Theses of the Central Committee", which you yourself wrote, the Anglo-French war against Germany was branded as "unjust" and "imperialistic" even before it was known to you that Moscow, too, would condemn it as "unjust" and "imperialistic." Later in 1939 you were "thrilled by the partition of Poland . . ." because "the Soviet Union was broadening the territory of socialism."

Even in the case of the Soviet–Finnish war you believed, in 1941, that Finland was a bourgeois country, and that the Soviet Union had every right to "protect" its interests and to assist in the "liberation" of the Finnish people.

> **"We accepted, without reservation, the explanations put forth by Soviet propaganda, not because we had to, but because we wanted to and because we genuinely believed in them."**

I hasten to add that I have taken all these quotations from your own self-critical writings over the past twenty years or so. I am, therefore, revealing nothing you have not yourself revealed and analysed more radically and at greater length than we can do in this conversation. Nevertheless, I'd be

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interested to know how these views strike you in the light of what you have told me about the current dangers of Soviet expansionism.

DJILAS: The views and attitudes which you have quoted, and which *I* deliberately quoted against myself, were part and parcel of Communist attitudes in pre-War and War-time Europe. Loyalty to the Soviet Union was a Comintern requirement which we needed no persuasion to adopt. This is too well known a feature of Communist history to need further explanation. But some of the details might.

The Finnish War posed a slightly tricky problem for us. True, we did believe that the victory of the Red Army, wherever and under whatever circumstances it occurred, was a victory for Socialism and a defeat of Capitalism—but in Finland the Red Army wasn't spectacularly successful. Indeed it was spectacularly unsuccessful and humiliated, and it avoided defeat only at the price of extraordinary casualties. Also, reports were reaching us that the Finnish people would have nothing to do with "socialism", and that their unexpected military resistance enjoyed popular support. All this might have sown real doubts in our minds had we not been Communists and (which came to the same thing) Stalinists.

"The partition of Poland seemed to me especially worthy of support—even today I would be prepared to argue that Stalin did the right thing. But by June 1948, we, the Yugoslav Communists, who had uncritically obeyed Stalin's every whim and fancy, came personally face-to-face with the inhuman face of 'socialism'. . . ."

Personally, I managed to convince myself that I really believed the sort of argument you have quoted from my writings—that the Finnish people were being "liberated" by the Red Army; that the Soviets were extending the rule of "socialism"; that Finland was part of a capitalist plot against "the fortress of socialism", and so on. And when, in the Finnish Peace Treaty, the USSR took only those bits of Finnish territory which were essential to the security of Leningrad and Murmansk, I managed to suppress any embryonic doubt I might have entertained about the justice of Soviet military action.

The annexation of the Baltic Republics and the partition of Poland didn't bother me at all. Indeed, I was fully in favour of both. The occupation and annexation of the three Baltic states in the summer of 1940 seemed to me to have been supported by "revolutionary forces" and sanctioned by "plebiscites." We thought of these countries as territories wrongly torn out of the flesh of Russia at the end of a lost war, and now justly reintegrated to the benefit of "world socialism." We didn't at the time know about the Secret Protocol and the Supplementary Provisions of the Ribbentrop–Molotov Pact which had assigned these states to the Soviet orbit—but I don't think we would have cared if we had. The Estonians, Lithuanians and Latvians had a long record of "anti-Sovietism", and that was enough to condemn them in our eyes.

The partition of Poland seemed to me especially worthy of support—even today I would be prepared to argue that Stalin did the right thing. You see, Chamberlain's and Daladier's attitude to the Soviet Union was so treacherous and generally contemptible that Stalin's decision to help himself to Poland's Byelorussian and Ukrainian-speaking territories appeared to me justified even though it was done in collusion with Hitler—with whom, at the time, we had no reason to quarrel. Moreover, we regarded the Polish government as deeply reactionary. Personally I had welcomed the Soviet-Nazi Pact in the expectation that it would create favourable opportunities for the Soviet Union to spread Communism at the expense of the two warring sides—and here, in fact, it was, happening faster than anyone could have expected . . . ! This was the framework of our thinking. . . .

—Until the expansion of Soviet power began to impinge on the Yugoslav Communists—which brings us back to Stalin's reluctance to share his revolutionary entitlement with late-comers from the Balkans.

DJILAS: The War taught us some bitter lessons, what with Stalin's support of the Monarchy and his long hesitation between Draza Mihajlovic and the Partisans. Stalin's veto of the Bulgarian-Rumanian plan for a customs union (even though it had been put forward by Dimitrov, whom Stalin trusted) and his anxiety (indeed his order) to force us into a Federation with the Bulgarians and Albanians made it more and more clear to us that Stalin was looking for *satellites*, not allies, and that no relations between "the people's democracies" would be tolerated unless they served Soviet interests and were under complete Soviet control. By June 1948, history had come full circle. The Yugoslav Communists—who had quite uncritically obeyed Stalin's every whim and fancy—came face to face with the inhuman face of "socialism": Stalin's determination to expand and to dominate.

V. Hungarians & Czechs

LET ME TRY to look at your attitude to "National-Communism" in the light of the 1956 Polish and Hungarian upheavals. You were strongly in favour of both and had high hopes about the personal leadership of Wladislaw

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Gomulka and Imre Nagy. You praised Gomulka as "a man who is unusually honest, brave and modest" and would not hesitate to choose "freedom and independence rather than totalitarian rule and dependence on Moscow." You praised Nagy for having "courageously decided to sacrifice the party and Communist power . . . for the sake of his country and freedom." And what is perhaps even more important, you thought that the programme of Nagy's short-lived government would—with certain reservations—serve as a model to the rest of Eastern Europe including the Soviet Union itself.

> **"In no case can the mass movement be halted [you wrote] whether it follows the Yugoslav–Polish pattern, that of Hungary, or some new pattern which combines the two.... And just as Yugoslav Communism ... initiated the crisis of Soviet imperialism, that is, the inevitable birth of national Communism, in the same way the revolution in Hungary means the beginning of the end of Communism generally!"**

It is fair to say that East European history since 1956 has, in the main, disappointed these expectations—though the West European repercussions of the 1948 Yugoslav and 1968 Czechoslovak heresies may be said to be in line with your prediction.

DJILAS: My reading of Imre Nagy was right—I was dead wrong about Gomulka. But you have to see the words you have quoted in the context in which they were written. They appeared on 19 November 1956, barely a few days after the suppression of the Hungarian uprising and at the very beginning of Hungary's long general strike. The important thing in those days was to give all possible encouragement to hard-pressed Hungarians and Poles. The small print could wait for another day.

I had very great respect for Nagy—he was a man of unshakeable integrity and his gut reactions were right. But he was weak on theory and his understanding of the Soviet Union left a great deal to be desired. Mind you, he understood the rules of the Soviet game better than the Czechs did in 1968—no one could have understood them *less* than they did!—but his general comprehension of what the Russians and indeed the World Communist movement were about at that particular time was very narrow. For example, he put his fate in the hands of Tito, thinking that Yugoslavia was a "liberal" country—which was nonsense. Nevertheless, if Imre Nagy's government had survived, Hungary today would be a democratic country, a prosperous country, and one many of her neighbours would want to emulate.

Gomulka was a very different kettle of fish. He was certainly dissatisfied with Soviet domination, with the state of the economy, and so on; but, unlike Nagy, he refused to risk changing the system. When the chips were down, he opted for repression, inching closer and closer to an unquestioning acceptance of Soviet methods and models.

The comparison that interests me most is that between Hungary and Czechoslovakia. On the face of it, Hungary was crushed; but it would be a mistake to think that the 1956 Revolution had been wasted. The Russians saved their hegemony—but, after the Hungarian uprising, had to change their tune throughout Eastern Europe. Most of the East European countries were eventually granted a measure of autonomy—above all, Hungary herself with her rather impressive cultural and economic "liberalism."

The reform movement of "the Prague Spring", by contrast, achieved nothing except occupation and repression.

—Are you saying that the Czechs ought to have stood up to the Russians as the Hungarians had done?

DJILAS: Well, history teaches that every armed uprising achieves *something*. It doesn't always achieve victory, but it invariably gains you something. I am not an *unconditional* supporter of revolutions, but I do have this lesson of history deeply imprinted on my mind.

The Czechs didn't fight. They didn't *want* to fight. The question of armed resistance to a Soviet invasion had been thrashed out (to the best of my knowledge) in their Politburo, and it was decided that fighting the Russians would lead to useless and unjustified bloodshed. Well—there was no bloodshed, but neither did the Czechs get anywhere.

You see, we have had in our own history many and often bitter differences with the Hungarians, but we as a nation respect them. They are a strong and proud people. And Stalin, come to think of it, also had a healthy respect for them. He said to me on one occasion that nations which had been ruled by powerful aristocracies, like the Hungarians and the Poles, were strong nations. Stalin was a great admirer of powerful states and powerful institutions even when he was opposed to them; and his fear of the Hungarians and the Poles was a revealing backhanded recognition of Polish and Hungarian stamina.

—I can't remember having read this in any of your books....

DJILAS: No, I didn't think it was very important, but in the context of our present discussion it probably is.

—The Katyn massacre, then, would be in line with Stalin's thinking....

DJILAS: Oh, certainly. Whether you looked upon the Polish officer corps as the equivalent of an aristocracy, or simply as officers who would stand

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in the way of your imperialistic designs—you wanted to get rid of them. And Stalin did. Stalin, as I say, had a very fine appreciation of what makes an institution, an army, or a government work . . . or cease working.

—He may also have had vivid memories of his experiences as a war commissar on the Polish front in 1920, when the Poles under Pilsudski, and his own mistaken military tactics, landed him in deep trouble—

DJILAS: That too. Moreover—as a kind of substitute Czar, which he undoubtedly was—Stalin was a legatee of the Polish–Russian relationship in the 19th century! None of this would have endeared the Poles to him.

—You have said that the Czechs might have wrested **some** *concessions from the Soviet Union if they had put up a fight when the Russians invaded—as the Hungarians had. This raises the question of the price to be paid for national integrity or the pursuit of messianic ideas, whether of the Left or of the Right.*

In the last War the Czechs offered no worthwhile resistance, but when the War ended, their cities were intact and so (with the exception of the Jews) was the vast majority of their population. The Yugoslavs, by contrast, fought both the Axis powers and one another, with the result that their numbers were virtually decimated and entire regions of the country were almost depopulated. Ancient feuds between Serbs and Croats, Moslems and Orthodox were not only not healed in any common resistance to the invaders, but were reactivated and exacerbated. I will not go into details because, after all, the most eloquent and sobering testimony to Yugoslavia's war, and her civil war within the war, is your own book "Wartime."

When you think of those 1,700,000 men, women and children who lost their lives (a figure, let me add, which is more than three times that of the number killed or missing for the entire British Empire with a population of about 600 million), I wonder whether economising on human lives isn't a more profound national interest than national honour, or territorial integrity, or opposition to foreign rule, or the pursuit of the promise of a good and just society.

DJILAS: I have some difficulty with your statistics. 1,700,000 is a much exaggerated figure, put about by Yugoslav propaganda. The casualties were, of course, immensely high—far too high—but historians who have examined our losses tell me that they were closer to the 1,200,000–1,300,000 mark.

But to come to your main point. We have to look upon the civil war, not with the wisdom of hindsight, but in the historical context in which it occurred; and that context was the oppressive hegemony of the Serbs over virtually everyone else—Croats, Macedonians, Albanians, and the rest. Peoples such as the Albanians, with a population of several hundred thousand, had no schools in their national language and no hope of national emancipation. Our peasants were extremely poor and backward; our ruling groups were corrupt; and the Royal Court was riddled with intrigue and favouritism. Such a system couldn't survive and didn't deserve to. The people who were ultimately responsible for the civil war were therefore not those who were driven to revolution, but those men and women who had, decade after decade, done nothing to lessen injustices and improve the lot of the ordinary citizen. What do you expect people to feel when they see all the wealth, privilege, authority, and prestige rigidly concentrated in the hands of a small élite, while the rest has to do without? I wouldn't want to go on record with the historically crude assertion that the "ruling class" as such was *consciously* responsible—rather was it the case that various ruling groups, carrying the burden of centuries of antiquated traditions, found themselves in a position where, willingly or unwillingly, they acted as they did. But history-in-the-making doesn't respect such fine distinctions.

"We stumbled from emergency to emergency, from chaos to chaos, from massacre to being massacred. It is a chilling thought that much of the cruelty of our revolution was inspired by revolutionary idealism. . . ."

Once a revolution has been unleashed on the premise that old injustices must be put right under a new social order, it acquires its own momentum and pays no heed to the admonitions of moralists, historians, and political scientists. We stumbled from emergency to emergency, from chaos to chaos, from massacre to being massacred in a constantly changing and shifting pattern. The element of "voluntarism", to use a Marxist word, is paramount in revolution. One is the victim of unforeseen circumstances in which no quarter is expected or given, and the lives of individual people are of absolutely secondary importance.

—This is clear enough from "Wartime", which I found chilling reading.

DJILAS: It is—and it is an even more chilling thought that much of the cruelty of our revolution was inspired by revolutionary *idealism*. We had sound ideological explanations for the brutality, the killings, and all the other unpleasant things that had to be done. Of course, *if* one has a choice between evolution and revolution one should choose evolution. But this choice is not always open to us. What do you do with monsters like Amin or Somoza? You *have* to rise up against them and put them down.

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VI. Fanaticism—Left and Right

AND YET, FOR ALL THAT, I feel there is a point where the revolutionary or counter-revolutionary struggle turns into sheer carnage, and the scale and horror of the devastation are such that it ceases to make any difference whether the villages were burnt down and their inhabitants slaughtered by this or that party in the fighting. Your own *Wartime* made me especially conscious of the need to preserve life even at a certain sacrifice of missionary zeal, patriotism, and honour.

DJILAS: You seem to be implying that we were responsible for the worst of the killings. This was not so. The Communists never shot women and children. The Ustashis and Chetniks did—deliberately, in large numbers, and under unspeakable conditions. That they, and especially the Ustashis, did not manage to massacre even larger numbers than they actually did was entirely due to the fact that we stopped them and destroyed them.

—But you did, on both (or was it three or four?) sides, renew old tribal feuds. The open-ended chain of revenge and counter-revenge was given a fresh lease of life.

DJILAS: The massacres—between Moslems and the Orthodox, Serbs and Croats—were happening in any case. If anything, Communist intervention helped to limit the disaster because often we fought both sides at the same time. I am, of course, not saying that the Communists were angels—far from it! We too, had a good deal to answer for.

—"Angelic" is certainly not an adjective I would readily associate with any aspect of your struggle. One of many instances of savagery that sticks in my mind is your description of the destruction of a captured Italian battalion:

> **"All the Italian troops—the entire Third Battalion of the 259th Regiment of the Murge Division—were put to death. . . . Many corpses were tossed into the Rama River. Several got caught among the logs, and I shared with our officers a malicious joy at the thought of Italian officers on the bridges and embankments of Mostar stricken with horror at the sight of the Neretva choked with the corpses of their soldiers."**

A bestial thing to do and to enjoy.

DJILAS: Oh, absolutely; but let me tell you what grotesque reasons drove us to do it. There was no *military* necessity to have this battalion mown down. We could have taken them prisoner, or we could have disarmed them and sent them back to their lines—as we sometimes did. Why didn't we do either? Because we were under the compelling logic of the glorious Soviet example. We had surrounded these troops and called for their surrender; but they refused.

Now, there was an unwritten rule in those days in the Red Army never to spare German troops once they had got themselves surrounded and refused an appeal to capitulate. Well, we could not, we thought, show ourselves to be less tough than the Russians—and that is why, when the Italians were eventually forced to surrender, we killed the whole battalion.

—What about the "malicious joy"?

DJILAS: It was, as in so many other cases, a matter of ideological implacability. Such, you might say, is the nature of man in wartime conditions. I'm not proud of it—I simply acknowledge the fact.

—Let me take another case: When you sanctioned the execution of the Tadic family you had presumably no Soviet model to follow?

DJILAS: That was an entirely different case. Tadija Tadic was a young student and commissar of one of our partisan units—naturally, a Party member. He had an uncle, Spasoje, who had gone over to the Chetniks and was hiding (as we heard on the local grapevine) in the neighbouring woods. We sent out a squad to kill him, but Tadija's loyalty to his uncle got the better of him. He warned him and, instead of making good his escape, Spasoje grabbed a gun and shot dead two of our comrades and wounded others. Tadija was arrested, whereupon the whole Tadic clan—a large family—rose up in rebellion. We arrested their leaders, all of them Party members. After an investigation by two of our comrades, four of the Tadices, including young Tadija, were sentenced to death and executed.

This was a terrible blow to the Tadic clan because they were not our enemies. Such indeed was their loyalty that they went on fighting on our side as Partisans, and many of them gave their lives for our cause. Ljubomir Tadic is today a well-known Yugoslav philosopher. He only escaped execution because we considered him too young to be shot.

—What is Ljubomir Tadic's attitude to you today?

DJILAS: He has never forgiven me, and he may be right—or he may not.

—Could you not have saved the Tadices from execution, seeing that young Tadija had been brought up by his uncle as his father, and owed him a loyalty older and deeper than any he could have owed to a political organisation?

DJILAS: We had these men shot because they had broken army and party discipline. It was, I grant you, an extremely drastic measure, whatever our reasons! I am still disturbed by the thought of what we had done, although I would not exactly say that I feel guilty about it.

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—Why do you make this fine distinction? You were in charge of the operation. . . .

DJILAS: Yes—if I had tried to stop the killing, the consequences for me as a leader would have been negative. I would have been accused of softness, of opportunism, of being unsuitable to lead Partisans.

*—**Had** you any intention of stopping the executions?*

DJILAS: No, I had absolutely no such intention. In the constraining conditions of war and revolution I had to act the way I did.

—But isn't this the standard excuse made by members of Hitler's armed forces when accused of having shot hostages and other civilians?

DJILAS: I personally think that the ordinary German soldiers cannot be held guilty for shootings of this sort. What could they have done? They were under military discipline—they had to execute orders or face execution themselves. A refusal to obey meant being shot on the spot by their officers. War is a hard taskmaster.

Some years ago I had a long talk in New York with Hannah Arendt—one of the most penetrating analytical minds of our time, even though she often drew (about Communist policies, for example) unwarranted conclusions. I asked her why she thought Hitler decided to exterminate the Jews. I told her that I could see no rational motivation for it. I could have understood (I argued) if, in the first flush of victory, he had taken property away from the Jews, if only to reward the *SS* men who had helped him to power. I could also have understood other measures: Jews are an international nation with contacts in many countries which Hitler knew would cause him a lot of trouble. So he might have decided to control the Jews by putting some of their leaders into camps and drafting their menfolk into unarmed units of the German Army to repair railway lines, dig trenches, and the like. They would not have made a great contribution to the German war-effort but would have been of *some* use.

Given the fact that the Jews were an international nation, and given Hitler's political thinking, there was, I argued, a case for saying that they represented a danger to him—but why *kill* them?

—Some of that argument is familiar to us from the Soviet Union, too. . . .

DJILAS: Yes, the Soviets feel threatened by the same internationalism even though their anti-Semitism is dressed up in an outwardly more respectable ideology.

In any case, I wanted to know what explanation Hannah Arendt had to offer for Hitler's extermination of six million Jews.

Well, she said she had no rational explanation except the simple but persuasive one that the whole ideology of Nazism, in which Jews were assigned the role of vermin, militated irreversibly for their destruction. The economic factor didn't matter, the loss of highly trained brainpower didn't matter—nothing mattered except the relentless logic of ideology.

—But, surely, you knew that without Hannah Arendt having to explain it to you?

DJILAS: I did and I didn't—I wanted to hear it from the lips of an eagle-eyed observer, herself Jewish, and critical of the Jews' non-resistance during the War.

—I take it you are drawing some parallel between your attitude to the Tadic clan and the Nazis' attitude to the Jews?

DJILAS: Yes—the parallel is the blinding and devastating effect of ideology. No matter what your ideology may be, once you believe that you are in the possession of some infallible truth, you become a combatant in a religious war. There is nothing to prevent you from robbing, burning and slaughtering in the name of your truth, for you are doing it with a perfectly clear conscience—indeed the truth in your possession makes it your duty to pursue it with an iron logic and unwavering will.

What I'm saying is that no revolution can take off without a cast-iron commitment to ideology, and that ideology demands the liquidation of your enemies, real or imagined. That is one reason why Stalin had the Polish officers shot at Katyn (we have already discussed some of the others). That incidentally also explains Pol Pot and Cambodia.

Our own commitment to the Communist ideology was just as firm. We held it with evangelical certainty and believed that whatever we did in its name was rendering a service to truth and the future happiness of our country and mankind.

—Do you now think you were misguided?

DJILAS: I don't think that is an entirely fair question. One would, of course, wish that none of these things had happened; but, given the need to counter the invaders and destroy the old régime, we had to have an ideology that would inspire general confidence and impress on our fighting men that we were struggling for a just, the only just, cause. That belief demanded the use of means which, under different circumstances, I would have repudiated and rejected.

—To be fair to the Nazis, though, they put their cards on the table from the very beginning, and let it be known to anyone who cared to listen that they regarded Jews, Blacks, Russians and Poles as subhuman and would treat them accordingly—as they did. But the Communists claimed to be spreading sweetness and light. They had liberation, emancipation and equality written on their banners; and even though they were theoretically committed to the destruction of capitalism and bourgeois rule, their operative message (anyhow since the Popular Front period) has been one of national unity and the cooperation of all "progressive" forces. During the War,

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this was their emphasis to the exclusion of almost any other. I would, therefore, suggest that one would expect Communists to want to be judged by higher standards than those applying to members of Hitler's armed forces. When you say that a soldier is a soldier and an ideology is an ideology, you seem to me to be putting the wartime behaviour of the Yugoslav Communists on a par with the Nazis.

DJILAS: What you are asking, to pursue your parallel, is whether we practised an automatic kind of class-discrimination against the bourgeoisie, analogous to the Nazis' persecution of the Jews. Well, it would be wrong for me to indulge in any retroactive idealisation of Communist behaviour during the War—but we didn't. We had a highly developed sense of *ideological* discrimination—sniffing out opponents and branding them as enemies. *Class* discrimination was not a conspicuous feature of our day-to-day policies. We did, of course, say that we would liquidate the bourgeoisie as a class, and we did; but we were always prepared to accept individual bourgeois elements provided that they wanted to work with us and we were satisfied that they were fit to do so. But the discrimination we practised on *ideological* grounds was fierce—because ideology was, to be completely frank with you, only a name for us under which we could summarily deal with our opponents whoever they might be. This was the rationale which governed our behaviour during the War and for some years after the War too.

That said, I cannot allow that—apart from similarities in the trappings of totalitarian propaganda, mass organisation, and the like—Communism and Nazism are at all comparable and this is a point that Hannah Arendt, too, got entirely wrong. The *basic* Communist message has always been libertarian, humanitarian, and transnational, and in this vital respect Communism has always been at variance with Nazism. That is why—until Stalin, and to a small extent since Stalin—Soviet Communism has been suffused with undercurrents of democratic heresies. That is also my reason for thinking that, whereas there is no way leading out of Nazism to a humanised variety of Nazism, Communism carries within it its own emergency exits—not in the shape of an *improved* type of Communism (for that, as I have said, is also impossible) but in a certain willingness to give way, under pressure, to new forces which will first make nonsense of the Communist system and eventually replace the Communist system.

"I had absolutely no intention of stopping the killing. In the constraining conditions of war and revolution I had to act the way I did. Once you believe you are in the possession of some infallible truth, you become a combatant in a religious war. No revolution can take off without a cast-iron commitment to ideology, and that ideology demands the liquidation of your enemies, real or imagined."

VII. Catechismic Communism

WHEN YOU SAY that Communism will eventually give way, under pressure, to some new form of government—do you have the Soviet Union as much in mind as some of the satellite countries?

DJILAS: No. In Poland and Hungary, for example, where Communism is a foreign import, the erosion of totalitarian rule is already well under way and will, given half a chance, go much further. But Russia is a very different proposition. We have already noted that the Russians like strong government. The Soviet establishment feel they haven't got one now, and my hunch is that after Brezhnev they will opt for a more single-minded and more austere leader—

—with full popular approval?

DJILAS: Yes, with the masses applauding. Let me remind you of something that Communists, in their anxiety to ignore or minimise the Stalinist past, tend to sweep under the carpet: *Stalin enjoyed majority support.* Of course, if someone had had the liberty to explain to the Russian public, in the framework of Western-style free elections, what Stalinism really stood for, Stalin might not have won through. But within the system as it was, Stalin was well supported. He had the Armed Forces, the Apparat, and the Party firmly behind him; and my impression was that those 45 million peasants who had been brought in from the villages and turned into industrial workers were also for him. This means that all the active, vocal sections of Soviet society endorsed the rule of the dictator, identifying with it the growth of Soviet power and the alleged progress of Soviet society. This tells us something about the future as well as the past.

—John Strachey and other critics of the Soviet Union have often underlined the fallacy of the assumption that the "progress" and especially the industrialisation of Russian society were due to the Soviet system. Without Stalin, and indeed without the Bolshevik revolution, Russia—they argued—would have advanced much faster and escaped the carnage of Stalinism. The sacrifices, Strachey observed, were appalling—"the results commonplace." Zbigniew Brzezinski (taking a leaf out of Trotsky) has indeed gone a step further, identifying Stalin as one of the great wreckers of the Soviet system and one of the great benefactors of its

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Western opponents. For who else, he asked, could have subverted the Red Army, undermined Soviet agriculture and the self-confidence of Soviet society with anything like the efficiency of Stalin.

DJILAS: Strachey's argument is certainly right. Between the turn of the century and 1914 Russia led the world in economic growth and industrialisation. I have no doubt that this would have continued. My estimate is that a genuinely democratic, Western-style Russia would possess a more balanced and more prosperous economy than the Soviet Union does today. There would probably be less steel and coal, but more to eat and infinitely more consumer satisfaction. "Economic success" could certainly not begin to qualify as justification for Stalin's despotism.

But then, contrary to cherished beliefs, revolutions are made in the minds of men, not in their bellies (or not only in their bellies). In October 1917, as at the time of the French Revolution, only political innocents would have had the folly to argue that the people had better stick to the old régime because *that* would, on balance, secure them a higher GNP!

—However disappointing the economic performance of the Soviet system may be, would you agree that considerable social and cultural progress has been made?

DJILAS: There has been no such progress. Progress has been restricted to the introduction of industrial technologies and the like, but one can hardly call that progress any more than the possession of a bathroom is proof of "culture" (a favourite Russian notion).

But let me add one thing: if Russia had been allowed to develop into a Western-style democracy, Europe's current fear of Soviet power would seem puny in comparison with the fear which a self-confident, democratic, undoubtedly nationalistic and economically strong Russia would quite rightly inspire. Brzezinski has a great deal of truth on his side, not only in the sense that Stalin demoralised the Soviet system, but that Bolshevism as a whole has done a great disservice to Russia's potential power.

—Aren't we then driven to the absurd conclusion that, having achieved strategic parity with the US and expanded to the four corners of the earth, the Soviet Union is **weak**, *or at any rate weaker than it might be?*

DJILAS: It is not so absurd in the light of another factor we have already touched on: the appeal of ideology no matter how cynically it may be exploited by the Soviet leaders. This is Moscow's passport to the rest of the world. Ideas, even false ideas, are powerful weapons. It is quite possible, as the Soviet case proves, to have a weak economy, a very strong military posture, and a seemingly invincible ideology. The net result is strength, despite the underlying weakness.

—My impression is that a powerful current of Russian nationalism is waiting in the background to make itself felt in Soviet life. If so, the atomisation of Russian society, of which Solzhenitsyn complains, may be nearing its end; and we may soon have additional reasons for being apprehensive about Soviet power.

DJILAS: This may be so. *Samizdat* literature carries a very strong strain of nationalism. Some of it represents a revival of orthodoxy and expresses an ambition to Christianise mankind under Russian auspices—no less. Its rationale is close to the Slavophiles' of the last century: never before has the Russian state been as powerful as it is today. Undermine the Soviet system but use its gains for the expansion of Orthodoxy—it is a bizarre claim, but it is being made in all seriousness. My impression is that this very right-wing, chauvinistic conservatism is the one most Russians support—not the Westernising rationalism of Sakharov. It is, of course, rabidly anti-Semitic as well. The curious thing is that all these strains, although officially disallowed, have found a life of their own *within* the state and the party.

—My original question, then, may be simply answered: the liberalisation and Westernisation of Soviet society is as unlikely as the liberalisation and Westernisation of Russian society. Both (to the extent that they are separate) favour authority, paternalism, spoon-feeding, and a catechismic kind of Yes-No mental diet.

DJILAS: Unfortunately this is true. Stalin understood his Russians extremely well and made full use of their need to be given a simple, easily digestible fare. In *Problems of Leninism*, for example, but in other books as well, he reduced Marxism and Leninism to the mental level of worthy but somewhat slow-witted bureaucrats who didn't have the time or the curiosity to be bothered with the obscure dialectics of the founding fathers:

"Where will the chain break in the near future?"
"... where it is weakest", said Stalin.

"Is the thesis that Leninism is the theory and tactics of the proletarian revolution correct?"
"I think it is correct", wrote Stalin.

"Is it possible in the present phase of Socialist construction to reach a real and durable agreement with the middle peasant ... ?"
"It is impossible."

"Did the peasants act wisely in supporting the October Revolution?"
"Yes, they acted wisely."

" ... what is needed is that the government support the collective-farm peasants to the utmost with men and money. ... Have you got such a government?"
"Yes, you have. It is called the Workers' and Peasants' Soviet Government", said Stalin.

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And so on, *ad infinitum*.

Mind you, it took considerable ingenuity and a sound knowledge of Marx and Lenin to filter the contradictions, qualifications, and plain waffle out of Lenin and present it with Stalin's Either/Or type of certainty. But false or not, Stalin satisfied a need, not only in the Soviet Party but throughout international Communism as well, where his dull, scholastic, but easily assimilated compendium became very influential. Stalin's role as a theorist has been much underrated. The skill with which he linked Marxist–Leninist theory to power and turned it into a guide to action had great appeal and gave him enormous strength.

I have little time for people who say: "Ah, but such simple-minded stuff cannot be taken seriously!" Little do they understand the practical needs of political fanaticism. Hitler's *Mein Kampf*, too, used to be dismissed by Left-Bank sophisticates as *badly written*! Badly written it certainly was, but that wasn't quite the point about *Mein Kampf*.

—Is there an audience for "catechismic" Communism in the Western world today—in your sense of the word and not, of course, the one Bakunin advocated in his "Catechism for a Revolutionary"?

DJILAS: I don't think sophisticated Euro-Communists in the Spanish, Italian and French Parties would put up with Stalin's heavy-handed didacticism. Yet the depressing fact is that, with one or two partial exceptions, every Communist Party in the world is *still* Stalinist in structure and run by Stalinist methods. These methods may be less brutal than those that were used in the 1930s or 1950s, but there is no getting away from the fact that "ideological unity", that great battle cry of Communism which ruled the lives of the Communist Parties under Stalin, still rules them today. "Ideological unity" was Stalin's contribution to the theory of Communist tactics. Lenin demanded "Party discipline", and even though he had given certain hostages to Stalin's revisionism (as for example in *Materialism and Empirio-criticism*), Lenin tolerated a great deal of controversy and democratic discussion within the Party, while Stalin didn't.

Method is all. Whether internal democracy exists or doesn't exist in a Communist Party is the only yardstick whereby we can estimate a Party's intention to respect or not to respect the rules of democracy in a free parliamentary polity. That is why I incline to advance a qualified measure of confidence to the Spanish and Italian Parties. These accommodate a good deal of internal dissent even though they have not abrogated "democratic centralism." But if a Communist Party insists on the Stalinist device of coercing its minority for the sake of "ideological unity", we have no reason to believe that it will tolerate the views, much less the organised existence, of its political opponents in the wider arena of national politics.

"Ideology is Moscow's passport to the rest of the world. Ideas, even false ideas, are powerful weapons."

—We are back to the oldest of questions: the great appeal of Communism relies on the fact that it is a matter of faith, yet you want Communists to observe the rationality and pragmatism of the run-of-the-mill political parties of Norway or the Netherlands. It seems to me axiomatic: **if** *faith—then coercion.* **If** *pragmatism—then little universal appeal. Can one have both?*

DJILAS: One can't nor should one wish to. As long as Communism goes on being a matter of faith and fanaticism—and goodness knows it is a very reassuring thing to embrace, as I know from my youth—its claim in a free society to be granted full *de facto* assimilation as well as *de jure* acceptance (which it has) must be handled with great caution.

—Your emphasis on the methods rather than the aims of Communism goes back at least as far as your "trial" at the third Plenum in 1954. You were then accused by Edvard Kardelj of being guilty of the kind of revisionism that Bernstein expressed in the observation:

> **"What is commonly called the ultimate goal of socialism is nothing for me; the movement is everything. . . ."**

DJILAS: I told the Plenum, in response to Kardelj's accusation, that although I had never read Eduard Bernstein (by now, of course, I have) I agreed that the goal was nothing and the movement everything.

—Did this, in fact, prefigure what you have just told me about the significance you attach to **method** *in the Italian, Spanish and French Parties? In other words, did you (in 1954) take Bernstein's words to mean that however desirable the final aims of "socialism" may be, nothing will come of them if the movement is mired in undemocratic, coercive methods—that it is, in the end, more important to have democracy than "socialism"?*

I ask this question because Bernstein's words could be given the opposite interpretation—especially if one is a Montenegrin revolutionary—as for example: "Give me a good revolutionary movement, and I don't much care what it is for."

DJILAS: The first—the emphasis on method—was really my meaning, even though Kardelj chose to say that my position was hostile to the Party, encouraging "anarchistic disorder" and the like. Years later I observed in *The Unperfect Society*:

> **"My dispute with the Party arose from my realisation that ideas by themselves do not make men either sublime or worthless, but that it is the means they employ that makes them one or the other. . . ."**

Let me add that in Yugoslavia this headstrong flirtation with Stalinism—for that is what the

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Plenum's case against me amounted to—has now happily passed into desuetude. Not so in France, for example.

Georges Marchais has recently gone on record in *L'Humanité* with the following lapidary statement: "We are happy people because we are struggling for [human] happiness. . . ." But how, you may wonder, does Marchais know what constitutes human happiness? He knows it, we must assume, because he is no mere party politician, but also a visionary. His faith has furnished him with certain unquestionable truths about the Meaning of History, the role of the Proletariat, the felicity to be ushered in by the Classless Society, and suchlike. There is no analytical evidence that any of these things are true—indeed there is every reason to think they are untrue—but once the basic premises of the ideology are accepted, the rest follows with enviable certainty: "happy" Communists get to work on the appointed "happiness" of mankind even if they have to destroy much of mankind in the process.

My point is that this kind of arrogant palaeo-Communism has nothing to do with the business of adult politics in free parliamentary societies. It is a sign that in most of the world's Communist Parties Stalinism has still a great deal of life left in it.

VIII. Rule by Conspiracy

AS WE HAVE decided to be completely frank and forthright in this conversation, I hope you will not think me unkind if I recall some of the things you have yourself written in praise of Stalin and Stalinism. Again—I'm unearthing nothing that you have not yourself brought to light and subjected to rather merciless self-criticism.

Here are some sentences from an article you published in *Borba* in November 1942:

> **"Can there be any greater honour and happiness than to feel that one's closest and most beloved friend is Stalin? . . . Stalin is the bitterest enemy of all that is inhumane, he is deeply concerned, he is the wisest person, he nurtures human kindness. . . . The Soviet Union is the only country without hidden motives. It will not enslave peoples but will give aid to enslaved peoples in their war of liberation against Hitler's tyranny. Stalin is the only statesman with a pure conscience and an unselfish heart. . . . Stalin is Marxism–Leninism revitalised and enriched. He is a man who never wavers, a man before whose eyes are unravelled future events, entire centuries. . . . He knows all and sees everything; nothing human is alien to him. . . . There are no riddles in the world Stalin cannot solve. . . . Stalin—he is an epoch, the most crucial epoch in the history of mankind. . . . History knows no greater love than that of Stalin for Lenin. And no one deserves Lenin's love as does Stalin. . . . It is a great honour to live in the era of Stalin, to fight under Stalin's leadership, which means to be a part of something that will live for ever. . . . Our love toward the Soviet Union is undying because it became our life through flood and fire, our soul, our future, our survival, our daily bread! That love is eternal because it is ennobled by the spirit of the great Stalin. . . ."**

Did you really believe all this to be true at the time, seeing that some 20 years later you wrote that Stalin was the greatest criminal of all time:

> **"for in him was joined the criminal senselessness of Caligula with the refinement of a Borgia and the brutality of Czar Ivan the Terrible. . . ."**

DJILAS: Oh, I did. I *was* a Stalinist—as *all* Communists were at the time; and had there not developed a conflict with the Soviet Union in 1948, I think I would have remained a Stalinist until the 20th Party Congress. Nowadays the fashion among Communists is not to admit their Stalinist past and to deny that they said what they actually did say.

I will do no such thing. My Stalinism is on record; and looking back upon it I can only repeat that had we not taken this unqualified attitude towards the Soviet Union and Stalin, we could not have won against Hitler. We needed it for our unity and morale. We *were* fanatics, and had to be.

Now, whether in 1942 I believed every detail of the eulogy you have quoted is another matter. I was a Party leader, and writing in November 1942, under extremely difficult conditions, I probably used some rhetoric that would not stand up to examination by a political scientist but was likely to fire the spirit of our hard-pressed fighters. The invincibility and omniscience of Stalin was an effective slogan against a seemingly invincible Hitler.

—I do appreciate this . . . yet I would imagine that there was no **need** *for you to say "Stalin is the only statesman with a pure conscience and an unselfish heart", or "there is no riddle in the world Stalin cannot solve", had you not fully believed these things to be true. "He knows all and sees everything" is surely a way of referring to God?*

DJILAS: No doubt about it—my approach to Stalin was something akin to a religious type of faith. We all believed in him in that manner. I may, as I say, not have had full confidence in every adjective I showered on Stalin (a certain ritual praise was *de rigueur* in those days), but I was persuaded that if one conceived of this praise at a higher level of political consciousness, it was right and essential.

—To side-track you for a moment: lacking the kind of fanaticism that you say is necessary for victory, can the Italian Communists win?

DJILAS: No, they cannot. They haven't got the single-minded determination. They may succeed in provoking a civil war, but they cannot win.

—Could you, then, on the strength of your own principles, fault an Italian Communist leadership (clearly not the present one) if it insisted that complete

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dedication to a monolithic ideology was the prerequisite for victory?

DJILAS: *If* you believe your Communist ideology to be absolutely fire-proof, your fanaticism irresistibly follows from it. I approve of the Italian Communist leaders' current policies precisely because they are ideological sceptics and have long given up fantasies about the dictatorship of the proletariat and the like.

—You said that the 1948 conflict made you first fully conscious that the Soviet Union under Stalin wasn't quite what you had thought it to be.

DJILAS: Not, at first, *fully* conscious. Even in 1948 we had a poor understanding of the Soviet Union. We were still in the phase of making excuses for Soviet reality. Yes, we said, the Soviets may be using brutal methods in their foreign policy, but their great achievements in building socialism were beyond question. Our recognition of the truth about Russia was a gradual process—even after our break with the Cominform. It was during my visit to Russia in early 1948 that it began to dawn on me that this was a bad system. But I still failed to understand that ours in Yugoslavia was not, after all, a great deal better. By 1950, however, I had shed most of my illusions and saw the Soviet system for what it was, and is. But make no mistake about it: even now there is a tendency in Yugoslavia to entertain illusions about the Soviet Union. There is still a current of opinion which holds that the Soviet system is "socialist" but for the minor blemish that it is controlled by a top-heavy bureaucracy. . . . There are still people who will tell you that—well, the Russians may lack democracy, self-management, and the freedom to travel, but they are, historically and ideologically speaking, on the same frequency we are. This is nonsense and—for the future of Yugoslavia—it may prove very dangerous nonsense.

"Every time I was invited to Stalin's table and became involved in this unseemly game of sycophantic toasting, marathon drinking and politicking, with the dwarf-like, pock-marked despot sitting in judgment over the lives of his subjects in his enormous empire, I could not suppress a feeling that these men had no confidence at all in the legitimacy of their rule and needed reassurance from wherever it could be obtained. . . ."

—In "Conversations with Stalin" you have described the sources and slow development of your distrust of Stalin. We know less about Stalin's distrust of you. Did he suspect you before you complained to him in 1945 about the behaviour of Soviet troops in Yugoslavia?

DJILAS: No—on the contrary—I think he felt I was a sincere enthusiast and therefore "a soft touch." He knew from my Party history that I was a rather open character—which I was—who had never joined factions, never intrigued against anyone, spoke his mind frankly and publicly.

—Dennison Rusinow (in his book on "The Yugoslav Experiment") suggests that when you broke with the Party in 1954, and were eventually "tried" by Tito, Kardelj, Rankovic, and other Party leaders, you did not canvass support because you were a lone, prophetic type of person who hoped to convert others by the weight of his views and words, not by mundane politicking. Stalin's impression of your openness is, then, confirmed by a student of history whom I respect.

DJILAS: Rusinow is basically right—though the matter was a little more complicated. Organising a faction was contrary to my convictions and character. Also, it would have caused dissension in the Party—hence I didn't do it. However, Rusinow is wrong in thinking that I expected that the strength of my opinions would change the minds of my comrades. I *knew* that I was losing and that I would go on losing, as indeed I did. But let me tell you how I *now* see the balance of my conflict with the 1954 leadership: I don't think I have lost completely. I certainly lost the struggle for power; but morally and ideologically I have, I think, been fully vindicated.

—You have indeed. I would go further: mightn't the Yugoslav people, in some future emergency, want to draw on your moral authority?

DJILAS: This doesn't strike me as very relevant or important. What is highly important, though, is the future integrity of Yugoslavia. Can we save our independence after Tito? Will the machinations of the Soviet Union succeed? All this worries me because our policy of Non-Alignment is not very successful; our economy is in profound trouble; and we are faced with powerful though covert forces of internal dissension. If we can save our national independence, we can, I'm confident, look after the rest of our problems with a fair chance of success—but can we?

—I don't want to draw you out on this clearly sensitive matter; but as Mihajlo Mihajlov has spoken my lines for me, let me quote a statement he made in the US recently. "When Tito dies", he said, "Djilas could become the president of Yugoslavia. . . ."

DJILAS: No—I'm too much out of the system for anything like that to happen. I have been under attack on-and-off for a quarter-of-a-century. I'm alienated from the entire establishment.

—Mightn't that be your greatest asset? Suppose there is, after Tito, trouble between Serbs and Croats with the Russians pulling strings in the background—mightn't you be called upon to lead Yugoslavia as de Gaulle was in the hour of France's emergency?

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DJILAS: I doubt that very much. In any case, I'm not really interested in power. I'm content with my life as it is. What does interest me is my independence. That I must preserve to the end.

—Have you friends (other than personal friends) who might support you if, for one reason or another, there was a chance for you to serve again?

DJILAS: No—a lot of people feel that I've been responsible for too many deaths for that to happen. But, as I say, I wouldn't be interested.

—Coming back to Stalin's reading of your character and intentions—he took you to be a fiery but naive intellectual who would go on swallowing Stalinism whole.

DJILAS: He thought I was open and sincere. I *was*, but I wasn't stupid! Nor could I be lured into betraying or intriguing against Tito. Tito and I were friends: we had been together in every conceivable difficulty; we had repeatedly faced death together; we were devoted to each other.

—Did Stalin try to line you up against Tito?

DJILAS: Well, he didn't do it frontally, but it was clearly his intention to split our leadership and enlist me against Tito. He didn't, of course, succeed.

—When you diplomatically forgot to take up Stalin's invitation to have your migraine treated in the Crimea and, later, complained about the looting and raping by Soviet troops in Yugoslavia, Stalin's estimate of you as a starry-eyed enthusiast must have undergone a change?

DJILAS: I believe it must have. . . .

—Why do you think Stalin needed so much yesmanship and reassurance, seeing that he had absolute power over the life and death of 200 million people? In your autobiographical writings you record a string of frightfully vulgar (and very Russian) dinner parties at Stalin's court, all marked by gargantuan appetites, oriental after-dinner humour, and drunken stupor. Tito himself, returning with you from one of these Bacchanalia, was puzzled: "I don't know what the devil is wrong with these Russians that they drink so much—sheer decadence! . . ."

Was *it "decadence", or would you say the explanation lies elsewhere?*

DJILAS: When Tito made that remark to me I was myself puzzled as to why the Russian leaders drank so desperately. Tito cannot take a great deal of liquor, and I don't drink at all. Stalin, at one of our sessions, said to me jokingly, but with not a little malice in his voice, that I was "a German" because, after the assembled luminaries had dared me to race them in vodka, I drank *beer*!

One explanation I would offer is that the whole tenor of life and manners in Russia is traditionally crude. Whether you want to drown your sorrows, celebrate your joys, or just nurse your puzzlement at the meaning or meaninglessness of life—you hit the bottle. The phenomenon has been written about again and again, so I will leave it at that.

—"Drink will be the ruin of the Russians", Turgenev observed in 1877. . . .

DJILAS: He was right. As far as the cabal around Stalin was concerned, their desperate search for wine and song (women were strictly not part of the fare) was an expression of the conspiratorial nature of Soviet leadership. Every time I was invited to Stalin's table and became involved in this unseemly game of sycophantic toasting, marathon drinking, and politicking, with the dwarflike, pock-marked despot sitting in judgment over the lives of his subjects in his enormous empire, I could not suppress a feeling that these men had no confidence at all in the legitimacy of their rule and needed reassurance from wherever it could be obtained: drink, 99.9% election results, vast armed forces, international treaties recognising their legitimacy (didn't the current leadership's search for the Helsinki Agreement and then SALT stem from the same uncertainty?)—even adulation from fraternal foreign visitors such as myself.

—Was it the tradition of the conspiratorial Party in which Stalin and his lieutenants had their roots, that lived on long after the need for conspiracy had ended?

DJILAS: Ah, but that is the whole point—*had* the need for conspiracy ended? Has it ended *now*? What my visit to Stalin taught me was that these men regarded themselves as appointed to rule over and against the will of the people. They acted like a group of conspirators scheming to suppress, squash, circumvent, or hoodwink the inhabitants of some conquered land, not their own. Power for Stalin was a plot, with himself as chief plotter as well as the one cast to be plotted against. It was an expression of the civil war which Communists in power have always waged, and *will* always wage, against society.

Of course, Russia under Stalin had "laws" and "institutions" on the statute books, and often these were even respected in matters such as driving on the correct side of the road, regulating the electricity supply of Tomsk, or the alcoholic content of vodka. But in all things pertaining to man's spiritual and intellectual freedom, Russia under Stalin was a lawless land. What the Prince says, goes—and nothing else.

—Do you think Stalin found some inner justification for the horrors of his rule: some Dostoevskian ethic in the style of the Grand Inquisitor? It would be surprising if Stalin, the former seminarist, hadn't worked out for himself a soothing rationale.

DJILAS: Stalin believed in Power, *an und für sich*, Power! Power for him was its own justification, no

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matter how it had been attained and what it was for.

The Grand Inquisitor's ethic? Yes—Stalin, like the Grand Inquisitor, killed God (the idealistic purpose of Communism) in order to save the institution (the order of Soviet society). Stalin the seminarist probably saw himself, despite his vaunted anti-Hegelianism, as Hegel's Absolute Spirit ruling by *fiat* in the name of History.

—Could this very cunning and practical man have believed in anything so fanciful?

DJILAS: Oh, certainly. Stalin was a mystical materialist. The key to the success of his diabolic rule was his fine combination of materialism and mysticism.

IX. Christ & the Commissar

ARE REVOLUTIONARIES born or made? Reading your books and reflecting on your career I am left with the impression that your Communism was a rationalisation of your native rebelliousness, reinforced by Montenegrin traditions of revenge and violence—that you were a rebel first, and Communism merely came along as a convenient framework to give your fighting spirit an organised and modern meaning.

There are, as I see it, two early clues to Milovan Djilas the intellectual Communist. Both come from *Land Without Justice* in which you depict your family background and childhood in Montenegro. The first is your description of the hard, not to say cruel, environment in which you found yourself as a small child:

> **"Everything is at war with everything else: men against men, men against beasts, beasts against beasts. And children against children, always. And parents with children. . . . The spirits strive with humans, and humans with the spirits. The strife is ceaseless between heaven and earth. . . ."**

If this is a rough clue to a primitive form of "class-struggle", my second clue points to a rudimentary form of "alienation":

> **"One plans and fights to achieve sacred dreams—but one plunders and ravages along the way to live in pain, misery and death."**
>
> **"To settle accounts—[this is] the most precious passion in life."**
>
> **"The human heart can find peace and pleasure only in returning evil for evil."**
>
> **"Vengeance—this is the breath of life . . . mother's milk and sister's vow . . . it was all, all."**

What I'm suggesting is that your early experience of life as a chaotic struggle for survival implanted in you an extremely pessimistic reading of the limits of human achievement and human felicity. Between them they prepared the ground in which a revolutionary ideology struck roots and flourished.

DJILAS: This is basically true, but I would formulate it differently: the Montenegrin character is rebellious, single-minded, violent, and much given to heroism and hero-worship. Hence it has a natural affinity with what is popularly taken as Marxism-Leninism. When a Montenegrin rebel meets Marxism-Leninism, the recognition is instantaneous and satisfying. The Montenegrin temperament and the temper of Marxism (and especially Leninism) are a perfect fit.

—Am I, then, right in saying that when your accusers asked you, at the time of your arrest in 1956: "Are you a Montenegrin?" (meaning a born rebel), and you answered "No, I'm a Serb", they, rather than you, were closer to the truth?

DJILAS: Looking back on that episode from where I am today, I think they were.

—Had another revolutionary movement come along to absorb your natural rebelliousness, would you have gone along with it?

DJILAS: Probably, yes. Revolutionaries are *born*. They don't need books to teach them revolution. Tito is another example. He too was a rebel by nature. If Communism and the Comintern had not existed, he would have found an outlet in some other idealistic struggle.

—Suppose Fascism had succeeded in presenting itself as the authentic revolutionary alternative. Would you have gone along with it?

DJILAS: Some Fascists were idealists—not all. But, then, it would be idle to pretend that all Communists were idealists.

I had a compelling discussion on this very topic recently with Dobrica Cosic, our best-known Serbian writer. He was a Partisan and is still a Communist of sorts although he is in disagreement with the Party.

"You and I have never been *real* Communists", I told him. "We were idealists who happened to be in alliance with the genuine article: the manipulating, power-hungry, bureaucratic kind. While the War lasted, some of these real Communists every now and then showed a sense of idealism, while we fell in with some of the requirements of bureaucracy. But our two worlds were basically always separate."

Dobrica Cosic didn't agree. He insisted that *we* with our selfless idealism were the only *authentic* Communists.

No, I countered—in different historical situations we would have supported totally different revolutionary or even national movements. I could,

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I said, easily see myself as a Serbian nationalist in 1914, fighting Austria-Hungary in the name of our national revolution.

—You have said that your Montenegrin rebelliousness found a congenial outlet in Marxism-Leninism.

DJILAS: Yes, most Montenegrin revolutionaries joined the Communist movement for exactly the same reasons, and in the same way, as I did; or, if you like, I did as they did. If there was any difference which set me slightly apart from them it was (if you'll permit my conceit) my superior educational background and my sensibility as a writer and critic. But in our single-mindedness, our stubborn refusal to budge from one-sided presentations of the facts, and in our determination to act on the facts thus perceived—we were all the same. As a young Communist, I rejected the old régime with the same uncompromising resolve as I now reject Communism. I was, and am, a Montenegrin.

—This worries me a little. Why, then, should we trust the views you are articulating in 1979 any more than those you held in, say, 1944?

DJILAS: Ah, an easy answer—I was sincere in *both* cases. For a more serious one, you will have to look at the facts and ask whether my views in 1979 aren't closer to the truth than those I uttered as a Communist.

—But aren't you going to try to **convince** *me that your current views are closer to the truth ... that they are distilled from the experiences of a long career and are, in fact, the views you would want to stand by?*

DJILAS: Probably so, but let me qualify. I wouldn't want you to think that I'm one of those former Communists who have become "disillusioned" with Communism or "converted" to some other faith or ideology. My life as a Communist was part of the growth of my mind and of my self-education. Communism equipped me with certain types of knowledge, experience, and psychological insight without which I would not be the man I am today. There is no *break* in my thinking or personality.

—Wasn't the price a little too high?

DJILAS: No. You cannot hope to acquire a truer insight without paying a price, even a heavy price. I've been purged, and I'm a better man for it.

—I mean the price you made other people pay as a leader of the Party in War-time Yugoslavia?

DJILAS: My exercise of power may have been expensive—but I don't think the price I have paid for my *self-education* has been excessive.

—Do you regard yourself as a kind of prodigal son who had to be mired in sin before he could return and repent?

DJILAS: No, I see no need to repent; there has been no sudden transformation in my views. They changed gradually and naturally. Sin? Guilt? I don't suffer from any sense of guilt although I know I have many weaknesses, and every now and then I remember certain things in my past which I'd rather not remember. But I don't *suffer* from them.

—What about your unarmed German prisoner whose throat you slit and whom you then clubbed to death with a rifle-butt? And the other German you signalled Raja Nedeljkovic to stab?

DJILAS: Oh, I feel absolutely no sense of guilt about that. We were at war. Had I not killed him he would have given our position away, as the German troops were within earshot. But I would have killed him even if he *hadn't* had a chance to do that.

—Why?

DJILAS: Because he was a German and I *hated* them all. They had killed many of my friends—I *hated* them as a nation.

—I suppose you can't fight a war without these brutal instincts getting the better of you....

DJILAS: Man is a weak, very weak, animal. I was, I must tell you, *elated* when I heard that the German cities were being wiped off the face of the earth with hundreds of thousands of civilians buried under the debris! Such was the brutalising effect of war on my mentality....

—The Maoists are more enlightened as well as more successful Communists than you were: they put their prisoners in camps to re-educate them.

DJILAS: We tried to do the same early in the fighting but without success. Then the Germans began to shoot our prisoners, and we retaliated.

—I suppose it would be futile to ask whether the tradition of local intolerance or Communist fanaticism was more responsible for some of the horrors of your fratricidal war. In "Wartime" you tell us that in Herzegovina

> **"Communist sons confirmed their devotion by killing their own fathers, and there was dancing and singing around the bodies...."**

Did you have a specific incident in mind?

DJILAS: Yes—but there were many. The one which I saw involved sons who were drunk on the ideas of revolution, war, and destruction. They killed their father and celebrated the murder with an orgy around his body. Now, this father was a perfectly decent old man. He had been critical of Communism but was by no means "an enemy" or an Italian agent. The boys killed him to demonstrate their faith in Communism. It was a sobering sight.

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—Wasn't this taking loyalty to Communism a little too far?

DJILAS: I suppose it was. But let me tell you one thing. Although I could never have killed my father out of a sense of devotion to Communism, I would not have hesitated to pass a sentence of death on a *brother* if he had been found supporting the enemy, or at the very least to send him to be judged by a Partisan court.

In Montenegrin tradition you are "your brother's keeper" in the literal sense of the word. If your brother has done wrong, it is up to you to punish him; indeed, it is your duty to do so.

—You tell us in one of your books that you did not read the Bible until 1960 . . . a surprising fact about the erstwhile ideological leader of the Party. Do you now feel that it would have made any difference to your views concerning, for example, fratricide, if you had?

DJILAS: I very much doubt it. If I had read the Bible I would have rejected the Judaeo-Christian tradition with the same strident asperity as Marx rejected it.

—You say you had no sense of guilt about killing your unarmed German. Yet the night after the killing, you had a strange and most un-Communist vision. "I fell fast asleep", you write in "Wartime."

> **"Suddenly in my mind Christ appeared ... his presence was pleasing to me, as if I found myself in some safe and glowing warmth. ... I closed my eyes, and there was Christ again—tangible, close enough to touch. I began to speak to him: If you came into the world and suffered for goodness and truth, you must see that our cause is just and noble. ... It never crossed my mind that this was a miracle or that miracles occur, though the apparition inspired calm and courage."**

I'd be very much surprised if an expert psychologist did not ascribe your vision to a feeling of subconscious guilt about the day's killings. I would certainly argue that you were in a state of shock which demanded a religious type of reassurance to help you overcome it—Bible or no Bible.

DJILAS: I was surprised myself. The point you are making was put to me not so long ago by the German writer Erwin Wickert, who is now German Ambassador in Peking and knows me well.

He wrote me a letter precisely about this episode in *Wartime*, the burden of which was that, despite all my protestations, a remnant of religiosity had been preserved in my mind and broke surface under the impact of the day's agonies. Forget all about your agnosticism and Communism, he said; that night you were thinking on a higher spiritual plane, and your mind stepped out of the constraints of ideology. And I think Wickert may have been right. The day's events were gruelling. Many of my comrades around me lost their lives. The horror of all this must have released a hidden strain of religious feeling in me.

—Didn't you feel remorse about your German prisoner?

DJILAS: No remorse, none at all. But, after the day's fighting, I began slowly but perceptibly to take a larger, more humane, and more forgiving view of what was going on around me. The analytical rigour of the Communist leader and the passionate dedication of the typical Montenegrin were still alive in my mind; but they began to be tempered by a gentler consciousness.

—Your vision of Christ was not your only "illumination." I have noted several in your books. While writing "The New Class" you were "seized by a strange and demonic delight in the havoc I was wreaking in my own work and beliefs." By the same token, the inevitability of your conflict with the Party was brought home to you by a midnight revelation (7–8 December 1953): "Smitten by some unfaltering realisation that I would not be able to abandon my views . . . I got up, went to my study, and there jotted down what . . . I now knew: the emergence of my differences with the rulers of the Party, the impending trial of my own strength. . . ." I could quote instances of a similar kind.

Don't such "illuminations" betray an artistic temperament (to put it no higher) which must have marked you out for conflict with any bureaucracy, let alone one as severely disciplined as the Communist Party?

DJILAS: Yes. Illuminations aren't good for you if you are a Communist! And I had many—in prison, out of prison, usually in the small hours. Problems I had stowed away in my mind would pop out readily solved with the force of revelation at the most unexpected times. But I don't want you to think that all such spells of intuitive insight are religious. They are the stuff of any creativeness, and need not be connected with religion.

—But your vision of the gentle Christ **was** *a religious experience. . . .*

DJILAS: Oh, absolutely, and for a long time I couldn't come to terms with it. Had I ceased to be a Communist? I wondered. Was I suffering from hallucinations? I was deeply ashamed of the apparition of Christ and tried to ignore it—until I wrote *Wartime*. I then decided that the story of my life would be incomplete without committing this episode to paper—let future historians make of it what they like.

Having written the passage you have quoted, I told a profoundly religious writer friend of mine about it. He was astonished but delighted. I said I

"I could never have killed my father out of a sense of devotion to Communism, but I would not have hesitated to pass a sentence of death on a brother. . . . I was deeply ashamed of the apparition of Christ and tried to ignore it."

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had doubts about the suitability of exposing this episode to public view—for here was something that was not only contrary to my earlier ideological convictions but somehow alien and unrelated to them. But my friend didn't at all share my qualms. Publish it, he said. No harm has yet come to the world because a man has a vision of Christ! So I did.

X. Debts to the Past

YOU SAID THAT there has been no break in your political thinking. I find this intriguingly demonstrated by the partial recantation you made at your "trial" in 1954. I realise that this is a sore point for you—I imagine you now wish you hadn't recanted at all. Nevertheless—although cautiously, ambiguously, and preserving your dignity—recant you did. What I find most interesting about this confession is not that it was made, but the reasons you have subsequently offered to explain it:

> **"I could not escape paying my debt to the dogma to which I was committed and to the movement that had a claim on me, because my activities until then, my whole way of life, were registered in its records."**

This is of unusual importance. If a man as courageous, critical, and intelligent as yourself, free at the time and in no way under police pressure, nevertheless succumbed to the unspoken demands of his past as a Communist, we have reason to entertain a much more sympathetic understanding than we normally do of the dilemma of some of the Old Bolsheviks (such as Zinoviev and Bukharin) who were, after great physical or mental coercion, prevailed upon to offer their own lives on the altar of the Party as a last sacrifice.

DJILAS: Zinoviev was a weak and altogether despicable man whose abject behaviour at his show-trial is not comparable with Bukharin's. Bukharin, however, played his trial with consummate intelligence, so much so that his was the last to be publicly held in the Soviet Union. Stalin learnt his lesson. What Bukharin did was to cheat his accusers of their prize. He pleaded guilty to crimes everyone knew he had not committed and couldn't have committed. Did his "Rightism" lead to the restoration of capitalism? Yes, said Bukharin, it did. Did he degenerate into an enemy of socialism? Certainly, said Bukharin, he did. Was he guilty of treason and of organising kulak uprisings? Yes, said Bukharin, he was. But when it came to the detailed evidence, one by one he deprived these grotesque charges of every semblance of reality.

All this required finesse. Bukharin understood well enough what the trial was all about and that he was doomed. At the same time he was a Communist who could not avoid paying his dues to his past and to the Party.

—He did, indeed, accept the need to surrender to Stalin long before he was put on trial, for in 1935 he explained rather significantly: "it is not **him** *[Stalin] we trust but the man in whom the Party has reposed its confidence. It just so happened that he has become a sort of symbol of the Party...." Bukharin, like the other Old Bolsheviks—and subsequently yourself in 1954—was defeated by his inhibition against taking the dispute outside the Party.*

DJILAS: Yes—in 1954 I found myself in a similar dilemma, although under incomparably less exacting conditions. I did, after much agonising reflection, make a partial confession. It was the result of two elements: political calculation and genuine ideological weakness. My past had caught up with me, too.

"I did make a confession to The Party. My Stalinist past had caught up with me, too. One cannot be a Communist and preserve an iota of one's personal integrity!"

The truly terrible thing is that one cannot be a Communist and *not* let oneself in for the shameful act of recantation. One cannot be a Communist and preserve an iota of one's personal integrity!

I remember Rodoljub Colakovic, an orthodox Muscovite comrade, urging me at a Plenum meeting to put my house in order by "disarming" myself before the Party. The word is significant. "Disarm" yourself, render yourself naked and defenceless, fall on your knees before the Party and beg for forgiveness! This is the typical progression. It took me a long time to discover that once you are a Communist it is only a question of time before you are asked to prostrate yourself before the Party and castrate your conscience.

—Talking of "disarming" yourself—isn't it true, though, that in 1937 you were, as the Party's principal ideologist, put in charge of drafting a moral code of sexual behaviour for Communists, and that you wrote a highly puritanical code which required Party members to disarm themselves before the Party—in practice, before the gruesome Alexander Rankovic? I do realise that penalties meted out for unapproved sexual exploits are not comparable with those handed down by Stalin's courts in Moscow, but the intention to exact prostration is perhaps not dissimilar.

DJILAS: This is so. I am responsible, together with other leaders of the Party, for everything we have done and said in the past. Puritanism in the late 1930s and during the War was an essential characteristic of Party policy which I fully shared and indeed encouraged. However, I like to think that even then my methods and approach were milder than those of some of my comrades.

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—But your puritanism must have been a very sincere and seriously held thing, seeing that when you discovered that you and another young Communist were both in love with Mitra Mitrovic, you prevailed on your rival to work out with you "a common revolutionary position", and sent Mitra a joint letter in which she was informed that you had both broken with her because she was betraying "bourgeois" characteristics such as trying to find a husband. (Fortunately your ideological position eventually crumbled under the impact of "reality" and Mitra became your first wife; but that is another story.)

DJILAS: Oh yes, oh yes, we were immensely serious and puritanical. A true believer has to be. It seems absurd in retrospect, but it wasn't so at the time.

—The psychology of your recantation intrigues me. I am reminded of General Walter Krivitsky's revelations, Max Eastman's reconstructions ("the victims had no objection to dying with a lie upon their lips [as long as] it was a revolutionary lie [and] the Party demanding it was still the Party of the proletarian dictatorship"), and of course Arthur Koestler's masterful re-enactment of the Bukharin trial.

DJILAS: In *Darkness at Noon* Koestler was the first to put his finger on the problem. His account is psychologically unassailable—whatever Stephen Cohen's otherwise impressive book about Bukharin asserts to the contrary.

—Bukharin's problem, you have said, was basically your problem, too?

DJILAS: It was. I survived—where Bukharin didn't—for a number of personal and institutional reasons; but my dilemma as a Communist was very similar to his.

The first thing I felt after my "trial" had ended and I had been given "a final warning" (that is, even before I was stripped of my membership of the Central Committee and the Presidency of the Federal Assembly) was that I must now pursue my critique of the Party relentlessly to the end. I knew in my bones that unless I went through a rational re-examination of everything Communism stood for, I would lose all self-respect as a free human being.

—You were fortunate enough to have survived your "trial" (I didn't myself at the time, as the Plenum's proceedings were broadcast, think that you would)—so that you were in a position to make such a decision. But what if you had been tried under Soviet conditions? What if you had been told: "We'll have to shoot you because you have undermined the socialist order of society—but you can, as the Communist we still think you are, render the Party a last service by confessing to this indictment. . . ."? Wouldn't you have done so, seeing that you did make a partial confession even though no pressure had been put upon you other than that you imposed on yourself, reasoning that you owed "a debt" to your past? Wouldn't you have acted on the Bolshevik principle so well summarised by Trotsky: "One must not be right **against** *the party. One can be right only with the party, and through the party, for history has created no other road for the realisation of what is right"?*

DJILAS: In 1937 or 1938 I would probably have made a full "confession" under the force of such an argument. But then, in 1937 or 1938 I couldn't *possibly* have found myself in a situation of that kind because I was fully committed to all of Stalin's policies. I was, so to speak, on the Prosecutor's side of the courtroom.

But in 1954 neither physical torture nor moral or psychological coercion could have swung me to do what I was determined not to do. I had absolutely no fear of physical pressure—not that there was any attempt to apply it to me, either at the time of the Plenum or during my subsequent imprisonments.

The qualitative change in my attitude to the Party and Communism generally was the result of my disenchantment with and opposition to Stalin. That released everything else.

I have recently re-read the pieces I published between the 1948 Cominform conflict and my "trial" in 1954. It is clear from these, and especially from a long series of articles I wrote for *Borba*, that I had heresy in my blood from an early stage. In article after article, month after month, I carried my doubts and my opposition further. First I toppled Stalin, then I fixed my critical sights on Lenin, and I ended up (though not in 1954) with a qualified rejection of Marx as well. I say "qualified"

Communist Reformation

Edited by G. R. URBAN

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advisedly, because for a long time after 1954 I went on being a Marxist. *The New Class* is, in its basic approach, still a Marxist book although it contains many unorthodoxies. Even now I'm sometimes under the impression that my mind is not completely free from the Marxist type of formulation.

—Then wasn't Stalin right in saying that any opposition to his leadership did, "objectively speaking", amount to the subversion of the Communist system?

DJILAS: From *Stalin*'s point of view, Stalin was undoubtedly right. But I cannot share that point of view, and I don't think there are many people left who can. All the evils that idealistic Communists believed Communism had banished from the world crept into the soul of Communism under Stalin's leadership, and have become a permanent part of it. I can see no wrong in wishing to subvert such a system. It is, indeed, a great wrong *not* to wish to do so.

XI. Feudalism & "the Millet System"

YOU HAVE COINED some of the most incisive tags we have about the Soviet system—"new class" and "state capitalism" come to mind as the most popular, even though the first can be traced back to Trotsky ("new ruling caste ... parasitic caste", etc.) and "state capitalism" to Lenin. What is your current reading of the Soviet Union as a society and as a world power?

DJILAS: The two images now uppermost in my mind when I reflect on the Soviet Union are "industrial feudalism" as an *aperçu* of her internal condition, and the Ottoman Turkish "millet system" as a symbol of Soviet imperialism.

Why, you may ask, is "State Capitalism" no longer adequate? State Capitalism implies competition, no matter how perversely it may be put into effect, and with that goes a certain amount of efficiency and consumer satisfaction. Neither exists in Soviet society. What we have there is an enormous chain of privilege-dispensing and privilege-consuming relationships in which everyone from doorman to chairman is at the giving or receiving end of some binding trust or obligation. Your place and advancement in this chain are not a function of your work or talent but of your usefulness and loyalty to the barons immediately in command of you, and ultimately of *their* use and loyalty to the centre. Therefore, the social as well as the economic character of Soviet society seems to me better symbolised by the relationship that exists in feudal societies between vassals and their superiors than by anything as socially advanced as capitalism, even "State Capitalism."

"The millet system" strikes me as an appropriate image of Soviet imperialism in the last fifteen years or so because the USSR, like Ottoman Turkish imperialism in the 16th and 17th centuries, appears to tolerate "millets" of its own, that is to say, dependent territories enjoying varying degrees of cultural and national autonomy. The "liberty" of these territories excludes the right to independence, or political agitation against the prevailing system. But there is a case for saying that, as for the 16th-century Christian and Jewish communities, the millet system was an advance on religious intolerance, so the Soviet application of "the millet" is an advance on the Stalinist variant of Soviet imperialism.

—One might take your analogy even further, and say that although Bulgarian or Serbian Christians enjoyed their own jurisdiction under the millet system, they were nevertheless second-class citizens compared to the ruling Muslims. Subjected to discriminatory taxation and humiliating restrictions in their personal lives, they were, if you like, the forerunners of Czechs, Poles, and Hungarians in Stalin's empire.

DJILAS: Yes, and I might add, to make my analogy complete, that as, for example, a 16th-century Bulgarian Orthodox Christian could escape all restrictions by opting for conversion to the faith of Mohammed, so a 20th-century Czech or Pole can obtain first-class citizenship by joining the Communist Party. Only—admission to Islam was a lot easier than joining "the vanguard of the proletariat"!

—It would be tempting, but historically inaccurate, to infer that the millet system weakened the cohesion of the Turkish Empire. On the contrary, Turkey reached the peak of its power under Suleiman the Magnificent, when the millet system was fully established. Would you say that Soviet hegemony has been weakened or strengthened by Moscow's relative permissiveness in its millets in the 1970s?

DJILAS: What our five senses tell us is that, whether *with* brute force or *without*—*with* military occupation or *without*—Soviet hegemony has been gradually expanding in all parts of the world. Despite reverses in various places (Egypt, for example, and now Afghanistan), Soviet imperialism is on the march, and is very close to threatening the West's access to oil in the Middle East. What our five senses also tell us is that the Western nations appear to be totally unprepared and even, as it often seems to me, unwilling to say to the Russians: This is where you are going to stop! But one day they will have to, unless they are themselves prepared to come under the millet system. At the moment they are actively supporting the Soviet system with vast shipments of grain, technology, and credits.

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—What can the West do to defend its interests and regain some initiative?

DJILAS: Well, for a start, the Western countries, and above all the USA, will have to stop refusing to read the evidence. When the Russians preach *détente* they make it very clear that, in their propaganda and, in fact, in everything that does not come under the rubric of direct involvement in war, they will go on pushing against Western interests. The West is not responding to this because, through the ideological incompetence and indecision of its politicians, it is mistaking *détente* for peace.

Also, the West has inflicted certain psychological wounds on itself which have no parallel in the Soviet Union. I have especially in mind the anti-nuclear propaganda of the Western Left. Their constant harping on mega-deaths and the prospect of doom descending on us unless SALT is signed, sealed and ratified has a debilitating impact on the NATO countries and especially on the United States. A few weeks before SALT 2 was signed, the US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (of all places) saw fit to publish a blood-curdling scenario of what America would be like after a few atomic blasts: "Areas of the country such as the Northeast corridor were reduced to a swath of burning rubble from north of Boston to the south of Norfolk", and so on.

Cui bono? The answer is obvious. No such accounts of the horrors of nuclear war ever reach the *Soviet* public, because the whole area of military planning is banned from discussion. This means that in the vital field of psychological confrontation the balance is strongly tilted in favour of Soviet interests. Some of the sentiments one hears expressed in the White House on this and similar topics would make fine Sunday-morning sermons in a little village community—but can they seriously be meant as America's response to Soviet policies?

I would want the West to stand up to the Soviet Union with a much greater sense of trust in its institutions and a much greater willingness to pick up and return the ideological challenge than it is currently doing. At the moment the USA has added moral disarmament to its puzzling eagerness to throw away its arms at the first sound of a softly spoken Soviet word.

—But could any of this be effectively done and said without increasing world tension?

DJILAS: Yes, it could. I don't want to see us return to the Cold War. But I do think there is an urgent case for giving the Soviet and East European peoples the hard, analytical facts about the differences between the Soviet and the Western systems, the ambitions and practices of Soviet expansionism, and the rest. There are many intelligent people on the other side of the Curtain, both in the Party and outside it, who have developed a resistance to propaganda but are keen to hear dispassionate criticisms of the system they live under. And let us be clear about one thing: these—and not your "mass audiences"—are the people who matter. The Russian people may not be ripe for self-liberation, but the Russian, Polish, Hungarian and Czech intelligentsia are. History stalks from country to country. The spirit of liberty has now begun its march through the Communist world.

—I'm still a little doubtful whether the right balance can be struck. At what point does enlightenment turn into propaganda, and who decides whether it is the one or the other? In any case, need propaganda always be a bad thing? Was it so when it was applied against Hitler or Stalin? You have yourself argued in "The Unperfect Society" that "the freedom fighters" against Communism must have the same confidence in their ideas and role as the Communists had in their struggle for power.

"This [you wrote] might be called the fanaticism of freedom, undogmatic dogmatism. So be it!"

If so, your programme portends civil war rather than cool criticism.

DJILAS: The passage from which you have quoted refers to the way in which the freedom fighters *within* the Communist system (Hungarians and

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Czechs, for example) ought to go about their business—not to what I would expect Western critics or governments to do.

—But would the latter need **less** *self-confidence and less "fanaticism" to press home their critique?*

DJILAS: The balance is not easily struck. Undoubtedly all critics of Communism must be fired by a principled and enthusiastic opposition to dictatorship and a complete faith in democracy. All I'm saying is that the manner in which the Soviet system is criticised should not be of the tub-thumping and intolerant kind, because that is self-defeating. Quiet strength and undemonstrative resolution—this is what we need, and this is what is lacking in the West at the moment, although it is not lacking in *all* cases.

If you look at the West German Federal Republic under *SPD* rule, you have an example of a democracy that is not frightened of asserting itself if mortally threatened. The Germans under Helmut Schmidt have liquidated terrorism with extraordinary speed. If I had been in Schmidt's place I would have gone about it in the same manner: terrorists are out to kill people—they have no right to complain if *they* are killed in turn.

"Some of the sentiments one hears expressed in the White House . . . would make fine Sunday-morning sermons. But can they be seriously meant as America's response to Soviet policies? The US has added moral disarmament to its puzzling eagerness to throw away its arms at the first sound of a softly spoken Soviet word."

Communists who moan about the harshness of the law when it is applied against them have little claim on my sympathy. I could never understand their tears—even when I was myself fulminating in our propaganda against "the barbarism of capitalist justice" and the depredations of "the bourgeois police"! Even then, in my heart of hearts, I was aware that we were people who incite to revolution, hunt down and kill our opponents—hence we had no right to expect better. I'm delighted that the Germans have struck a blow for democracy. My eyes remain dry when I hear of the terrorists' sufferings.

—It seems to me that much of the weakness of the West, in respect of both its internal and its external enemies, derives from a vestigial but strongly surviving notion that to be "anti-Communist" and, by extension, "anti-Soviet" is somehow not quite respectable. A man who has his heart in the right place belongs, on this showing, to the Left or even the Far Left because, with all its faults, the Soviet system portends a "progressive" world order.

DJILAS: Would giving it to you in writing reinforce the point I've already made? *Nothing* that I can think of is more remote from a "progressive" world order, social order, or any order, than the Soviet system! Only if you take the following propositions to be axiomatic: "the bigger your Army, the better your society"—or "the more efficient your machinery of repression, the more progressive your society"—then, and *only* then, can Soviet society be said to be progressive. . . . God protect us from the Soviet type of progress!

But I take your point—Western liberals (in the American sense of the word, i.e. your general European Left) have always placed, and continue to place, a great deal of overt and covert confidence in Communist causes and even Soviet policies. That the Communists have always looked upon this compromise-happy Left as their arch-enemies, and exterminated them wherever they could, appears to have done little (although it has done something) to dissuade the Left from the Communist connection.

You asked me earlier in this conversation whether I thought cultural and social progress has been made in the Soviet Union, and I said that that progress would probably have been as great or greater if the Bolshevik Revolution had never happened. Let me now add a related thought about "bread and liberty", condensed in the proposition that freedom is more important than material welfare, or, if you like, poverty is a lesser evil than despotism. And by that I simply mean that a society of free men and women will, if it finds itself in economic hardship, eventually devise the means to improve its material condition; but a society endowed with the material necessities of life but lacking liberty has no institutional means of moving from unfreedom to freedom. Mind you, I'm no believer in a return to some Arcadian form of society. I'm for a science-and-technology-based industrial civilisation with a high standard of living. But if there is any question of having to choose between a free but poor society, and one that is affluent but unfree, I am clear that we have to choose the former. As I've said: as long as we have freedom, we have a very good chance of eliminating poverty—but a high standard of living under despotism carries a built-in barrier against liberty.

—But isn't this running against the first article of faith of any socialist worth his salt—the ritual cry that "freedom means nothing to the man with an empty belly"? Old tags come to mind about man's "liberty" to spend the wintry nights sleeping on a park bench, and the like.

DJILAS: This is one of the most dangerous delusions of our time. I have two reasons for saying that it is nonsense.

First, people living in a free polity are socially closer to each other and have more reason and

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greater opportunity to understand and help each other than in a closed society. Doing without some of the material necessities of life is easier to bear under such conditions than sustaining spiritual suffering in an unfree society. In other words, a free society, even one suffering from material deprivation, has the makings of a more decent, more compassionate, and more humane society than one which offers a higher standard of living but is a vast concentration camp.

Second, where liberty is absent even material welfare is sooner or later endangered. The Soviet Union provides an excellent example. Lack of liberty in Soviet society has brought about inequality between man and man, because there it is ideological factors and all the rules of industrial feudalism which decide advancement, social position, and earning power—not work, aptitude, or competence. This, in turn, has produced a state of affairs in which there is nothing unusual about a factory manager or *rayon*-secretary commanding thirty times the income of a shop-floor worker—a ratio far in excess of comparable differentials in the "capitalist" West where the ratio between shop-floor worker and top manager is somewhere between 1:4 and 1:7. Soviet society is, therefore, characterised by the *de facto* repudiation of equity and social justice, and the gross re-introduction of what Communists in other contexts call "exploitative relationships." In other words, the vast majority in the Soviet Union are poor or very poor, while a small minority lord it over the majority in varying states of relative or even absolute affluence.

And why has all this arisen? Because Soviet society is egalitarian *in theory*, but no one has the freedom to raise his voice in protest when vague egalitarianism is reversed into crude exploitation.

Western society does not claim to be egalitarian, and isn't; but it is intellectually and socially free. This means that the grosser forms of inequality and abuse in earning power, social benefits, and the like are kept under public scrutiny so that injustices are identified and kept within limits. The end result is that Western "capitalist" society is now socially more just than Soviet society; and income in Western society is incomparably more fairly distributed than under the Soviet system. Literally as well as symbolically, it *pays* to be free.

—The choice between the virtues of the Soviet type of society and those of Western society is, happily, not a difficult one, because so far at least, Soviet society has been both poor and unfree.

DJILAS: True—but if you think of the lure of "consumerism" now spreading over Hungary and slowly penetrating the rest of Eastern Europe (including the Soviet Union), my emphasis on the primacy of liberty over material welfare needs, if anything, to be re-emphasised. Lulling unfree men into acceptance of their condition through goods

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and gadgets is a danger we ought to be watching.

Yugoslavia is a good example of a country which can boast a relatively fair standard of living, consumer satisfaction, job mobility, and even a modicum of private enterprise. But if you take the smallest step outside such licensed "liberties" as the régime has decreed should exist, you run into a wall. Your intellectual freedom—and there is strictly speaking no other; *all* freedom is intellectual—is circumscribed by the Constitution. This guarantees you a great many rights *on paper*, but makes nonsense of them by the omnibus stipulation that they are all subject to the interests of "socialism"—a feature, incidentally, which it shares with the new Soviet Constitution. In other words, even in Yugoslavia material welfare is easily revocable; but the denial of liberty is firmly institutionalised.

XII. Victims of Repatriation

PERHAPS WE might appropriately end this conversation with a topic which has caused a great deal of public disquiet in Britain in the last few years—the forced repatriation of Russian and Yugoslav refugees by the British authorities in the spring and summer of 1945. The circumstances, indeed the fact, of the repatriations were first brought to public attention by Alexander Solzhenitsyn in his *Gulag Archipelago*. More publicity and much heart-searching followed when Nicholas Bethell published *The Last Secret*, and more recently Nikolai Tolstoy re-opened the subject with *Victims of Yalta*. The politicians and civil servants who made the decisions at the time have remained silent. The public had, until Solzhenitsyn's revelations, been kept in the dark.

The facts are by now too well known to need going over. Let me simply ask you whether you now think that the forced repatriation of some 20–40,000 Yugoslavs was right.

DJILAS: No, it wasn't! The great majority of the people the British forced back from Austria were simple peasants. They had no murders on their hands. They had not been Ustashis or Slovenian "Home Guards." Their only crime was fear of Communism and the reputation of the Communists. Their sole motivation for leaving the country was panic. If the British had handed over to us "Quisling" leaders such as Nedic, and police-agents who had collaborated with the Nazis in torturing and killing people, or had done it on their own, there could be no question of the morality of the British action. But this is not what they did. They forced back the lot—and this was profoundly wrong.

—Their numbers have been put as high as 40,000. . . .

DJILAS: I don't think it was as high as that because many Chetniks and Chetnik sympathisers were caught by us on Yugoslav soil—before they had a chance of getting away to Austria. But the British certainly had some 20–30,000 in their hands. The really large numbers concerned the Russians—the Cossacks and Vlassov's men—whom the British also repatriated, some to their immediate death, others to a slow death in Soviet camps.

—The British had, they claim, a number of reasons of overriding importance for doing what they did. Fear of disturbing an already strained relationship with Moscow. Apprehension that the Russians might refuse the return of British troops who had fallen into their hands if the British failed to repatriate the Russians. And the Soviet government's refusal to admit that any Soviet citizen had "fought against Communism" and was "reluctant" to return to the homeland—matched by the British government's reluctance to confirm what the Russians wouldn't.

DJILAS: I'm ready to concede that the British had a certain *raison d'état* on their side. The Soviet Union was a much-lauded ally whose government the British had for many years considered to be essentially no different from their own—and most of these *were* Soviet citizens. But what the British did not realise, or at any rate didn't mention in their public utterances, was that the Soviet Union was no *normal*, that is to say, no *legitimate* state by any accepted standard.

"I find it profoundly shocking that in an open and democratic society it should have been possible to cover up, for almost thirty years, the whole question of forced repatriations. . . . There is surely a case here for a public enquiry."

The British failed to see that the Soviet state had no independent judiciary, that the *MVD* or *NKVD* was the sole law in the land, and that returning these people to the Soviet Union was turning them over to naked terror. It was astonishing that the British, with their fine sense of justice and the administration of law, should have been so thoroughly remiss in examining the sort of justice that was likely to be meted out to the repatriates.

—I'm surprised to hear you say that the Soviet Union—a staunch ally of your government and of the West in the war against Nazi Germany—lacked legitimacy in 1945. Was **your** *government legitimate?*

DJILAS: Even less so! We were an entirely new, brash, revolutionary force without a properly elected leadership, courts, and all the rest. Indeed, in 1945 we still went about detaining and executing

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people quite arbitrarily either for political reasons or for anything else we decided was culpable. Our basis of legitimacy was even thinner than that of the Soviet government.

—I appreciate that these are your sentiments now, speaking as we are in 1979. But was it your considered view in 1945, too, that the British were misguided in returning your escapees?

DJILAS: To be quite frank with you—we didn't at all understand why the British insisted on returning these people. We believed, in the ideological context prevailing at the time, that the British would have a good deal of sympathy with these refugees, seeing that they had fled Communism. We thought the British would show "class solidarity" with them, and some of us even feared that they would enlist them for future use against Communist governments, especially our own. Yet, to our great surprise, they did none of these things but delivered them into our hands. This was all the more astonishing because we knew that many Yugoslavs (Croats and others) who found themselves in Britain as prisoners of war were considered quite safe from repatriation.

—You have said that the British government might have had some—though not much—"raison d'état" for forcing the return of the Russians. But why should it have delivered the **Yugoslavs***? Your government held no pawns against the British, and the British had no reason to ingratiate themselves with ultra-Stalinist (as she then was) Yugoslavia.*

DJILAS: This was, as I say, truly puzzling; but I tend to ascribe it to the rule of tidy-minded bureaucrats who wanted to clear their desks and close the files. You see, the 20–30,000 Yugoslavs in Carinthia were a burden to the British. They had to feed them, house them, keep them under control. The simple way out was to force them back to Yugoslavia.

—Are you saying that the British were guilty of a mixture of indifference, lack of political imagination, and plain imbecility?

DJILAS: Imbecility above all—they ought to have looked at the character of our government, such as it was at the time, and drawn their conclusions.

Yes—the British did completely the wrong thing in putting these people back across the border, as *we* did completely the wrong thing in shooting them all. In *Wartime* I make no secret of my view that these killings were senseless acts of wrathful revenge.

—Is this what you thought in 1945 too?

DJILAS: I was in Montenegro when news reached me of the mass killings. Even then I felt that this was a most repulsive way of settling scores.

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—I would have thought that mass shootings involving tens of thousands of people could not have taken place except on Tito's direct orders?

DJILAS: Whether or not Tito had given direct orders no one knows. But certainly he was in favour of a radical solution—for pragmatic reasons, as the British, too, had pragmatic reasons for returning these refugees. Yugoslavia was in a state of chaos and destruction. There was hardly any civil administration. There were no properly constituted courts. There was no way in which the cases of 20–30,000 people could have been reliably investigated. So the easy way out was to have them all shot, and have done with the problem.

—Could the British Foreign Office and the military people have reasonably assumed that you would shoot every single repatriated refugee?

DJILAS: I think they ought to have had a pretty shrewd idea of what we'd be doing with them. We had a British Military Mission attached to us. Its members could have entertained no doubt as to how the Ustashis and Chetniks were treating us, and how we were treating their captured men and, in fact, anyone we remotely suspected of supporting them. But the British preferred to shut their eyes.

They were, of course, not alone in not wanting to know. One of our leading "allies" in the Wartime "National Liberation Front" was Edvard Kocbek, a distinguished Christian Socialist, a fine upright man, imbued with a sense of asceticism and utterly honourable in his thoughts and actions. He was also a writer whose talent we all acclaimed. He had been on our side from the beginning, thinking that there would somehow be room for Catholic spirituality under a Communist system. One day rumour reached him that we were shooting thousands of Slovenian Home Guards ("White Guards" as we used to call them in those days). Kocbek was worried. As head of the Christian Socialist Party in the Liberation Front, he rushed off to see the leaders of our Slovenian Central Committee to ask them whether these rumours were true.

Our comrades in the Central Committee poohpoohed the idea to reassure Kocbek. "No, no, Mr Kocbek", they said. "Of course these rumours are absolutely untrue. The Home Guards are in camps and they are being well looked after. Every case is being conscientiously investigated and will eventually come before the courts if there is a case to answer. . . ."

So Kocbek came back, visibly relieved, to tell us that he had received perfect satisfaction and was at peace with his conscience. *We* of course knew that he had been told a pack of lies because those Home Guards had been shot to the last man. But Kocbek *wanted* to believe what he was told—and so he did. He was, as honest people often are, utterly naive.

Perhaps the British, too, *wanted* to believe that we would give the repatriates a fair hearing—although, given Britain's long political experience, it is a little difficult to assume that they could have been so naive.

However this may be, I find it profoundly shocking that in an open and democratic society—which Britain is—it should have been possible to cover up, for almost thirty years, the whole question of forced repatriations, and that the men responsible have not been made to speak. There is surely a case here for a public enquiry.

—Does this flaw in British democracy weaken some of the things you have just told me about the virtues of open government when set side-by-side with a closed society?

DJILAS: It does a little, but not fundamentally. After all, in Britain the truth *has* been forced to the surface—even though it has been much delayed and, so far at least, explained *away* more than explained. In Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union you *still* can't talk about these matters.

WE HAVE NOW BEEN TALKING for many hours, and I have been watching you doodle as you were thinking. The figures you have been scrawling appear to be a square placed within a circle—"squaring the circle", if my reading of your absent-minded drawing is correct.

DJILAS: *(laughs)* **It looks like it, doesn't it?**

—What is the circle you are trying to square?

DJILAS: *(laughs)* **I suppose my hope—against hope—to see Communism one day turned into democracy!**

That—as you can see from this long conversation—is indeed trying to square the circle.

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In the last years of his life, after he had retired from his professorship at Oxford, Gilbert Ryle maintained his interest in philosophy. His chief concern was to repair the omissions and to strengthen what he saw as the weaker points of the theory which he had developed in his celebrated book *The Concept of Mind* (1949). Among other things, he came to believe that he had not done justice to the topic of thinking, and in particular to that aspect of thinking which consists in solitary meditation. The spectre which haunted him was that of Rodin's famous statue *Le Penseur*. Rodin's intention had been to depict a man absorbed in thinking. Undoubtedly his intention had been successfully executed. But exactly what had he succeeded in depicting? How was the activity attributed to the thinker properly to be described?

On Thinking[1] contains Ryle's final skirmishes around this problem. It consists of seven essays respectively entitled "Adverbial Verbs and Verbs of Thinking", "Thought and Soliloquy", "Thought and Imagination", "Thinking and Self-Teaching", "Thinking and Saying", "Negative 'Actions'", and "Improvisation", together with a critical review of Professor Zeno Vendler's book *Res Cogitans* and a very short appendix attacking Professor O. K. Bouwsma's conception of Wittgenstein's later method of philosophy. There is a preface by Geoffrey Warnock, defending Ryle against the charge of having himself enjoyed no inner life, and a moderately helpful introduction by Professor Kolenda of Rice University (Houston, Texas), in which the contents of the book are briefly summarised. Including the introduction and the four-page index the book occupies 136 pages.

Ryle's aim is very clearly stated in the opening paragraph of the first essay:

> My long-range objective is to find out how to talk sense about the thinking that *Le Penseur* is occupied in doing without committing *(1)* The Category-howler of Behaviourism or *(2)* The Category-howler of Cartesianism—that is, *(1)* without trying to *Reduce* thinking to what it isn't, for example, to audible soliloquising; and *(2)* without trying to evaluate it by *Duplicating* it with some bits of inaudible because "mental" soliloquising.

Is this objective achieved? It is very hard to say. Ryle writes more than once of making a knight's move, which amounts in fact first to elaborating some analogy and then fitting the analogy to the point at issue, and one rather gets the feeling that, except for advancing the occasional pawn, he is content to leave all the attacking to his knights. The result is that one is so caught in the thicket of analogies that one loses sight of the points to which they are directed. My general impression is that the horn of behaviourism does end by being muffled, while that of Cartesianism retains some of its sharpness. Exactly how Ryle proposes to leap safely between them remains unclear.

One reason why the Cartesian horn is not entirely blunted is that there is some doubt concerning the nature of the categorical howler, or set of howlers, of which the Cartesians are accused. If one went by a cursory reading of *The Concept of Mind* one might assume that it was the mistake of crediting *Le Penseur* with the indulgence in any sort of inner process. But the existence of day-dreams or even of private sensations is not consistently denied or explained away in *The Concept of Mind*, and in *On Thinking Le Penseur* is allowed to ponder and meditate, brood over his problems, engage in mental fantasies, silently try out arguments, rehearse speeches, and altogether live a very full mental life, without its being suggested that all this comes down to his being disposed to engage in any form of overt behaviour. We are, indeed, forbidden to treat various concomitants of his activities as though they were duplications of them, but even if this involves some thinning out of the

[1] *On Thinking*. By Gilbert Ryle. Edited and with an introduction by Konstantin Kolenda. Blackwell, £7.95.

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stream of consciousness which we are inclined to attribute to *Le Penseur*, it does not abolish the stream altogether or turn the whole of it into something else.

This is not necessarily a criticism of Ryle since it is not clear that he intends his remarks on thinking to put paid to the inner-outer distinction, or even to have any strong bearing on the question of privacy and publicity. It will be fairest to him simply to summarise and comment on his series of arguments.

IN HIS FIRST ESSAY he makes the valid point that there is a special class of verbs which might metaphorically be labelled adverbial. Later it is suggested that they form a literal counterpart of abstract nouns. The examples he gives, drawn from a larger stock, are "hurry, hesitate, persevere, obey, disobey, take care, attend, rehearse, play, pretend, enjoy, accelerate, cooperate, experiment, succeed, fail, abstain, bungle, recur, shirk. . . ." The common feature for which he selects them is that they do not stand for distinct activities but qualify verbs that do. To hurry or hesitate, persevere or obey is not to do anything *per se*; there must be some thing that we do hurriedly or obediently, persevere in, or hesitate over. The mistake which Ryle ascribes to the Cartesian is that of supposing that if the recruit obeys the sergeant's order to slope arms he must be performing an internal act of obedience in company with the external act of shouldering his rifle; but no intelligent Cartesian would suppose this. He might suppose that if the recruit resented obeying the sergeant's order, the man's shouldering his rifle might be accompanied by an inner feeling of resentment; but there he would not necessarily be wrong.

Ryle criticises "Wittgenstein's notion of family-likeness concepts" on the ground that it springs from a misconception of the work done by such verbs.

> Wittgenstein's own favoured example of game-playing (though he unfortunately stressed the noun rather than the verb) seems to me a clear case of an adverbial verb being misdiagnosed as itself a highly hospitable verb of doing. The report that during a certain period John was playing is not, as Wittgenstein seems to have thought, just vague, unspecific, elastic, or disjunctive; it is unfinished. For it to be true or false there must have been a positive, concrete or *per se* something that he was doing with a name and a description of its own, like wheeling a wheelbarrow or hitting a ball.

This is true so far as it goes, but seems to me open to the rejoinder that the notion of doing something "in play" is itself sufficiently elastic to qualify for Wittgenstein's description.

The remaining points of interest in this first essay are that "trying" and "intending" are instances of adverbial verbs, that to be thinking what one is doing need not imply that one's typing, for example, is interspersed with bouts of meditation, and that *Le Penseur*'s thinking what he is doing, when he is trying, let us say, to compose a poem, "cannot be carved off into a second collateral thinking of thoughts, even of self-didactory admonishing thoughts", or else we land him in an infinite regress, and finally that there is a class of *per se* verbs like "scrutinise", "bargain", and "damage", but also like "calculating", "composing" or "examining", "which already carry some of their own adverbial luggage." Consideration of this last class of verbs is supposed to take us a step nearer to understanding the condition of *Le Penseur*, but how it does so is not clear to me.

IN HIS ESSAY "Thought and Soliloquy" Ryle starts by maintaining that saying things, whether aloud or to oneself, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition of thinking. It is obviously not sufficient since one may be merely babbling or reciting something by rote. The examples given to show that it is not necessary either are those of a composer at the piano and a child doing a jig-saw puzzle. Nevertheless there are some special areas, though they may form only a small part of the whole territory, where thinking does require saying things to oneself, and Ryle's main purpose in this essay is to say what this involves or more particularly what it does not involve.

Thus he attacks Hume and other epistemologists and psychologists for taking "mental doodlings, verbal and pictorial", as the primary sort of thinking and then vainly trying to account for more elaborate forms of thinking on this basis. This error is connected with the belief that there must be something, words or images, that we think "in"; but, according to Ryle, this is nonsense. There is nothing that we think "in." Even a man who is composing a speech which will be delivered in English cannot properly be said to be thinking in English. If he considers a word and rejects it he surely has not been thinking *in* it. And the same is true of the words that finally go into his speech.

> Had he thought *in* them while composing? Obviously not. He had then been searching for them, and his searching could no more be described as *in* its objectives than prospecting could be described as being done *in* diamonds or *in* nuggets of gold.

Well, perhaps this is a misuse of the preposition, but I cannot see it as very heinous to say of a man who is admittedly reciting English sentences to himself that he is thinking in English while this is going on.

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A point which Ryle makes is that very often a man who is saying things to himself is rehearsing or recalling some public performance; and he argues that these rehearsals and recollectings are not to be construed as performances given to an audience of one. The reason is that the man's behaviour is quite different from what it would be if he were actually performing. Not that the thinker does no more than rehearse, but even when he is wrestling with a problem the remarks he makes to himself have a heuristic and not a conversational purpose.

RYLE'S VIEW OF LANGUAGE comes out more clearly in the essay "Thinking and Saying."

> The word is not a noise *and* something else as well: and it is not just a noise. It is a complexly qualified noise, a noise endowed with a quite specific saying-power, endowed sometimes by institutional regulations, generally by accumulating public custom, slightly rigorised by pedagogic disciplines; and so on. It is a semi-institutional *enabling*-instrument. It is something that we have learned how to use and how not to misuse.

This theme is developed in "Thinking and Self-teaching" in the way the title indicates. In "Thought and Imagination" we are reminded that these are not two different faculties. We think more or less imaginatively; and imaginative thinking is displayed to a greater or lesser degree in works of history or science, and not merely in works of fiction.

The class of "Negative Actions" that Ryle finds interesting are those, like postponing writing a letter or abstaining from eating meat, "which consist in the agent's intentional non-performance of some specifiable actions. . . ." He gives reasons for and against classifying them with actions proper and finds the reasons against to be the stronger. Neither will he have it that they are dispositions. They are explained in terms of being of a higher order than the actions which they negate. This analysis is charged with an anti-Cartesian moral. "In some cases 'Not muscular, because inner' may give place to 'Not muscular, because supra and negative'. . . ."

In his review, curiously entitled "Mowgli in Babel", of Vendler's *Res Cogitans*, Ryle finds a good deal to praise in Vendler's work, especially his dissociation of knowledge from belief; but he comes down heavily and rightly against Vendler's joining with Noam Chomsky to re-introduce innate ideas. Ryle points out that they are both victims of the narrow Skinnerian theory of learning which they profess to reject.

> We do not talk mechanically. So (notice the argument) *since* to learn is to be Pavlovianly conditioned, therefore the language-learner does not *learn* to talk and follow talk. Instead of sitting back to think ecologically (and not hydraulically) about learning, teaching, training, showing, stimulating, correcting, guiding, leading, emulating, etc., Chomsky, Vendler & Co. surrender the whole notion of learning to the mechanisers, and make do, as best they can, with the notion of evolutionary inheritance."

The proper conclusion is not that we have innate ideas but that to learn is not to be mechanically conditioned.

I HAVE QUOTED ENOUGH to show that this is a harder book than *The Concept of Mind*. It is also more sophisticated. It is to its credit that it stays further away from behaviourism. I do not believe that Ryle has finally laid the Cartesian ghost; but then, in my view, it was not to be expected that he should. The fact remains that *Le Penseur* does think. Even so, I have the feeling that Ryle has gone nearer to the heart of the problem than I have been able to follow. If only he had used the knight less, and the bishop and the rook more often. But of that it is idle to complain. One of J. L. Austin's very best sayings was "*Le style, c'est Ryle.*"

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Behaviour & Belief

On Millennial Sects—By BRYAN WILSON

"I BELIEVE IN the Holy Catholic Church', and I only regret that it does not exist", Archbishop Temple was once reported to have said. The quality of belief among lesser mortals may often be somewhat of the same kind. The creeds are recited, and the symbolic gestures of commitment, tacit and explicit, are elicited, and men are then counted as believers. Following the vigorous rebuttal of Pelagian heresy, the Christian clergy have always been disposed to regard belief, its associated ritual gestures, and the support of the church and clergy, as what really mattered. And even though Christianity was often heavily charged to sustain social and political control, the wider behavioural consequences of belief have been taken consistently seriously only by the self-styled "religious" (whether in church orders or in wayward sects).

The moral exhortations of Christianity were, in any case, of so idealised a character that they virtually defied men to conform to them. Conventional morality and ritualised gestures—sacred routines, but routines none the less—usually sufficed to establish a man's *bone fides*. How indeed could a settled society demand the total enactment of the various, contradictory, self-denying and society-denying ordinances of Christianity? In Puritanism, a serious attempt was made to exact a stricter behavioural conformity at least in some respects. Whereas the Roman Church had in effect preached, "Thou shalt not sin—but being human, of course, you will", and had provided a coping mechanism in the confessional, Protestantism made the individual the regulator of his own conduct, tightened the screw of conscience, and demanded unrelenting vigilance by ruling sin out of court. In doing so, it gave rise to that necessary hypocrisy on which Western civilisation has so vitally depended, and for want of which it now languishes.

Puritanism overtaxed the consistent zeal of all but a few, and, within the major Protestant denominations, its pristine rigour did not last. It persisted at the fringes, in the sects, in the religions of those who would be religious virtuosi. They not only believed, but even more they behaved: and their behaviour was the testimony to their belief. Such groups have become increasingly conspicuous in a permissive social climate in which Christians, too, have become increasingly permissive. In a period when the clergy of the major denominations show a steadily declining interest in moral issues (unless they can be politicised—racism, sexism, inequality), the sects persist in regarding the standards of personal comportment as the vital proof of Christian commitment. For them, believing means behaving, and it is perhaps no accident that our best studies of the significance of belief come from groups the teachings of which have been distinctive, and the behavioural consequences conspicuous.

Whereas it is difficult to know what ordinary men and women believe, and just what believing means, among sectarians such problems, while not eliminated, are much less gross. Those who do not believe, or who behave as if they do not believe (or sufficiently believe), are expelled. The attraction of such groups to the attention of sociologists, and increasingly to historians, is, then, evident. Sociologists are probably disposed to demand that believing should have behavioural consequences, since it is only then that believing has social significance. One of the problems with the studies of the major churches is that the behavioural consequences of being a Christian under their auspices are obscure: membership entails nothing very definite with respect to what members will actually do.

POPULAR BELIEF comes into its own as an object of study when it is belief giving rise to distinctive behaviour, and that generally of a socially disruptive kind. So it is that we tend to know much more about the ideas of medieval millenarians, Anabaptists, Ranters, and Fifth Monarchy men than we do about the beliefs of the pliant, conforming citizenry. The problem, at least with historical sects, is not so much in knowing what was taught, believed, and acted upon, as in the social composition of the actors, and the particular life circumstances which induced one individual rather than another to espouse the beliefs of a particular sect. It is a species of ignorance much lamented by John Harrison in *The Second Coming*, his lucid account of 19th-century millenarians.[1]

The idea of the second coming has been the most powerful belief in Christianity's heterogeneous

[1] *The Second Coming: Popular Millenarianism 1780–1850*. By J. F. C. HARRISON. Routledge & Kegan Paul, £9.95.

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224 pages £7.00. To be published January 1980.

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repertoire in stimulating vigorous social response. John Gager[2] credits it, and the cognitive dissonance experienced by first-century millennialists, with the impulse to proselytising activity: one way of softening the disappointment at the delayed second advent was to persuade others to believe that it was still to come. But not only simple minds have been captivated by the promise that Christ would return. Modern Christians and comparative religionists may need reminding that, even if—for theologians—the terms of the debate about Christ have shifted, in the past the second advent was literally and seriously discussed by the most eminent intellects. The Rev. Don Cupitt in *The Debate about Christ*[3] dismisses "these old apocalyptic and eschatological ideas" in a couple of paragraphs, wrongly declaring that Sir Isaac Newton was the last front-rank thinker to take them literally, and, with a certainty that few sociologists would dare, declares that they linger on "in small sects . . . because of their profound appeal to the deprived." Professor Ninian Smart, in his collection of deftly-drawn vignettes which depict Christianity in various historical, geographic, and intellectual contexts,[4] mentions the second coming only in passing and chiefly with reference to the effect of William Miller's prophecies in up-state New York in the 1840s.

THE SIGNIFICANCE of the debate among scholars is splendidly brought out in *Prophets and Millennialists*, an impressive new book by W. H. Oliver, who, although concerned primarily with the early 19th century, provides an intelligent overview of earlier opinions and debate.[5] The accommodation of the Bible's affirmations of a second coming to a gradualist conception of the ushering in of the millennium through the steady christianisation of the world (so-called "post-millennialism") did not convince all scholars. Advent prior to millennium ("pre-millennialism") was clearly a biblically more warranted exegesis. Despite the excitement of the Napoleonic wars, the temptation to identify Napoleon as Anti-Christ (as an alternative candidate to the Pope), and the strong feelings of some that contemporary events were clear evidence that this was a time near to the end of times, scholars were by no means all convinced that prophecy should be used to work out forthcoming events. Yet it is important to record their concerns, and the outpourings of works on prophetic exegesis, and their abundant reissue at the end of the 19th century, were undoubtedly a fillip to popular millennialism both in the United States and in Britain.

Whereas the intellectual history of early 19th-century millennialism is Oliver's preoccupation, the social manifestations of these beliefs are more the major concern of Harrison. Their paths cross where Christian millennialism gave rise to secular radicalism and libertarianism, for example in James Smith and John (Zion) Ward. But even here they neatly divide the field—to Oliver, Smith is important for his association with Owenism; to Harrison, his importance is as a follower of the Christian Israelite descendant of Joanna Southcott, John Wroe, whose new city of Jerusalem was to be constructed at Ashton-under-Lyne. Joanna Southcott is perhaps the central character of Harrison's rich and informative narrative, spawning as she did a variety of sundry prophets and messiahs, some of whom outdate the concerns of this book, but failing to spawn, as she promised, the man-child predicted in the book of Revelation.

Many of the popular millennial movements of the period invoked legitimations that at least supplemented (and sometimes transcended) the strictly biblical teachings in which they believed. So it was, certainly, with Joanna Southcott herself, with Ward, who claimed to be God, Richard Brothers, precursor of the British Israel movement (not to be confused with Wroe's Christian Israelite congregations), and Emanuel Swedenborg—all of whom people Harrison's pages. Even the Seventh-Day Adventists, widely accepted as fully within the Christian tradition, came into being only after special revelations had vouchsafed to Ellen Harmon (Mrs White) and others the need to reinstitute the Jewish Sabbath and dietary regulations, while the plethora of additional legitimations invoked on behalf of Mormonism has caused some other Christians to withhold that designation from the Latter-Day Saints.

REVELATIONS MAY, of course, remain within a tradition, or quite transcend it. A common concern of all movements that make claim to special inspiration is the validation of inspiration against other sources of legitimacy. And where inspiration is a commonly claimed gift, as was the case with both the Mormons and the Irvingite Catholic Apostolic Church, the regulation of such God-given powers must become a matter of explicit concern. Like Mormonism, its almost absolute contemporary, Irvingism, invoked a variety of legitimating principles, from the conspicuous liturgical preoccupations of a highly hierocratised church to the operation of the gifts of the Spirit. But, much more than Mormonism, it sustained its

[2] John G. Gager, *Kingdom and Community: The Social World of Early Christianity* (1975).

[3] *The Debate About Christ*. By DON CUPITT. SCM Press, £1.95.

[4] *The Phenomenon of Christianity*. By NINIAN SMART. Collins, £6.95.

[5] *Prophets and Millennialists: The Uses of Biblical Prophecy in England from the 1790s to the 1840s*. By W. H. OLIVER. Oxford University Press, £10.50, $15.00.

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fundamental commitment to pre-millennialism. For the Irvingites, everything was taken back as far into history as possible, which, as Robert Wilken displays in his scholarly study of *The Myth of Christian Beginnings*, has been a powerful preoccupation of Christians of much more orthodox persuasions.[6] The words of Jesus, the apostolic injunctions and ordinances, the liturgical practice of a much later church, the institutions of a medieval "age of faith" are all employed to remake the past in the image of later concerns and preconceptions.

POPULAR MILLENNIALISTS have shown a special capacity for the accretion of belief commitments, perhaps because so many of the movements of which we have knowledge were still new and creative even at the time when they went into decline. Religions are not born fully-formed and fledged: they develop their ideas, abandon some, enhance others, and permit yet others to undergo transformation. In spite of this tendency, and the ease with which many millennialists have departed from the strictly scriptural sources of their central belief, it is as well to be reminded that a fundamentalist, orthodox Protestant tradition of pre-millennialism does persist, particularly among evangelicals. Timothy Weber documents the development of this tradition in the United States, concentrating particularly on those who accepted a rather special interpretation of millennial prophecy, the Dispensationalists.[7]

This intellectual tradition is owed to John Nelson Darby, leader of the Plymouth (and later of the Exclusive) Brethren. Neither Harrison nor Oliver mentions Darby or the Brethren, perhaps because the millennium was not the primary focus of the Brethren's concern, and certainly it was not the subject that gave rise to the divisions in that fissiparous movement. Nor is Weber concerned with the Brethren, but rather with the evangelicals who preached the early second advent, and whose influence spread particularly through revivalists such as Moody and Torrey. Weber's book, despite his explicit commitment to a "behavioural approach" to history, is a study of ideas. He asks, certainly, "What differences did believing in the imminent second coming of Christ make in the way people actually lived?" And he tells us that few if any of the pre-millennialists of 1875–1925 behaved as the early converts of William Miller are reported to have behaved in expectation of the second coming in 1844, when businesses were boarded up, farms sold, debts paid, and crops were left unharvested.

Just what proportions of Millerites behaved like that is contestable. But if men like Moody were busy with long-term plans to found educational institutions at a time when they were preaching that for the truly converted worldly concerns ceased to be of importance, they were so, perhaps, because Dispensationalism put the millennial hope into a less predominant position than had the earlier, Millerite, exegesis. And of course, Dispensationalists did not set dates. A behavioural approach might be more rewardingly pursued with those whose beliefs were less circumspectly propounded and more centrally located in the scheme of history they accepted—namely with other schools of adventists, Seventh-Day Adventists, Christadelphians, and Jehovah's Witnesses, perhaps.

THE TEST FOR SECTS which begin with single-minded commitment to the advent, and which see in contemporary history the signs of the soon end of the present system of things, is of course the failure of specific prophecy and the disappointment of believers. The temptation to allow the advent to take second place to projects originally designed as part of the response to the injunction, "Occupy till I come", is evident even among the Seventh-Day Adventists, whose commitment to the Saturday sabbath has provoked more public attention than their expectation of the early second advent. The Mormons, too, whose earliest English periodical bore the title *Millennial Star*, and whose early hymns proclaimed the imminence of the Parousia, soon allowed, as official Church historians admit, their preoccupation with discovering the site at which Zion should be gathered to occlude their pre-millennial ideas.[8] Today, among all the other facets of Mormonism, it might be difficult to say whether the imminent second advent is still effectively part of Mormon belief.

THE LINE BETWEEN scholarly exegetes, inspired prophets, and messianic claimants has not always been easy to draw. The self-claims of prophets sometimes undergo change, usually in the direction of the enhancement of status. In general, the closer a movement has remained to Christian orthodoxy, the more circumscribed have been the claims of those who have worked on biblical prophecies. William Miller, John Thomas (founder of the Christadelphians), and Pastor Charles Russell claimed no superhuman qualities, and had none claimed for them. Rather more was claimed for

[6] *The Myth of Christian Beginnings*. By ROBERT L. WILKEN. SCM Press, £2.95.

[7] *Living in the Shadow of the Second Coming: American Premillennialism 1875–1925*. By TIMOTHY P. WEBER. Oxford University Press, $14.95, £8.00.

[8] The point is conceded in the new scholarly study, *The Mormon Experience: A History of the Latter-day Saints*. By LEONARD J. ARRINGTON and DAVIS BITTON. George Allen and Unwin, £9.50.

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Mrs White of the Seventh-Day Adventists, who was designated a special vessel through whom special messages came, while the founder of Mormonism, Joseph Smith Jr, began with elaborate and comprehensive revelation to which Christian tradition was affiliated. Many of the new religious movements of our own times are uninhibited by an encumbrance of received Christian prophetic tradition, drawing their inspiration from alien sources, but one which combines a certain Christian fundamentalism with additional revelation, and the leader of which is a messianic claimant, is the Unification Church of Mr Sun Myung Moon. Similarly grounded in Christian apocalypticism is the movement which follows the Prophet David (Moses) Berg—the Children of God.

Our knowledge of these new movements is, despite the number of sociologists who hover about them, still somewhat fragmentary. Sects and cults grow faster and change more rapidly, one suspects, than used to be the case. There appears to be a diminution of stable, persistent commitment. Ideas are floated, seized, tried out, amended, and dropped in more rapid succession than used to be the case. In some respects it is much easier for the contemporary sociologist than for an historian like Harrison to obtain direct evidence of the behavioural implications of believing, but the evidence is itself volatile, and generalisations become difficult to establish. One observer, working with one commune or congregation, at one time, might find that all his findings fail to be confirmed by members of the same movement in some other place or at some other time.

HOW TO GET PERSPECTIVE and overview become the problems for the sociologist: how to get detailed life-histories, intimations of motivation, and the precise effects of conversion are the difficulties for the historian. Among new studies, perhaps the most impressive is the perceptive description and analysis of the Children of God provided by Roy Wallis in a book which is devoted to a number of essays on rather diverse social movements.[9] Not only is there a convincing blend of detail and generalisation about this extraordinary movement, based on an analysis of its literature and on interviews with members, but Wallis puts the whole into the context of a critique of what for long has been the prevailing orthodoxy in the sociology of religion—the relative deprivation thesis. The idea that religious commitment, and especially sectarian or deviant religious commitment, can be explained by the felt-sense of deprivation (relative to the position of others or to one's own erstwhile expectations for oneself) has the attraction of reducing religious belief to social and psychological variables. As a theory it is easy to invoke, but difficult to substantiate conclusively. It often explains too much, and it does so, often, by purely circular reasoning. The Introduction to Wallis's book might be profitably read and re-read by everyone concerned with explaining religious behaviour.

The Children of God have, at the behest of Moses, their prophet, undergone a variety of changes in policy, but a central feature has been a commitment to the second coming, now scheduled for about 1993, following the emergence of anti-Christ and the period of the Great Tribulation. Wallis does not identify the specific exegetical tradition from which Berg, whose parents were evangelists of a fundamentalist persuasion, derived the prophetic scheme with which he began, and which, despite the changing programme of the sect, appears to have remained its central concern. Of course, not all eventually millennial movements begin with preoccupations about the millennium. Some start with quite different interests, and only later add the second advent and the apocalypse to their repertoire. Such a movement was *The Process*.

THIS MOVEMENT BEGAN virtually as a therapeutic exercise closely imitative of Scientology. When I was admitted to an informal discussion among its leaders in the mid-1960s, they were inventing their nomenclature. What, I was asked, might they call their therapists? The Scientologists used the term *auditor*. What might be an appropriate alternative designation for Process therapists? At that stage, the Process was scarcely conscious of itself as a religious movement, even though the leaders expressed an eagerness to meet sectarians of any sort, and naively asked me how they could get in touch with some. Perhaps unconsciously they espoused the idea of relative deprivation, and considered that, of all people, deviant religionists needed their therapy. In the course of a short time, the movement picked up a mélange of religious ideas; called themselves The Church of the Last Judgment; became polytheistic, with Jehovah, Lucifer, Satan, and Christ as deities, whose various dispositions corresponded to the personalities of members of the cult. Members might pick, as it were, their deity. The therapeutic system was described as "man's last chance" for salvation before the ultimate devastation of the planet. Rituals, symbols, vestments, and programmes of meditation ("directed fantasy") were developed over the years, as the cult migrated from Britain to Mexico and North America, eventually experiencing schism and deposing its founder and leader.

[9] *Salvation and Protest: Studies of Social and Religious Movements*. By ROY WALLIS. Francis Pinter, £10. Roy Wallis is also the author of the fullest and most impressive study of Scientology, *The Road to Total Freedom: A Sociological Analysis of Scientology* (1976).

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Our information about the Process comes from an impressive ethnographic study by William Sims Bainbridge, who spent years as a recognised hanger-on (treated, one supposes, much as is an anthropologist by "his" tribe).[10] His resultant study is rich in often minute detail, with life histories, accounts of meetings, and a fully recounted history. If it does not achieve the analytical clarity of Wallis's studies, it is none the less one of the fullest accounts we have of any of the new movements. Irritatingly, Bainbridge has felt the need to cloak the cult in the anonymity of an assumed name, *The Power*, and to disguise the names of all the participants. This retreat from sociological convention—begun earlier by John Lofland in his early study of the Unification Church[11]—is to be regretted: social reality should be discussed explicitly and openly.

A NARROWER STUDY of a much bigger movement than the Process is encompassed in *Sacred Journeys*, in which James Downton provides an account of eighteen interviews with converts to the Divine Light Mission of the Indian boy-guru, Maharaj Ji.[12] The Hindu tradition has in itself not been hospitable to millennialism, but the Divine Light Mission picked up the term, and while it might be too much to say that an attempt was made to stage the millennium, by convincing followers and the media that something dramatic had happened, none the less, to name a giant rally in Houston, Texas, *Millennium 1973* suggests both an innocence of the many failed millennia of Christendom and an exaggerated self-confidence. The failure of that festival to awaken public interest, and the scepticism of the press, was a turning point for many of the converts to the guru, but of Downton's eighteen cases there were only three outright defections, even though others had reservations when the guru came to claim to be the messiah.

The development of the movement is refracted through the personal stories of the respondents, who are permitted in considerable measure to speak for themselves. There is little explicit analysis, but the stories reveal a variety of common experience that might be grist to a relative deprivationist's mill. The background of respondents included broken homes; the sense of personal inadequacy; isolation and alienation; dropping out of college; experimentation with drugs on a regular basis; and random searches for spiritual meaning. From his follow-up studies, it is clear that most of the converts believed that Divine Light, and particularly "the knowledge" transmitted by the guru, had saved them from despair, and this was so even for one of the defectors. But then, this is in conformity with what most religions would claim to achieve for their followers, and it can occur even when the (acknowledgedly equivocally-proclaimed) millennium does not.

A MORE EXPLICIT, traditional, and Christian idea of the millennium is canvassed by the Unification Church, in which the Rev. Sun Myung Moon is considered by his followers to be the messiah. The implications of believing, and just how people come to believe in, the teachings of Mr Moon have been of more than narrowly academic interest in recent years. Press stories probably create an image of the movement which is gross when it is not false, and it is unfortunate that we have not had a serious sociological study since the mid-1960s, when the movement was still very young. The most recent book, edited by Irving Louis Horowitz, who teaches sociology at Rutgers University, scarcely fills the gap.[13] Among some serious essays are scattered press reports, accounts of custody proceedings relating to minors who have joined the movement, and indictments of the Church's alleged association with the South Korean government and its Central Intelligence Agency. Horowitz himself attacks the Church's penchant for organising scholarly conferences. But if the Vatican and the World Council of Churches sponsor such conferences—and they do—why should not the Unification Church do likewise?

People in Britain are now so accustomed to the state monopoly that they are often astonished, and even scandalised, to learn that, for example, the Seventh-Day Adventists in the United States, or the Soka Gakkai movement, or the Tenri Church in Japan all have their own, well-accredited and impressive, universities. After all, the private universities in America, and indeed the ancient universities in Britain, originated as religious foundations. The interpenetration of Church and politics was long taken for granted in Britain, and is so still in Ireland. In this longer historical perspective links between the Unification Church and the South Korean government may not look so unusual. Perhaps the strange thing, however, is the millennialism of the Church. Few governments have found it easy to go into partnership with an apocalyptic movement, the leader of which is regarded by his followers as the new messiah.

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[10] *Satan's Power: A Deviant Psychotherapy Cult*. By WILLIAM SIMS BAINBRIDGE. University of California Press, £10.50.

[11] John Lofland, *Doomsday Cult: A Study of Conversion, Proselytization, and Maintenance of Faith* (1966).

[12] *Sacred Journeys: The Conversion of Young Americans to Divine Light Mission*. By JAMES V. DOWNTON Jr. Columbia University Press, $16.20, £7.50.

[13] *Science, Sin, and Scholarship*. Edited by IRVING LOUIS HOROWITZ. The MIT Press, £8.75, $12.50.

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The Self as Double Agent

Psychology & the Imagination—By ERIC RHODE

"As thou knowest not what is the way of the Spirit, nor how the bones do grow in the womb of her that is with child, even so thou knowest not the works of God, who maketh all things.

ECCLESIASTES XI. 5: quoted as an epigraph to JOHN LOCKE, **An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.**

Or if it be possible that the soul can, whilst the body is sleeping, have its thinking, enjoyments and concerns, its pleasure or pain, apart, which the man is not conscious of nor partakes in; it is certain that Socrates asleep and Socrates awake is not the same person. . . ." LOCKE, *Essay*

I PRESUME THAT any model of understanding requires some confidence about our capacity to assess the nature of what can be understood, and some clarity about the boundaries of what cannot be known. I also presume that such a model requires some conception of the mind as having the means to communicate between its various parts. For, on Lockean grounds, if the self is seen to be divided, or as consisting of two or more agents dissociated in consciousness, then the authority of reasoning (and of understanding) will be undermined. The wildest probabilities will pass unchecked if there is no central sorting office, as it were; and perception and judgment unpredictably subverted.

Yet though checked, such wild probabilities can be entertained—if only to refute absurd arguments. Locke entertains one such probability when he argues against the belief that men think at all times. He imagines Castor to be asleep and in his sleep to invade Pollux, who is sleeping without his soul. "We have here the bodies of two men with only one soul between them, which we will suppose to sleep and wake by turns."

Locke ridicules: but the present-day mind is less likely to be struck by the mockery in his idea than by its stimulus to the imagination. Locke's idea germinates in the mind; it invites us to meditate on possible meanings; although I suspect that Locke would have found such a post-Romantic conception of thought as undermining as he did the conception of self as a double agent. To allow yourself thoughts over which the waking self has no control is to give experiential sanction to such unverifiable events as dreams. And if dreams are to be sanctioned, then why not hallucinations, rumours and even lies (assuming that the distinction between lies and truth can be maintained)?

For all this, Locke's idiom is not remote from the idiom of psychoanalysis now—in the sense that Locke believed, as do many psychoanalysts, that any theory of understanding (in order to have value) needs to be secured to some conception of human development which, in turn, requires to be based on actual observation. One of the pleasures in reading Locke is that one comes across many instances of his having affectionately observed infants and children. (His "Essay Concerning Human Understanding" gives evidence of this just as much as does his delightful essay "On Education.") And Locke thinks about his observations in a manner that anticipates Freud's commentary on his grandson's game with a wooden reel in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle.*

WHAT MAY PUZZLE US about Locke's point of view is why he feels the need to shift a division posited in consciousness to the more physiological differentiation between sleeping and waking; and what may be the significance of this split for any theory of human development. One has only to read Norman Malcolm's excellent monograph on *Dreaming* (1959) to see how questions of this kind have perplexed philosophers since the days of Aristotle, though Malcolm doesn't mention Aristotle, or a momentous later occasion, recalled by Hegel in *The Philosophy of Mind*:

> The distinction between sleep and waking is one of those *posers*, as they may be called, which are often addressed to philosophy. Napoleon, for example, on a visit to the university of Pavia, put this question to the class of ideology.

Hegel saw sleep as an invigoration for "the self-conscious and rational activity" of being awake. Sleep is "a return back from the world of specialisation, from dispersion into phases where it (*the soul*) has grown hard and stiff."

In making these speculations, Hegel begins to accrete a view which to some extent allows the idea of the self as double agent some dignity. He

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suggests a likeness between the conscious mind and its relationship to dreams and the conscious mind and what he calls its secret inner life—by which I think he means some daemon or form of unconscious; and he also suggests that these two relationships are like the foetus's relationship to its mother *in utero*. The foetus and its mother are an

> undivided psychic unity: the one as yet no *self*, as yet nothing impenetrable, incapable of resistance: the other is its actuating subject, the *single* self of the two. The mother is the *genius* of the child.

By linking dreams, unconscious thoughts and life in the womb, Hegel does hint at an idea concerning the origins of the self as double agent—in the unity, then the dual relationship, of mother and child. In this Hegel is more bold in his thinking than all but the most adventurous psychoanalysts. (Perhaps many analysts would hold his probabilities too wild to entertain.) At the same time, the main trends in psychoanalytic development in Britain since the late 1920s have related to observations of the mother-child relationship, and since the late 1940s a similar interest has emerged in American psychoanalytic thought.[1] Until recently, few analysts have speculated on the meaning of life in the womb, although some have now begun to speculate in this way; and clinical investigation, surprisingly, has given the subject a new bearing (e.g. in the June 1972 issue of the *Australia and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry*, the paper by the gynaecologist A. W. Liley on "The Foetus as Personality").

ONE DECISIVE CHANGE has been called for in order for this to happen: the psychological barrier between sleep and waking has had to be dropped, and so too has been the assumption that experiences alien to the reasonable or commonsensical notions of waking life must necessarily be psychopathological. In *The Innocence of Dreams*,[2] Charles Rycroft examines Freud's theory of "Two Principles of Mental Functioning" and proposes that Freud's primary process (as extrapolated from the condensation, displacement and symbolisation of dreams) is identical to Coleridge's definition of the Secondary Imagination (which "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to recreate"). But with this difference: that Freud, in viewing the primary process as (states Rycroft) "primitive, maladaptive, irrational, unrealistic and anarchic", left himself "no option but to categorize imagination, creative ability and even intuition and emotion as in principle neurotic, aggressive and symptom-like."

Rycroft sees dreams as a way by which the second agent tests out problems and experiences imaginatively. Dreaming need not necessarily be a neurotic activity, it need not necessarily be associated with hallucination or self-deception. Freud was right to stress the likeness between dreams and art. Where Freud was in error, Rycroft suggests, was in seeing both of them as neurotic activities, whereas both in all likelihood stem from the saner part of the self.

Rycroft wishes us to see dreams within a tradition that includes the ancient Egyptian and biblical interpreters as well as the Romantics and he makes out a lively case for this point of view. Yet in suggesting certain solutions to Freud's awkward categorisation of dreams, he in turn raises other problems. For instance, if the making of dreams is such an innocent activity, why does the agent that creates them tend to be so cryptic?

RYCROFT'S EMPHASIS on imagination and on psychoanalysis as an imaginative activity is heartening; and a key to other interests in this field. For the view that psychoanalysis is essentially an imaginative activity based on observation is one of the themes of Donald Meltzer's *The Kleinian Development*,[3] a commentary (originally three sets of lectures) on the work of Freud, Melanie Klein and W. R. Bion.

Meltzer is less concerned to set out a Great Tradition (though in effect he does that) than to resolve a debate he long has had with himself about the rival claims of these three formidable personalities. What they all have in common, he has come to realise, is the belief that psychoanalysis as a form of imaginative work always exacts a price in mental pain. The act of attending to the patient entails an openness to (and acceptance of) the mental pain always present in the patient, though the patient himself may be unable to recognise this pain. Indeed, the only way an analyst can develop is through listening to what his patients tell him, either intentionally or unintentionally. Psychoanalysis was initiated not by Freud, not even by Josef Breuer (as Freud

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[1] *Oneness and Separateness: From Infant to Individual*. By LOUISE J. KAPLAN. Cape, £5.95. On this evidence, however, the Americans have not learned much, if anything, from their British colleagues, such as Esther Bick, Martha Harris, or Frances Tustin. Dr Kaplan vitiates her observations by premature generalisation. She does not write about individual mothers and children but (in the manner of René Spitz) about some statistical entity whose development appears conditional on its age. Yet, surely, mother-infant observation depends for its life and convictions on particularities. How these relate to a theory of development remains problematic (and I suspect will remain so for a long time).

[2] *The Innocence of Dreams*. By CHARLES RYCROFT. The Hogarth Press, £6.95.

[3] *The Kleinian Development*. By DONALD MELTZER. Clunie Press, £12.50 (from Karnac Books Ltd., 56 Gloucester Road, London SW7).

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claimed), but by the patient known as Anna O. And its most remarkable patient, states Meltzer, was Freud himself in his own self-analysis.

Meltzer is an exacting critic of the way this analysis was conducted, as indeed he is of the analytical work of both his other mentors. He is amazed by the glib, sententious "interpretation" that follows Freud's report of the complex content and associations to Freud's own dream of "Irma's injection." The analyst fails to do justice to the patient. For what we have in this dream and its associations is the portrait of the longings, worries and indecisions of a youngish man at a crucial stage in his life, a portrait rich enough to engage the attention of a great novelist, which Freud is unable to realise because he is dominated by a simplistic theory concerning the nature of dreams.

MELTZER'S OVERALL VIEW of Freud is of a clinician forever in conflict with a theoretician, and at his best being forced, under the stress of experiencing the lives of his patients, to abandon often comforting theories about the mind, including those of a behaviouristic kind. Under this stress, Freud was obliged to recognise that patients could not be described as a complex of symptoms or mechanisms. He came to see that you cannot begin to understand people without the willingness to open yourself to an imaginative notion of the total life.

His most attractive quality, Meltzer believes, was his courage—his courage in keeping to his method in spite of all the anti-imaginative pressures imposed on him by his patients. The turning point in his career was his analysis of the young woman known as Dora, a painful experience which modified Freud's character, although in worldly terms this case was a failure, and it took courage on Freud's part to publish an account of it.

> Really, one must be a little aghast at the courage of this lonely man at the turn of the century. The method had seized him and he was pressing on with the excitement—nay, recklessness—which only the thrill of the pursuit of knowledge can explain. The traits of ambition and the urgency of the parvenu are gone.

In all this, worries about the meaning of the self as double agent appear marginal. If there is a duality (and sometimes intimacy), it lies in the relationship between patient and analyst. And sometimes, as we consider this relationship, it can become in our minds a threesome—as occurs in the most moving section of Meltzer's commentary, his extended critique of Melanie Klein's detailed and lengthy narrative of a four-month analysis with ten-year-old Richard.

In her account of this analysis, Mrs Klein was able to recreate the intensities and complexities of feeling with which their relationship imbued the toys, gestures, and unusual setting in which the analysis was conducted (of all places—and yet, why not?—a scout's hut in Pitlochry during the Second World War). What is so moving about Meltzer's critique is the love with which he brings to life, from a later perspective, details of an analysis in which he had no part. It is a little like a son observing from a doorway his mother's relationship with his own son, ungrudgingly conscious that he himself no longer has the child's privilege.

IT IS NO COINCIDENCE that at times Mrs Klein's account of her sessions with Richard, as reported by Meltzer, has the resonance of a dream or a Shakespearean play: since we are in touch with the power that "dissolves, diffuses, dissipates in order to re-create." That is, an experience of an analytical session, a dream or a Shakespearean play can be of the same modality, though the Shakespearean play nearly always may represent a higher order in organisation and consciousness. And so, when Freud reports in *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* on what he observed when he contemplated the small boy throwing a wooden reel, it is of secondary importance, in regard to the meaning he elicits from this event, whether he saw the boy in actuality or in a dream. Feeling and imagination acknowledge actuality and dream as but differing consequences of the same modality. Indeed, to consider a structured event like a child's game as a dream is one way to gain a fresh outlook on its possible meanings. It is one way to escape, as it were, from the forces of anti-imagination in yourself.

The quality of Freud's observation is exemplary, and so is the manner in which he infers a theory from it (though one may, or may not, agree with this theory); as when he suggests that the child is attempting to master its anxiety about its separation from its mother. This passage is a *locus classicus* in a number of ways. It anticipates Mrs Klein's thoughts about what she called the absent object (the absent beloved, or an aspect of the beloved) and the two systems of values—the so-called paranoid-schizoid and depressive positions—in which she would subsume thoughts about this absent object.[4]

[4] This is to simplify the complex and often complicated question of what exactly was Mrs Klein's debt to Freud: a question untangled with great skill by HANNA SEGAL in *Klein*. Fontana Modern Masters, £1.50. Dr Segal's reading parallels and yet diverges from Meltzer's in a manner that provides a truly binocular vision of Melanie Klein's work, and she has some moving and freshly-researched pages on Mrs Klein's childhood and early years.

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THIS PASSAGE has also fascinated French psychoanalysts of the recent psycho-linguistic school: Jacques Lacan has some rewarding things to say about it in his lectures and so has Maud Mannoni, one of the more impressive of Lacanian analysts.[5] And now we have an extract in translation of Jacques Derrida's lengthy commentary on *Beyond the Pleasure Principle*.[6]

Derrida's close reading of the text, or what he calls an "unreading", dissolves and diffuses many of our assumptions about it. He points out that Freud, the observer, does not admit that the child playing with the wooden reel is his own grandson, Ernst, and that, for all his seeming impartiality, Freud is emotionally in a mirror-like relationship with the child, since both of them are related in different ways to the same absent object, Sophie, who is both Freud's daughter and Ernst's mother. That Sophie died some time after the writing of *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (as indeed did Freud's favourite grandson Heinerle), that Ernst, then aged five, appeared unable to mourn his mother's death, and that Freud in later editions of this book mentions the mother's death in a clipped-tone footnote are poignancies that Derrida gives full weight to.

He is especially skilled at illuminating the throwaway or in-parenthesis remark that the casual reader is liable to skim over.

> The child had a wooden reel with a piece of string tied round it. It never occurred to him to pull it along the floor behind, for instance, and play at its being a carriage.

How Derrida picks on the regret in that second sentence and with what gusto does he relate it to Freud's confessed antipathy to travelling by train! Of course, such an approach could be intrusive, psychobiography at its most impertinent. In fact, Derrida is tactful. As I see it, his intention is to demonstrate how the power of a so-called objective observation can depend for its objectivity on a loss of the self in the thing observed. Or, as Coleridge put it: "The province [of the imagination] is to give consciousness to the subject by presenting to it its conceptions objectively."

WHERE DERRIDA DIFFERS from the usual practice of textual criticism in poetry is in giving his commentary the allusive free-associative qualities that the young Freud ascribed to the unconscious. The

[5] Maud Mannoni, *The Child, His "Illness" and the Others* (1970) and *The Retarded Child and the Mother* (1973).

[6] Derrida's abridged text appears in *Psychoanalysis and the Question of the Text*. Edited by GEOFFREY H. HARTMAN. Johns Hopkins University Press, $9.00, £5.25.

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reader is invited to be an analyst, as it were, in relation to this flamboyant, rude, and disjointed manifestation of the primary process. The trouble with such an invitation is that once you have accepted it you may find the roles have become reversed; and the text, or rather the author of the text, has raised questions that begin to encircle you.

FREUD WAS FASCINATED by Diderot's essay "Rameau's Nephew." As Lionel Trilling (among others) pointed out, this rather likeable if unfortunate nephew is a prototype for the Dostoevskian voice from under ground which rumbles through so much recent literature: portraits in which the part of ourselves we would most like to suppress, publicly and embarrassedly speaks out. The most recent eruption of this type is the French analyst, Jacques Lacan.

Lacan claims to be identified with the workings of the Id and to be at daggers-drawn with the Ego: by which he means, among other things, that he is hostile to the dominant ego-centred psychology school in American psychoanalysis. It is not surprising, perhaps, that this anti-American feeling should arouse such attention in the United States now, in this self-doubting post Viet Nam period.

Sherry Turkle points out in her gossipy, avidly-researched study of "Freud's French Revolution", in her *Psychoanalytic Politics*,[7] that the experience of Viet Nam and the May '68 insurgency are key events to the emergence of psychoanalysis in France, at least as a journalistic phenomenon. I find her method of seeing the meaning of psychoanalysis in sociological and political terms unhelpful and at certain points inaccurate: as when she argues that French bourgeois society had no need for psychoanalysis because the "bureaucratic" structure of family life gave the individual adequate security. (Any reading of *Madame Bovary* would cast doubt on this belief.)

When she is giving a blow-by-blow account of Lacan's conflict with the French Psychoanalytic Association, however, she is fascinating. At first the story has a farcical turn about it, as Lacan cuts down sessions to ten, then five, minutes and thereby threatens to swamp the market by turning out miniature Lacanian analysts by the hundreds. Dr Turkle is a woman of the Left and wants us to admire Lacan (after all, wasn't Lacan presumed to be the man who smuggled Dany Cohn-Bendit across the French border in the boot of his Jaguar?) But the smile is soon wiped off our face, as the action becomes more and more berserk. An anonymous onlooker remarks: "There were so many suicides." In all this, Lacan comes over as impersonal, almost a void at the centre; perhaps appropriately for a man who wishes to embody unconscious energies.

LACAN'S INFLUENCE can be felt in many recent American publications. From these I gain the impression that psychoanalysts in the United States are going through a period of unusual self-assessment: ego psychology is on the retreat and hostility to foreign influences in abeyance. (Are American students still obliged to read Mrs Klein's books under strict supervision?)

This sober tone marks Reuben Fine's *A History of Psychoanalysis*.[8] Dr Fine is especially conscious of American achievement in this field, but he is open to other currents of thought. The way he has organised his history ahistorically—that is, in terms of subjects—makes for a useful work of reference, but stability is achieved at the price of a loss of verve, and students (for whom this history appears intended) will find little in it that might shake their complacence.

On the other hand, they will find little else in the three latest volumes from Thomas Szasz.[9] Dr Szasz calls in doubt nearly everything and everyone. His polemical style annihilates behaviourists, analysts, and whomever else you like to think of, including Nobel Prize winners (such as Linus Pauling—for believing that Vitamin C might cure schizophrenia). Read in short extracts, Dr Szasz is exhilarating, and he cares for the people who come to treatment. But the shrillness of his tone does no justice to the frequent truth of his perceptions.

AND FINALLY from the American scene, *Psychoanalysis and Language*,[10] an absorbing collection of essays that includes Chomsky brooding on the nature of inaccessible knowledge (one form of this being an unconscious that cannot even be inferred), Henry Edelheit considering Freud's interest in Lamarck, and Hans W. Loewald raising the interesting thought, in a piece on the primary process, that the child's earliest experience of language is through the web of speech-sounds its mother weaves around it—an experience which Loewald likens to the sing-song of church liturgies, often in an unintelligible and ancient tongue. Marshall Edelson discusses the meaning of

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[7] *Psychoanalytic Politics*. By SHERRY TURKLE. Basic Books, $12.50; Burnett Books, £6.95.

[8] *A History of Psychoanalysis*. By REUBEN FINE. Columbia University Press, $31.20, £14.30.

[9] *The Theology of Medicine. Schizophrenia. The Myth of Psychotherapy*. By THOMAS SZASZ. Oxford University Press, £5.75, £5.95, £5.95.

[10] *Psychoanalysis and Language*. Edited by JOSEPH H. SMITH. Yale University Press, $20.00, £14.40.

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interpretation and comes out with the striking statement that "Neurosis is not to live in a fictive world, but rather to live in an insufficiently imagined world."

And so new paths are being opened up. What is required is further investigation into the perennial battle between the forces of imagination and anti-imagination as it occurs in the analytic setting.

Men of Action

Philosophy & Social Theory—By MARTIN HOLLIS

THE SOCIAL SCIENCES grew up infused with a vision of nature as a mechanical, law-governed, humanly empty system. That vision never appealed directly to common sense. It relied on the old idea that the flickering shadows of experience are a shaky clue to the steady realm of true being. Scientific explanation involved inference from appearance to reality, from subjective to objective, from surface to structure. When man and society became targets for science, these dualisms forced some drastic choices. Was social life, as experienced, apparent or real? It was usually treated as appearance, a shaky clue to laws, forces and structures hidden from the untutored minds of the actors themselves. There was a search for the Newtonian mechanics of the social world, which outlasted the original scientific vision in the natural sciences. Even when the bombast went out of social theory, a notion of science as the detection of universal laws still governed the canon of explanation. Indeed it remains, I suppose, the single most common assumption about the purpose of scientific method.

Two other lines of thought might have changed the story, had they not been absorbed into the dominant rubric. One was the theme of hermeneutics: that the character of social action depends on the actors' own understanding. It demanded that the social world be grasped from within and a sense found there which human agents could recognise—a sense unlike the sense or order found in nature. But Weber's edgy formula, calling for adequacy at the levels of both meaning and causation, disarmed any widespread radical challenge.

The other line was to analyse social life into the interplay of choices by rational individuals, as in utilitarian and liberal economics. But it too made peace by treating choice as effective preference for the greatest expected utility and hence within the scope of psychological laws. Here too the demands of scientific method made it virtuous to reduce subjects to objects.

I do not mean that social theory has been crassly deterministic, since there are well tried ways of trying to reconcile human initiative with law-like explanations. But I do suggest that the dominant rubric has stressed "the problem of order" above "the problem of control." The former is to account for the continuities in social life, which rise above the brevity, variety and discord of individual ambitions; and its usual solution is a theory of enduring structures. The latter is to show how human beings are or can be masters of structure and engineers of change; and it calls for a theory of action. By common consent, admittedly, every social theory worth having must allow some men some control—that is, in the end, why we seek scientific enlightenment. But order has proved more tractable than control. Robust theories of action have been hard to come by and harder to square with the dominant rubric.

ANTHONY GIDDENS' *Central Problems in Social Theory*[1] sets out to shift the balance and to unify the classic problems. The book makes sense on its own but more sense as a continuation of his *New Rules of Sociological Method*.[2] There he distinguished three principal keys to the understanding of social life—the concepts of meaning, moral order, and power. "Meaning" was the province of interpretative theories, resting on a view of the social world as the skilled, reflexive work of active human subjects. "Moral order" referred to those, like Durkheim and Parsons, who started from the external and constraining character of norms and tended to exhibit human subjects as creatures of norms. "Power" gestured to the structures of domination in every society and to underlying forces which accounted for both norms and meanings. There was virtue in all three keys, he argued, but they could not be combined in their usual

[1] *Central Problems in Social Theory: Action, Structure and Contradiction in Social Analysis*. By ANTHONY GIDDENS. Macmillan, £10, paper £3.95.

[2] Anthony Giddens, *New Rules of Sociological Method: A Positive Critique of Interpretative Sociologies* (Hutchinson, 1976).

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forms, especially not while the orthodox notion of scientific explanation debarred interpretative theories. So he discarded the orthodoxy, sought to show that norms are always subject to negotiation, and treated power as the capacity of actors to mobilise resources. Social life emerged as "an interplay of meanings, norms and power", with the bulk of the glory going to an interpretative approach. It was all theorising in the grand manner (witness the hubris of the title), and left plenty of unfinished business.

Central Problems in Social Theory carries the business forward. Giddens describes it in a leaden phrase as "a non-functionalist manifesto" and the nub of it is that "structure is both medium and outcome of the reproduction of practices." Structure has a "duality", which, correctly conceived, overcomes both "the dualism of individual and society, or subject and object" and "the dualism of conscious/unconscious thought." Structures both constrain and enable social practices; practices both embody and modify structures. Individuals are inherently social beings, but social beings, who learn a practical consciousness through monitoring their own performances, are neither psychic robots nor cultural dopes. Structure and action presuppose one another in a "dialectical relationship."

THE MANIFESTO is in seven discursive essays, containing more ideas than I can unpack now. But two in particular carry most of the general philosophical argument. The final chapter is titled "The Prospects for Social Theory Today"—oddly, since it does not deal with that topic. Instead it levels five instructive charges at what Giddens terms "the consensus which held the 'middle ground' of sociology" among English-speaking sociologists until at least the late 1960s. He begins by scorning the view of industrial society which led to premature announcements of the end of ideology but his main indictments are philosophical. The consensus was wrong, firstly, about the place of scientific laws in social explanation. "Laws in the social sciences are *historical* in character and *mutable* in form", whereas in natural science they are putatively universal. Secondly, it relied on an "outmoded and defective philosophy of language", which was taken to be primarily a medium of description, whereas it is in truth better seen as "a medium of social practice." It presumed, thirdly, on an "oversimple revelatory model of social science", which failed to respect the authenticity of actors' beliefs and the role of "mutual knowledge" in social life. Fourthly, without a proper concept of agents' self-monitoring, it had no genuine theory of action (despite gallant efforts by symbolic interactionists). Fifthly, it erred in adopting a positivistic model of natural science, failing to realise that, since explaining is always done in a context of particular puzzles and queries, there is no unitary form of explanation.

These five counts are a useful summary of recent protests by action theorists, and the chapter clears the deck for the constructive parts of Giddens' manifesto. The charges are too baldly stated to stick but I agree that a stout theory of social agency needs to make most of them. A picture of active human subjects cannot be drawn while following Positivist laws of perspective, and the orthodox claim to have a neutral test of a good theory has been a lasting source of mischief. The recent havoc in the philosophy of natural science started as an internal wrangle but, by breaking the consensus there, it has been immensely cheering for the prospects of the actionist camp in social theory.

THE CONSTRUCTIVE PLATFORM is laid in the long chapter called "Agency, Structure" (note the dialectical comma). Structure is often pictured as the anatomy of a social organism or the girders of a social edifice. Such images suggest that it is rigid or static; but in truth it exists only in action, and action always has place and time. Equally, action should not be conceived apart from structure. Although every society has a structure of domination, all actors draw on it and bend it to their own uses—"all social actors, no matter how lowly, have some degree of penetration of the social forms which oppress them." Thus structure ("rules and resources, organised as properties of social systems") and system ("reproduced relations between actors or collectivities, organised as regular social practices") are two sides of a unifying concept, dubbed by Giddens "structuration." This is the core of the "duality" which overcomes dualisms and is also why structure is both medium and outcome. Other chapters apply the theme to Institutions, Reproduction and Socialisation; to Social Contradictions, Power and Historical Materialism; to Ideology and Consciousness; and to Time, Space and Social Change.

The theme is thus ambitious and timely. It is spoken in dense polysyllables, which come especially fast at tricky moments, but in the main I found the book splendidly bold, rich in intellectual landscape and blessed with a helpful eye for where the central problems lie. Giddens stakes all on his power to turn a dualism into a "duality", however, and I was not persuaded to take the gamble. Take, for instance, the twin theses which sum up "Agency, Structure" (and much else):

> *1.* Social systems are produced as transactions between agents and can be analysed as such on the level of strategic conduct. This is "methodological" in the sense that institutional

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analysis is bracketed, although structural elements necessarily enter into the characterisation of action, as modalities drawn upon to produce interaction.

2. Institutional analysis, on the other hand, brackets action, concentrating upon modalities as the media of the reproduction of social systems. But this is also purely a methodological bracketing, which is no more defensible than the first if we neglect the essential importance of the conception of the duality of structure.

Decoded, this means (roughly) that social systems can be thought of as the activities of individuals manoeuvring, and institutions as the rules they work within and upon, provided that the distinction is realised to be a theoretical contrivance for analysing a single duality. Famous old dualisms thus melt away like magic. But were they really due just to quirks of the orthodox consensus?

That depends, I suppose, on the relation of theory to fact. Giddens is after some global theory which covers all aspects of the social world through dialectical oppositions. Is the test of success that the theory maps the world correctly? He often talks as if society is an open book to him, complete with causal loops and feedback, and as if dualities are a fact of social life. But he is also firm in denying that theory should or can limp along behind discovery in this empiricist way. So is the test that the theory is proved true independently and hence dictates that the world is as it reports? Perhaps; but, if so, he provides no independent measure beyond the comprehensive, interlocked character of the theory itself. Moreover much of the interlocking depends for consistency on treating tensions "dialectically" and, since this piece of magic is not properly explained and justified, it sounds question-begging. So is it, finally, that tests of truth are beside the point, once language is seen to be more a medium of social practice than a medium of description? That would be in the spirit of the book but would also need a deeper discussion than the book offers.

THIS VERY ABSTRACT QUESTION becomes urgent whenever Giddens seems to want something both ways. His subtitle is "Action, Structure and Contradiction" and the last of the trio is a good example. Many thinkers have wanted to explain social changes by appeal to "social contradictions." For instance Marx, by some accounts, expected capitalism to be brought down partly by a falling rate of profit, which was bound to result from the rational pursuit of rising profits. For, if each capitalist had good reason to reduce his wages bill, the total effect in reducing consumption would lower profits and give fresh reason for each to economise still further.

These connections would be clear enough in a

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model which explained change as the result of rational action by individuals. But, for Giddens, that would be to rely too much on the system (action) side of the system/structure duality. Social contradictions, he says, stem from "an opposition or disjunction of structural principles." That sounds very well; but how, I wonder, do structural principles, as opposed to actors' reasons, come to have motive force? I am not sure how Giddens would reply, but it certainly looks as if the only real motor he in fact recognises is the reflexive activity of social actors. If so, the proclaimed "duality" of action and structure is something of a fraud. But, since I was uncertain what test of truth to apply, I cannot be sure—a trouble which often arose in seeing how the all-embracing theory actually explains what it weaves into whole cloth.

I PICK THE PROFIT EXAMPLE also because Giddens uses it to chide Jon Elster, whose splendid *Logic and Society* [3] contains a memorable chapter on "Contradictions of Society." Elster squarely favours the action side (hence Giddens' complaint) and thus does not have to roll everything into one embrace. Social change often results, in his view, from "counterfinality" and "suboptimality." The former applies when, for instance, each farmer fattens extra hogs, on the assumption that the others will act as they did last year, and there is an unanticipated glut. The latter applies, when each, although foreseeing the glut, still fattens more hogs, because he cannot afford to be an odd man out. Either way they all end up worse off than they need have been. Such perversities either are directly motors of change or prompt men to organise politically—sometimes to halt the motor, sometimes to clear its path. "Structural conditions" occur in this account but they are more like deposits left by previous actions than a separate aspect of reality. Perhaps I was seduced by the many splendours of the book—its force of exposition, range of reference, eye for unexpected comparisons and originality—but there does seem to me virtue in backing the claims of action squarely when advancing an actionist theory. At any rate, I do most warmly recommend his ways of applying logic to social life. Even when I thought the logical apparatus more elegant than explanatory, I still found the social problems illuminated. The book strikes me as a major and often startling contribution to its subject.

BEFORE SAYING THE SAME of his still more recent work, I would like to block in a little more landscape. The shift from order to control, which makes Giddens and Elster so interesting, is a general one. A humanist revival is afoot, making men creators instead of creatures, players instead of pawns, subjects instead of objects. The rhetoric of the revival is easy, heady stuff and every social science is sporting its iconoclasts. Who could refuse to warm to a title like *Existential Sociology*,[4] or fail to sigh at its cavalier abuse of traditional theories, its reckless projections of tiny empirical studies, and its raw abstractions? The greatest skill and thought are needed to dismantle the old consensus without destroying hope of philosophical foundations for a new science. Negatively, it is a large aid to enthusiasm that the naturalism implied by work on the theory of science is less definite and constricting to social theory than it was in the days of universal laws and functional mechanisms. Indeed the unity of science seems to be being renegotiated on terms quite favourable to a humane social theorising. Constructively, however, there is a whole interpretative framework to find and the searchers are busy in every department from phenomenology to Marxism, with results that seem to me so far partial and fragmentary at best. The challenge which promises most, to my mind, is to find a notion of "meaning" to connect the meaning of utterance with the meaning of experience and the meaning of action. There are more lines open than I can introduce here and I must be content with two.

AESTHETICS WILL NOT HAVE struck everyone as a likely methodological frame for science. Richard Brown presents his *Poetic for Sociology* [5] with lively imagination, however, and pursues his case into the natural sciences. Artist, sociologist and physicist are all, he contends, in the same work: the making of paradigms to understand experience by. Literature is especially instructive, since metaphor and irony are the stuff of all understanding. No virtuous aesthetician should tolerate a line dividing the objective and cognitive from the subjective and sensual, for reasons which call into general question the distinction between the art of discovery and the logic of validation. The themes are too coloured and detailed for summary but there is much to reflect on (and enjoy) in the book, even for those who reject its ambitions. Brown commits himself too nearly for my comfort to the idea that reality is somehow an aesthetically decided construct. So it was a relief to learn at the end that "our poetic for sociology sees formal thought as a game but also recognises that toy soldiers have real

[3] *Logic and Society: Contradictions and Possible Worlds*. By JON ELSTER. John Wiley & Sons, £10.95.

[4] *Existential Sociology*. Edited by JACK D. DOUGLAS and JOHN M. JOHNSON. Cambridge University Press, £16.00, paper £5.95.

[5] *A Poetic for Sociology: Toward a Logic of Discovery for the Human Sciences*. By RICHARD H. BROWN. Cambridge University Press, £11.50, paper £4.50.

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guns." Well, yes, there need to be real guns, if the nine o'clock news is to make sense. But it seemed to me too late to smuggle them into Brown's ambitious poetic.

THE OTHER OPEN LINE (which I admit to picking out because it has my vote) finds its sense of meaning through analysing rational action. In *Ulysses and the Sirens*,[6] Jon Elster argues that "the 'rational choice' approach to human behaviour is without much doubt the best available model, but many problems concerning its scope and resolving power remain to be settled." Action is to be thought of as the result of two successive filters. The first narrows an agent's notionally possible options down to those truly feasible for him. For instance he cannot marry just anyone he pleases. The second decides his actual choice from among those feasible. For instance (to take the economic version) he will not choose Joan, if Mary offers the same advantages at lower cost. In the usual account the first filter sets parameters within which the rational choice is calculated. Elster objects that this makes human beings merely "parametrically" rational, whereas they are (or can be) "strategically" rational through rational choice of the parameters too. A parametric Ulysses would have only a constrained choice whether to hear the song of the Sirens and be shipwrecked or to sail away with curiosity unappeased. Ulysses, the strategist, changed the parameters by ordering his crew to bind him to the mast, block their ears, and ignore his signals. Thus a rational man can pre-empt his own weaknesses and irrationality and can combine with others to overcome structural constraints. The scope and resolving power of Elster's approach is not suited to a snap verdict but it is exhilarating to read so pointed, well informed, wide-ranging, clear and original a text.

Ulysses' task is not plain sailing and Elster does not tackle everything. Adding strategy to the usual "economic" tactics calls for profound changes both in the economic model and in the philosophy of mind which underlies it. It raises metaphysical puzzles about the identity of an agent who can choose to change his identity. It unsettles relations among the rational, the irrational and the non-rational. It challenges many theories of social structure too openly for truce by talk of "duality." It stirs up demonic questions about scientific method. But this is surely inevitable in a theory of action with humanistic aims. Elster is not being simply intemperate in untying the bag of the winds, as a few comments may show.

The stock economic model has it (broadly) that

[6] *Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality*. By JON ELSTER. Cambridge University Press, £9.50.

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the rational choice is the one which is likely best to satisfy a given scheme of complete and consistent preferences. Explanation of the preferences themselves is largely for other social sciences and, philosophically, action is assumed to be a function of the agent's beliefs and desires. So there is nothing much there to take the strain, when the agent starts making a strategically rational choice of what desires to have. The two filters, which are easy to understand when successive, become cryptic when one option among the feasible options is to change the feasible options. When, in principle but precisely, is it rational to take that option and what theory of the mind is needed before it makes sense to say so? Does "structure" retain any final standing as an explanatory term and, if so, what is the new distinction between structure and action (and between economics and other social sciences)? Elster himself still thinks of the filters as successive, but I reckon that he has queried too many assumptions for that.

Moreover, many accounts of scientific method rely on a distinction between positive and normative, descriptive and prescriptive, explanation and evaluation. Elster's strategically rational man has the preferences he has rationally chosen to have, and perhaps, indeed, can operate only under structural constraints which rational men would combine to choose. There cannot be many of him about. What, then, is the explanatory value of this kind of ideal-type theory? This too, I think, is a question set by any strongly actionist theory of rational choice. Elster, let it be said at once, is fully aware that he is loosing the winds, and does more than his duty in a short book to suggest what might be done next. Since he is, like Giddens, a prolific writer, he will no doubt soon be following up his many, fertile suggestions.

In Elster's index *Marx, K.* follows *Marx, G.* The latter is there for remarking, "I would not dream of belonging to a club that is willing to have me for a member." This wry *mot* puts Elster in mind of the master-slave dialectic and prompts him to say that a worthy rational-choice model should manage to cope with paradoxes too. His hope is both to reach out into behaviour often thought pathological, by showing how there is paradoxical logic in it, and to find the notion of contradiction which helps explain social change. In general, strategic rationality often involves a dash of paradox, as when the rational way to outmanoeuvre an opponent is to lose one's temper or to solve a problem is to think about something else. As Elster puts it, rational strategy often involves going one step back so as to take two steps forward. Perhaps the same applies to social theorising itself. Giddens' complaints about the orthodox consensus sketch a very winnable campaign for going one step back, and many other theorists lately have been advancing backwards, in order to purge scientific method of constricting assumptions. But in which direction, then, shall we take the steps forward?

I BEGAN BY NOTING two lines of thought which might have drawn the social sciences away from construing man as just another object. One was to make the actors' own understanding central, and to ground explanation in some account of the meaning of experience. Brown's poetic shows what might be tried. I think myself that it fails, through internalising nature and social structure within human culture and then finding that something has to be external to the game after all. But this is not to dismiss every way of stepping forward in the name of hermeneutics, phenomenology, Critical Theory or other interpretative schemes; and Giddens too is in pursuit of a liberating account of social meaning. The other line was to look to rational action and to analyse social life into an interplay of choices by (imperfectly) rational agents. Here Elster is a valuable guide. Giddens suspects that any rational-man model will be too individualistic to make sense of social structure, and there is no blinking the point. But, distrusting smooth talk of "duality", I shall continue to hope for a rational-choice theory which can present man as an inherently social being without thereby throwing Ulysses to the sirens of structure.

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Coming to Terms

Analytical Philosophy—By ROGER SCRUTON

CURRENT WORKS OF PHILOSOPHY, whether written for the professional academic or for the common reader, manifest a peculiar self-consciousness. The writer refers nervously to himself and to his own experience; he takes prolonged backward glances at the history of his subject; he even doubts that he has a subject, or raises, as his principal preoccupation, the question of "a method" with which to proceed into realms that have yet to be defined. Something called "analytical philosophy" is subjected to repeated abuse (usually by its practitioners), being dismissed as "unhistorical", "irrelevant to the condition of modern humanity", "out of touch" with important developments in phenomenology, in Marxism, or in whatever rival school seems to avoid the "analytical" failings. The books I wish to discuss are extremely varied in intellectual and literary quality; but with one or two exceptions they exemplify this ruling self-doubt to such a degree that it would be impossible to describe their aims and merits without referring to it. In almost all of them one sees the hesitation and the unsureness with which the modern philosopher tries to come to terms with the complex intellectual history that has preceded and perhaps pre-empted his reflections.

According to *Philosophy and Its Past*,[1] it is precisely the inability to confront and understand the history of its subject that has cut off analytical philosophy from the true end of its enquiry, and condemned it to that sterile academicism for which it is notorious. In the opening chapter Jonathan Rée accuses modern philosophy of preserving an illegitimate view of its own history, as a series of "conjectures and refutations", from which nothing is worth preserving except that which still seems true. This view is contrasted with another—attributed to Kant, Hegel, and one of the personae of Marx—according to which the progress of philosophy is "dialectical", absorbing and reconstituting each successive system in its unsteady progress towards—towards what? The truth? Or the present most plausible conjecture? Or the most satisfactory system? Or something quite different? Mr Rée does not tell us. His arguments are vague, and the contrast between the refutation of a philosophical system and its dialectical absorption (or "diremption") is so crudely drawn that one can only guess at the supposed difference between them. It does not help to be referred, at such a point, to Hegel, since Hegel's conception of historical development rests on a logic that is neither true nor intelligible. And the Marxian "dialectic" (which one senses in the background, when one does not see it in the foreground of the author's thought) is a theory that tells us how ideas develop, but seems to leave unanswered the question how to determine whether they are true—a failing which immediately negates its philosophical pretensions.

The book continues with a chapter by Michael Ayers, in which recent misinterpretations of historical philosophers are catalogued. The chapter is hardly intelligible to those who have not read the works to which Ayers refers, and is accompanied by little general reflection on how the errors that they contain have arisen, or how the author's preferred interpretations generate greater philosophical insight. Jonathan Bennett is castigated for his tendency to treat the great dead philosophers as though they were contemporaries with whom one might actually argue, and whom it is not a sin occasionally to misunderstand. It is precisely this disputatious quality that has, in my opinion, enabled Bennett to cast light on the philosophies of Kant, Locke and Hume. Would Ayers really like us to return to the kind of Teutonic pedantry that regards the truth of a philosopher's views as irrelevant? The author of the book's final chapter, Adam Westoby, would perhaps not be averse to such a regression. His synopsis of Hegel's history of philosophy contains no argument, and rapidly sinks into dogma, invoking that future in which all mysteries will be dissolved, and in which obfuscation will be succeeded by the worldview of "the modern proletariat", whose present indifference to philosophical enquiry is presumably explained by their subjection to a ruling class that sustains itself through academic niceties.

IF THE BOOK has a serious intellectual purpose, it is to remind the reader that modern philosophy

[1] *Philosophy and its Past*. By JONATHAN RÉE, MICHAEL AYERS and ADAM WESTOBY. Harvester Press, £8.50, paper £3.50.

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makes a sharp distinction between the history of philosophy and the history of ideas. An idea may have a complex and interesting history even when it is obvious to every philosopher that it has no persuasive power. (Consider the idea that there is more than one God.) Likewise an idea may have serious philosophical content, but owe its influence not to its truth but to the desire of men to believe it. (Consider the idea of redemption.) In such cases, one is tempted to say, the history of philosophy must diverge from the history of ideas. The history of philosophy must consider an idea in relation to the arguments that support it, and is distracted by too great an attention to its more vulgar manifestations, or to its origins in conceptions that have no philosophical worth. It is surely right for the historian of philosophy to study Kant's ethics, and to ignore Luther's *Bondage of the Will*, even though, from the historical point of view, the former would have been impossible had the latter not been written. In conceding such points, we concede also that the best method in philosophical history may be at variance with the practice of the historian of ideas. It may be necessary for the philosopher to lift an idea from the context in which it was conceived, to rephrase it in direct and accessible language, simply in order to estimate its truth. The history of philosophy then becomes a philosophical, and not an historical, enquiry.

An important illustration of that thesis is provided by the great theme of 19th-century philosophy—the relation between subject and object. Kant argued, in *The Critique of Pure Reason*, that my knowledge of myself as subject is possible only because I employ concepts that presuppose the existence of objects. A presupposition of self-consciousness is the existence of the objective world of physical science. Hegel transformed this idea by suggesting that I know myself as subject only because I "posit" the existence of an object (a world), and it is only as that world develops in my thinking from inarticulate Being to the full realm of political reality that self-consciousness and the freedom which stems from it are born. Marx argued that there are conditions under which a man may lose the sense of himself as subject, conditions in which he becomes an object for himself, the victim of forces that negate his autonomy. In the state of alienated labour the subject is absorbed into the object and overcome by it. The phenomenologists reaffirmed the thesis that man's subjectivity is inescapable: it is the premise from which he begins, and the real problem is not how he can escape being an object to himself, but how the world can be an object for him. It is in the feeling of anxiety, according to Heidegger, that the boundary between subject and object breaks down, to reveal pure Being in its undifferentiated totality. Only in the "authentic" gesture does the subject again create himself and his freedom out of the débris of consciousness, reconstituting the world as object, in relation to which he is subject, will, and power.

FROM THE POINT OF VIEW of the history of ideas we can see a continuity between those philosophies. Each regards the relation between "subject" and "object" as the premise of philosophical enquiry, and the origin of the problem which philosophy must solve. But the superficial resemblance between the resulting doctrines masks their deep differences of aim and understanding; to dwell on the resemblance is to miss both the ideas and the arguments which might support them. Kant's concern was to refute scepticism, by showing that the sceptic's premise (the "cogito" of Descartes) was sufficient in itself to refute his conclusion that we can have no guarantee of objective knowledge. Recent historians of philosophy have been attracted by Kant's argument because they have thought that it might be true. Its relation to Hegel and Marx has seemed of little interest when set beside the possibility that it furnishes a genuine refutation of scepticism, and a secure foundation to philosophical enquiry. Such historians have often seen a parallel between Kant's argument and a more recent one (due to Wittgenstein), which tries to destroy the possibility of a "private language." Wittgenstein argues that the privileged knowledge which we have of our mental states (the privilege of "subjectivity") is possible only because we employ a language which identifies mental states as features of a public world. The argument has the corollary that a language designed to describe "the immediate contents" of experience, while making no suppositions about the world of objects, is impossible. If that is so, then there can be no "pure phenomenology" of the kind expounded by Husserl and assumed by Heidegger. If Heidegger seems unintelligible, it is perhaps because he is. The philosophical basis which might now be given for Kant's original argument cuts away a large part of what an historian of ideas will consider to be its natural progeny. The validity of Wittgenstein's argument is not in point. What matters is that, approaching the history of philosophy with the state of mind which such an argument engenders, one will see as superficial a relationship which the historian of ideas will continue to see as deep.

THE ACCUSATION is often made against analytical philosophy that it is unconcerned with, or unable to assimilate, developments that do not occur within the confines of its own specialised field of enquiry. This accusation seems to me to be more fairly addressed to the schools which

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ostensibly rival it. A reading of the enormous *Heidegger and Sartre* by Joseph P. Fell[2] shows how insulated the author is from arguments of the kind that I have just referred to—arguments which, if valid, would show the philosophical doctrines that he discusses to be considerably less interesting than his text implies. If we reject the possibility of a "pure phenomenology", then little remains of Heidegger beyond a collection of striking psychological insights, and a persuasive description of the religious frame of mind (the frame of mind in which Being as such is the object of contemplation). The claims made for the Heideggerian philosophy—that it provides us with a new "ontology", a new way of "situating" ourselves towards the world, a new doctrine of freedom, of the subject, of the nature of "things"—all these claims seem inadequate when set beside the actual arguments which are given for them, and when considered in the light of Wittgenstein's devastating critique of pure phenomenology. (As Wittgenstein says, in the recently published *Remarks on Colour*,[3] "there is indeed no such thing as phenomenology, but there *are* phenomenological problems." It is in the description of these "problems" that Heidegger excels, not in their solution.) No doubt, judged from the narrow perspective of existentialist scholarship, Professor Fell's book is a sound, scholarly and modest reassembling of the familiar jargon. But judged from the point of view of truth, a book which offers such insights as that "the ground of values is the value of the ground" and "the realisation of this is the end of nihilism" is unlikely to prove satisfying to someone not already deeply immersed in the belief that such utterances are meaningful.

This is not to reject the book's enterprise—that of showing a deep relation between the thought of Heidegger and that of Sartre. On the contrary, such an aim is worthy and interesting. Nor is it to indulge in a naive positivism that would reject every metaphysical utterance as insignificant. It is rather to point out that the respect for truth forbids the use of idioms whose sense can be explained only to those who already pretend to understand them. To ask questions like this: "*On what level* does and can one situate oneself in order to define reality? Is the ground (reference point, basis, criterion) of Being the life-world, the transcendental ego, or both?"—to ask such questions is to invite a dismissive reply.

[2] *Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place*. By JOSEPH P. FELL. Columbia University Press, $31.25, £15.70.

[3] *Remarks on Colour*. By LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN. Edited by G. E. M. ANSCOMBE. Blackwell, £2.95.

Essentials of Postgraduate Psychiatry

edited by P.Hill, R. Murray and A. Thorley
October/November 1979, xviii + 802pp., £21.50
0.12.791983.X (Academic Press)
0.8089.1204.6 (Grune & Stratton)

The contributors of this book,who were all until recently members of the staff of Maudsley Hospital, provide the trainee psychiatrist with a reasonably sized general text with a modern approach which contains all the information that is now essential for the competent practice of psychiatry. In the words of Dr Birley, Dean of the Institute of Psychiatry, writing in the foreword: "The result of their labours is a very readable volume which provides up-to-date reviews of most of the important fields of psychiatry, with a plentiful supply of references for further reading."

Equality, Justice and Rectification

An Exploration in Normative Sociology

Derek L. Phillips
October 1979, xiii + 325pp., £12.00
0.12.554350.6

"It is the issue of economic equality and inequality that most frequently divides the left from the right." By integrating political and legal philosophy with empirical social inquiry the author has achieved an entirely new approach to an issue that affects all nations. It is to be hoped that this book will contribute to clearer thought and argument in all who debate these questions, be they students of sociology, politics, philosophy or jurisprudence or anyone concerned with the basic concepts of equality, justice and liberty.

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IN LESS ACADEMIC VEIN, and writing with an evident desire to be understood, William Barrett directly confronts the issue of the relation between existentialism and the philosophies which rival it. He sees the dispute between Wittgenstein and Heidegger in terms other than those that I have adumbrated: for Barrett the dispute is between a behaviouristic and materialist vision of man, and the rival vision of man in his freedom, able to make spontaneous gestures which forbid his manipulation by the purveyors of "technique."[4] Barrett's style is homey, comfortable, with a flavour that might be described as "lukewarm gospel." He treats us to personal anecdotes by the score, so illustrating the realism of his philosophy and its nearness to everyday concerns. He digresses into popular science, into the history of modern culture, into the realms of high art and revealed religion. But one eye is always on the doctrines of the great philosophers, and on the relevance which Barrett believes those doctrines to have for the problem which concerns him: how far the manipulation of human beings, by science, by doctrine, or by oppression, is a real possibility.

Barrett's thesis is summarised in his title. Men have believed in techniques; techniques whereby to generate, in mechanical ways, the new world, the new man who will occupy it, and the whole truth about them both. These beliefs are illusions, for, whether in the sphere of knowlege or in the sphere of action, the fact of human freedom constantly defies the techniques whereby thought and behaviour might be controlled. This fact—not so much proved as dramatised by the existentialist philosophers—is one that our academic philosophy and our arrogant faith in scientific progress have tried in vain to eradicate. It stands in the way of Skinner's brave new Walden just as it stands in the way of the Positivist's attempt to reduce the operations of thought to a logical calculus.

In attempting to establish these results Barrett reviews—with a self-confidence that his easy-going style fails to conceal—the whole enterprise of modern philosophy, attempting to refute, not only the Fregean logic, but also the Wittgensteinian philosophy of mind, the Russellian reduction of mathematics, the Cartesian search for a method—everything, in short, that he considers to deny the fact of human freedom. He does not hesitate to enter the highest regions of mathematical logic, demonstrating in the process a tenuous grasp, not only of set theory and the significance of Gödel's theorem, but also, so it seemed to me, of modern logic itself. It is surely absurd to fight battles with the aery spectre of logical truth in the cause of a human freedom which, if it is a fact, no logic could ever have denied. It is certainly true that the respect for Heidegger increases as the respect for logic declines, but whether this is the best way to win the sceptic away from his "techniques" towards a recognition of existential truth may be doubted. It is certainly difficult to feel drawn to a doctrine that employs vulgar rhetoric of the following kind in order to commend itself:

> The moral will as our human centre! How disappointing a message this must sound to our modern ears! How odd and simple-minded it seems against all the sophisticated currents of modernity that have run the other way! But above all, how tame a cause this is to argue, how prosaic and stodgy, how positively hackneyed and old-hat!

With what relief one turns back to the quiet prose of Frege, the clear paragraphs of Russell, the pregnant aphorisms of Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein!

Professor Barrett's thought is undeniably philosophical. He wishes to show that certain beliefs are not just false but absurd and even self-contradictory, so that any vision of man which attempts to employ them as a foundation will be wrong from the start. One senses behind his arguments the spirit of American pessimism as it has arisen in recent years. This pessimism about man and his achievements is the relict of a disappointed belief in them, a belief which, to the continual amazement of Europeans, has provided the intellectual climate of America ever since America first managed to have an intellectual climate of its own.

THE SAME PESSIMISM speaks through the pages of David Ehrenfeld's *The Arrogance of Humanism*,[5] a book which reviews many optimistic prejudices in order to show that, in so far as they each have been founded on exaggerated estimates of human capacities, of human intellect, of natural resources, and of our ability to understand the world, they have been not only false but harmful. Ehrenfeld—a professor of biology—does not argue philosophically, nor is he occupied by the elevated problems of self-identity that worry Professor Barrett. He is obsessed rather with the tawdriness of American society, with the depravity of popular myths, and in particular with the deleterious nature of the myths associated with popular science and comic-strip futurology.

Of course these are depressing things, and Professor Ehrenfeld is right to argue, for example, that the idea of "a bionic human being" hovers between the absurd and the profane, an offence equally to intelligence and to natural piety. But it is

[4] *The Illusion of Technique*. By WILLIAM BARRETT. William Kimber, £8.50.

[5] *The Arrogance of Humanism*. By DAVID EHRENFELD. Oxford University Press, £4.50, $10.95.

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not enough to brood over these facts, and neither sympathy nor the spirit of enquiry will be aroused by an author who asserts that "I have not devoted any space in this book to hydrogen bombs, defoliating chemicals, man-made diseases . . . yet, they, too, are children of humanism, and I have not forgotten it." It is not that we should forbear to think of our imminent destruction; but from what perspective should we view it? One can feel some sympathy for those philosophers who, like Barrett, are drawn to the existentialist position, arguing that we must first take responsibility for our "being in the world", before we can address ourselves to the world that demands our attention. For only then do we see the world as we should see it, in relation to our will. Moral philosophy needs to withdraw some way from accumulated evil, if it is to provide us with something more than morbid fascination, and self-involved despair.

IN AN INTERESTING and scholarly work,[6] Stephen Donadio shows how the existentialist position, or something very like it, underlies the philosophy of human relations expressed in the novels of Henry James. Donadio finds in James a Nietzschean vision of the individual, as a being whose responsibility towards himself is not merely the condition of his own autonomy, but also the only guarantee that he will not absorb and dominate the lives of those whom he encounters. The expression of this existential responsibility towards the self lies, for James, in taste, the quality of mind without which, saith Zarathustra, the world of man is unintelligible. Professor Donadio's book is an example of the history of ideas at its most persuasive. He neither attacks nor defends the Nietzschean conception of individuality. Nor does he make unwarranted assumptions about the influence of Nietzsche on James (whose brother, nevertheless, could not have written *The Will to Believe* had he not been familiar with the Germanic ways of thought from which Nietzsche departed). Donadio uses ideas historically, to illustrate a meaning in the Jamesian irony that would otherwise escape our attention. In the course of doing so he casts unexpected light on *The Golden Bowl*. This is an achievement, for in the field of Jamesian criticism it is difficult enough to say anything new, far more difficult to say something which is also important.

Donadio's book returns us to the history of ideas. Henry James vividly represents the human subject ("the reflector") whose perilous relation to the world finds terrifying expression in the later

[6] *Nietzsche, Henry James, and the Artistic Will.* By STEPHEN DONADIO. Oxford University Press, £6.95, $15.95.

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novels. Kantian philosophy also speaks of the position of "the subject", and I earlier referred to a tradition which arose from that philosophy while bearing only a nominal relation to it. It is over the problem of "subject" and "object" that the historian of ideas and the philosopher are most likely to differ. The former might well consider that it is incumbent upon him to explore the irony of Henry James while the latter will view such an enterprise with scepticism. If the two disciplines in which they are engaged are not kept apart, the result is confusion.

THIS CONFUSION is illustrated by Lucien Goldmann,[7] who envisages the whole course of philosophy from Kant to the existentialists in terms of a single problem, describing the problem with so little respect for the various arguments which the terms "subject" and "object" conceal that he is unable to see that there *is* no single problem to which he is addressing himself, and no genuine alternatives in the "answers" that he discerns in Lukács and in Heidegger.

He asserts in these lectures (collected and published in this format posthumously) that "the traditional philosophy of the progressive and revolutionary bourgeoisie, as well as that of the bourgeoisie in power, had radically separated the *subject* of consciousness and the action of the *object* with which both were concerned." Hence it seems to him that bourgeois philosophy (he means the tradition which extends from Descartes to Hegel and which was brought to an end, according to the Marxist liturgy, by the *Theses on Feuerbach*) has *created* a problem by forcing a separation between things that are not truly separate. Man is a part of his world, not separate from it: he only seems to be separate from it when the productive activity which constitutes his essence also distorts his perception. The existentialist Heidegger, in pondering the deliverances of a consciousness that has been (in accordance with the "method" of phenomenology) isolated from the world that is "posited" through it, merely holds open the fracture that capitalist production creates, and bourgeois philosophy endorses; while Lukács (i.e., the early Lukács, the exponent of the Hegelian undercurrent in Marxism) heals that fracture, bringing subject and object together, by demonstrating their unity in "praxis."

Much emphasis is placed on Lukács's influential but (in my view) highly eccentric analysis of Marx's theory of fetishism, but the whole is written in a style at once so academic, and so ignorant of what does and what does not establish the truth of an assertion, that nothing emerges from the book other than a kind of unshakeable dogmatism about philosophical positions which the author himself is either unable or unwilling to define. It is simply not true that an analysis of the "illusory" quality of exchange value in the market economy can provide an answer, either to Cartesian scepticism, or to the Hegelian problem of the conditions of self-consciousness (among which conditions Hegel counted the institution of private property, and the exchange-value which flows from it). The constant shift of the argument from questions of influence to questions of doctrine, and the remorseless indifference to the true concerns of Kant, Hegel and Heidegger (to name but three), renders this book as worthless intellectually as it is an unfitting memorial to the gifted author of *Le Dieu Caché*.

AMONG THE MANY QUESTIONS concealed within "the problematic" (as French fashion would call it) of subject and object is another that has its origins in Kant and which continues to preoccupy philosophers of every school. This is the question of the possibility of a human science, and it is the question to which Roy Bhaskar addresses himself in his *The Possibility of Naturalism*,[8] during the course of which he attempts to demolish standard arguments for the view that there can be no natural science of man.

Kant advocated the now famous "two worlds" hypothesis, according to which men, while existing as part of nature, also belong to a transcendental world, obedient not to natural laws but to the commands of reason. This view was replaced by the more intelligible, if less majestic, doctrine of 19th-century philosophical anthropology, the doctrine of *Verstehen*, according to which there are not two worlds, but rather two rival and incompatible ways of understanding. To understand people as people (rather than as organisms), we must abandon the viewpoint of natural science, and enter into the concepts and perceptions which form and govern human activity. This doctrine survives in post-Wittgensteinian philosophy, as a body of related distinctions. The classification of human acts is held to proceed by different principles from the classification of bodily movements; explanation by reasons is distinguished from explanation by causes; deciding on the future is contrasted with predicting what the future will be. In these distinctions can be seen the difference between man as agent, and man as thing. One may confront and participate in rational agency; or one may see only organisms, swept along in the ineluctable flow of nature.

[7] *Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy*. By LUCIEN GOLDMANN. Routledge, £2.50.

[8] *The Possibility of Naturalism*. By ROY BHASKAR. Harvester Press, £11.50, paper £4.50.

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Bhaskar is concerned to demolish the philosophy that has erected itself on these distinctions. He writes in an awkward style, cluttered with references that only a professional philosopher will understand, always half-revealing what he contrives to half-conceal. He makes suggestions as to why the project of a human science has presented such difficulties, and argues that, in this area, we must present new classifications before the work of explanation can begin. (A science of human activity might be forced to classify actions in a manner that the agent himself would, in the course of decision-making, reject.) He therefore advocates what he calls a "transformational model" of social activity. He argues vigorously for the thesis that both the positivist's "science of man" and the Weberian rejection of it rest on crude and outmoded views of the nature of scientific explanation. He introduces his own view (borrowing Kantian terminology) as a form of "transcendental realism." Where I could understand what he meant by this I found the doctrine serious but unoriginal. Standard arguments to show that reasons are causes are mixed with inapposite reflections on the relation between base and superstructure in the Marxist theory of history, so that the appearance of novelty turns out on inspection to be the effect of a laboured irrelevance. Perhaps the fault is one of style; for it is clear that Bhaskar has thought long and hard about the views which he has such difficulty in expressing.

IT IS WITH SOME RELIEF that I turn to three works of moral philosophy in which clarity of style is respected as an intellectual virtue. Each of them exhibits the present attempt of analytical philosophers to re-establish the contact with life which they have been accused of abandoning, and each is partially successful. Renford Bambrough puts forward in *Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge*[9] an elegant defence of the objectivity of moral judgment, arguing against the many recent theories that have seemed to deny it. Mr Bambrough is refreshingly free from doubt as to what school he belongs to, as to the validity of his philosophical method, and as to his stance towards the history of his subject. He writes with conviction about those matters and theories which he honestly considers to merit his attention, in a style that is both fluent and carefully considered.

The result, of course, is that he is extremely easy to "place." This book could have been conceived

[9] *Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge.* By RENFORD BAMBROUGH. Routledge, £5.50.

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METHUEN

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and written nowhere but in Cambridge, and it could have arisen out of no influences other than those that have furnished that university with its unique intellectual atmosphere—the influences of Moore and Russell, Wittgenstein and Wisdom, Richards and Leavis. There is certain to be a reviewer who will remind us of the extent to which this Cambridge preoccupation with moral "judgment" and its "objectivity" is the product of a provincial academicism, a bourgeois "reification", a failure to grasp "human practice" in its "specificity" (which is to say, its "historicity"). Not only does Bambrough never mention Althusser; he even ignores the philosophy of Marx. His authority in the proof of moral objectivity is that great Bloomsbury apologist G. E. Moore, who proved the existence of the external world by saying that he was so certain that he had two hands that he could never be more certain of the validity of any philosophical reasoning that purported to make him doubt it.

"I know that I have two hands", said Moore. "I know that this child who is about to undergo an operation should be given anaesthetic", says Bambrough. No moral scepticism can have greater weight for him than that piece of moral knowledge, and, as he shows, the usual arguments for moral scepticism are extremely unpersuasive. But *I* know that lamb tastes better with garlic. I am prepared to assert this in the face of any *reasoning* that someone might offer me to the contrary, even sceptical reasoning designed to alienate me altogether from the contents of my larder. Does this mean that I am forced to hold that judgments of taste are objective?

It is significant that Bambrough does not consider such examples, nor the more problematic examples provided by aesthetic judgment. Moreover, there is a major sceptical argument to which he gives little consideration, despite its being the single argument which Kant, in his defence of moral objectivity, felt called upon to counter. This is the argument of Hume's, that reasoning alone can provide no motive for action, so that no judgment can issue in action unless conjoined to some antecedent desire to obey it. Bambrough's interesting discussion of Aristotle on practical reason left me unconvinced that he had provided an answer to this radical form of moral scepticism.

THE INNOCENT READER might be disappointed, after learning that moral judgments are objective, to be offered no advice. The two greatest defenders of moral objectivity, Aristotle and Kant, proceeded at once from their philosophical conclusions to comprehensive answers to the question how to live. Such a reader may therefore take more pleasure in Sissela Bok's *Lying*,[10] an essay in applied philosophy which gives detailed consideration to the question "When might I lie?". Kant would have answered "Never", while Aristotle might have said "Never, unless the wise, just, prudent and courageous man would find reason to do so."

Mrs Bok's style is pleasant, honest and serious, and the reader is certain to be drawn to her essay, as much for the virtuous character that speaks through its style, as for its explicit philosophical content. In focusing on a moral problem with which everyone is familiar, Mrs Bok is able to justify the complexity of thought which ancient and medieval philosophers (from whose writings she has collected copious extracts) devoted to this issue, reminding us that in the history of philosophy truths may be as easily lost as gained. Her own discussion is rich in examples, all directly or indirectly expressing the horror of the American conscience as it wrestles with the truths of modern politics, unsupported by that doctrine of "the Noble Lie" with which Plato has consoled the more worldly consciences of Europeans. However, the clarity and honesty with which the examples are discussed are not, I think, matched by the weight of the reasoning devoted to them.

[10] *Lying: Moral Choice in Public and Private Life.* By SISSELA BOK. Harvester Press, £6.50.

POETRY WALES

Special feature of two successive numbers on CRITICAL ISSUES

Contributors include (Autumn 1979) C. H. Sisson (on translating Dante), Barbara Hardy (on women poets), Elizabeth Rokkan (on hymns), interview with Oxford Professor John Jones, 40-page Anglo-Welsh critical symposium, (Winter 1979–80) Terry Eagleton (Marxism, Nationalism & Poetry), David Smith, Keith Sagar, Dannie Abse (on rhyme), Douglas Dunn, Tom Paulin, Dafydd Glyn Jones (on criticism in Welsh)

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As Mrs Bok points out, the discovery that one has been the victim of a lie can be one of the most painful of human experiences. She goes on to weigh the "harm" of this discovery against the various benefits that might seem to balance it. She acknowledges as her main principle that, while no justification is needed for telling the truth, justification *is* needed for a lie. But her mode of reasoning is that of cost and benefit, and the main principle itself is taken only as a premise, the philosophical depth of which remains only partially explored. There is a rival philosophical position, that of Kant, and of Grotius (who said that it was right to lie, not when some benefit followed, but only when the victim had lost his right to the truth). This position sees the wrong of lying not in its consequences but in its nature. The horror of discovery reveals the essence of the lie: what the victim sees is that his right has been violated, his personhood held in contempt, himself treated (as Kant would put it) not as an end but as a means. In that perception is the death of friendship. Without a philosophy which describes the intrinsic wrong in lying, one will be driven always to the examination of consequences, sharing the crass view of Bentham, that "Falsehood, taken by itself . . . can never, upon the principle of utility, constitute any offense at all." Mrs Bok does not share that view, but her devotion to concrete examples seems to prevent her from fully perceiving why.

TO ESTIMATE THE EVIL of a thing in terms of its consequences is to postpone the question of evil. What makes the consequences wrong? The word "harm", used so often in this context, is a diversionary tactic, designed to secure the consent of the reader while diverting his judgment from the idea of intrinsic evil. The question of intrinsic right and wrong is one that preoccupied Kant; it has also preoccupied one of the most distinguished of modern moral philosophers, Thomas Nagel, whose new collection of essays, *Mortal Questions*,[11] continues the Socratic exploration of the moral life for which he is renowned.

There is no doubt that, whatever is meant by "analytical" philosophy, Nagel exemplifies it at its best. He does not write without clearly presenting the question that he wishes to discuss; he does not bewilder the reader with unnecessary technicalities or academic references; he approaches the question as a matter of general intellectual concern, falling within his purview because only philosophical thought would seem to provide an answer. And his main concern is truth. He writes about difficult subjects—about death, about the absurd, about war and sexuality—but they are subjects which pose questions to every thinking person.

The famous paper "What is it like to be a bat?" also contains one of the best recent contributions to that composite problem which earlier occupied us—the problem of the relation between subject and object, and of the true nature of the "subjectivity" from which philosophers in the Kantian and Hegelian tradition have begun their enquiries. The modesty of aim implied in the title is characteristic of this author, whose thoughts, quietly expressed, begin from surprising places to end always in the depths of metaphysical enquiry, their clarity undiminished. Who, after immersing himself in the tangle of existentialist philosophy, will not be grateful for remarks like the following?

> If a sense of the absurd is a way of perceiving our true situation (even though the situation is not absurd until the perception arises), then what reason have we to resent or escape it? Like the capacity for epistemological scepticism, it results from the ability to understand our human limitations. It need not be a matter for agony unless we make it so. Nor need it evoke a defiant contempt of fate that allows us to feel brave or proud. Such dramatics, even if carried on in private, betray a failure to appreciate the cosmic unimportance of the situation. If *sub specie aeternitatis* there is no reason to believe that anything matters, then that does not matter either, and we can approach our absurd lives with irony instead of heroism or despair.

It is clearly no accident that Nagel's prose contains such vivid invocations of the spirit of Spinoza.

Not everything in the book is of equal quality, and even this most sceptical of American intellectuals has difficulty in considering the possibility that, in political matters, it could just be the case that every item of liberal dogma is false. But his scepticism goes far enough to be shocking to many, while his evident humanity will cause even his opponents to look on his writings with the respect that they deserve.

[11] *Mortal Questions*. By THOMAS NAGEL. Cambridge University Press, £9.50, paper £2.95.

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DISCUSSION

Inquest on a Coroner

By Austin Mitchell

A PARTY OF Change faces a perennial problem. At each stage of the journey people fall away. Some find the going too rough or their companions not to their taste. Others decide things were better where they were before. A few won't go unless they drive the waggon. Thus a deserters' choir of *Stars on Sunday* proportions chorused their disapproval of Labour and their own past at the last election. David Marquand's "Inquest" (July) isn't of this genre. Not quite. Nevertheless it is inconceivable that Social Democracy could have come to the end of the line so soon after Roy Jenkins left the driver's cab and Marquand himself ceased to be a passenger.

Social Democracy isn't fashionable. Its adherents in the party are under a cloud. It does not have the élan and the trendy appeal of 1963. The world is a colder, harder place and such a climate strengthens the extremists: in my view, if not in David Marquand's, it has put them into office. There is a malaise. Tony Crosland's dwindling band of devotees do face a need to present the human face of Socialism, to adjust its scale, soften its rigidities, and to encourage group and community aspirations instead of concentrating on blanket provision and the flabby compromises of the New Corporatism. As a minority government facing a major crisis Labour's electoral stance was bound to be that there was no real alternative to our approach (and Margaret Thatcher may well prove us right); so we inevitably fell from office with a sulky sense of injustice, based on the assumption that the Government wasn't bad but the People weren't quite up to it. In so far as Marquand is making these obvious points, he is correct. Yet they are trivial compared to a main problem which is both wider and more deep-seated than he allows. This problem is Britain's and not exclusively Labour's. The problems of Social Democracy seem to him intractable. If they are it is because Britain's are too.

Such a situation was implicit from the start, though we ignored it in the easy optimism of the 1950s and early '60s. Labour's policies, though largely applied by party traditionalists, have sprung from the Gaitskell-Crosland revisionism of the '50s. Growth was the central ingredient in the prescription. It was to ease both the pain of redistribution and the burden of increased welfare and public spending. It was to provide the affluence and the freer choices which are the right of those removed from immediate poverty; and it was to spread both more widely. Growth was the key. Yet the weak point of the argument was always how to get growth in an economy as sluggish as ours. Crosland's intellectual rigour deserted him at this point since he tended to assume that it would come from Keynesian economic management and the unleashing of the energies of a society freed from "the Conservative Enemy." Gaitskell may well have worked on the unspoken assumption shared by all party politicians from Churchill to Margaret Thatcher: "Things will be better with me. Because I'm a Goodie. . . ." Both were wrong, though the proof is a little difficult in Hugh Gaitskell's case.

THE FOURTH LABOUR GOVERNMENT'S growth record from 1964–70 was, as Crosland confessed, a sad disappointment. There was scope to argue over the reasons. Some, including David Marquand at the time, put it down to a failure of conviction: Harold Wilson was more committed to parity as a status symbol than to growth, and "the National Plan" was sacrificed on the altar of an untenable exchange rate. The fifth Labour Government's record from 1974–79 was even worse (though now excuses were valid since the situation was more extreme and other countries were doing almost as badly). With no majority we came to power to grapple with a crisis of unprecedented dimensions at a time when comparative was slipping into absolute decline. Survival and the maintenance of social welfare obligations were the best that could be hoped for. Taxation and borrowing, not growth, were to bear the burden of redistribution and welfare, as well as the extra loading of jobs and finance for industry.

There was room for argument about the scale of

AUSTIN MITCHELL *was a journalist and TV broadcaster before entering politics. He is Labour MP for Grimbsy (the seat Anthony Crosland held before his death in 1977).*

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the burden. There was even more margin for objection to the failure to take risks by defying the monetarist obsession and going for expansion. Yet when it came to the crunch in October 1976 Tony Crosland felt it wrong to lead a revolt against a coalition of Chancellor, Prime Minister, and IMF; and he was not prepared to ally himself with the "alternative strategy" group in the Cabinet against the cuts; so his more expansionist alternative was never tried. In any case the burden was already heavy, and keeping spending high ran the risk of making it heavier. Meanwhile failure to grow was exacerbating every problem, Labour's and Britain's. The tensions of a class-divided society were made worse as people focused their aspirations on each other, instead of being satisfied by the growth of shares. "Industrial relations" became a battle-ground for the improvement that growth wasn't bringing. "Incomes policy", which was always popular in a community where the Dunkirk spirit lingers on, became a means not of distributing rewards fairly but of cutting living standards, and it thus generated sufficient discontents to bring about its own collapse. Borrowing ensconced "Monetarism" and its obsession with symptoms which it treats by making causes worse. It also enthroned Monetarism's attendant archangels: high interest rates and deflation. All this militated even further against growth. So Labour's growth record was derisory, and relations with the trade unions which lay at the centre of the New Corporatism (and which had, *pace* Marquand, brought the country through the Ice Age) collapsed. Labour ceased to deliver, or even to control the situation. This accumulation of disasters and resentments produced electoral defeat. Labour's "rich" (the skilled, the better-paid, the Southerners, the would-be home-owners) all revolted in sufficient numbers against Labour's poor, and also, be it noted, against Britain's straitened circumstances, to bring down a government whose hold on power had always been tenuous.

IT IS NOT CLEAR that Marquand appreciates either the nature of the dilemma or the extent to which the central problem was, and still is, *growth*. Certainly he offers no solutions beyond that routine call for "new thinking" which reveals him as something of a politician still, rather than an academic: he doesn't, after all, bother to supply it, even in the footnotes. This would hardly have been Tony Crosland's position. Growth was so important to him (and to his view of Socialism) that instead of denouncing the symptoms he would almost certainly have applied himself to the problem of how to get it. The techniques for securing it may now be different. They would certainly need more rigorous definition than he gave them in the 1950s or in his more casual review of the early '70s. Yet they are still there. To assume that they are not is to abandon hope for our role as a party, for the betterment of the mass of our people, and more importantly for Britain as an advanced economy. The alternative is decline.

BRITAIN'S SHARE of world trade has fallen steadily as our exports have become less and less competitive. Imports have gained such a massive and increasing share of our market that de-industrialisation and a steady rise of unemployment to levels unparalleled in other advanced countries are real prospects. The cause of all this may be some recently emerging flaw in our national character, some post-War, almost Polynesian, preference for "the easy life", or some other of the numerous character defects which our galloping national inferiority-complex has unearthed. On the other hand it may also be that this economy has never been run for growth; that because of the balance-of-payments constraint each *go* has quickly become *stop*; that the pound has been persistently overvalued, thus creating both a disincentive to export and a stimulus to import. By contrast, other countries started from the base of undervalued currencies which made exporting profitable. This, in turn, attracted investment which increased productivity and triggered off that virtuous growth-cycle which has now endowed them with such massive exporting machines that we, who have enjoyed none of these benefits, can hardly compete even in our own market and certainly not overseas where the pound is now grossly overvalued because of Oil.

If this indeed is the case then certain conclusions follow. They may be unpalatable to Marquand and to the soft-faced men who've done well out of the market. Yet they are still broadly acceptable to Social Democrats committed to growth. The policies to secure it probably now involve management of imports. This can be achieved either by progressive devaluation to allow British industry to improve its competitive position and provide the long-term stimulus to invest and grow; or by import-controls and import-substitution to provide the same stimulus for the domestic market; or, more likely, by some long-term combination of the two. This causes pains and problems, yet what are the alternatives? "Full-blooded socialism" would make no difference to either our ability to compete or our propensity to import—though it could, of course, come in as the price of failure with great swathes of British industry falling limply into the arms of the State (and Sir Keith Joseph seeking sanctuary in some merchant bank with European connections). "Market forces" provide no alternative. (They simply exaggerate the loss of jobs and use unemployment as a cruder and nastier import-

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control.) Nor does the "Europeanism" offered by Marquand: it imposes on us contributions which a country in balance-of-payments disequilibrium can hardly afford and an agricultural protectionism which is not in our interests. Until it develops a massive Regional Policy and a Common Energy Policy which will jointly provide the same stimulus to our interests as the CAP does to others, the Market will continue to be a growth-drain and the cause of a perpetual haggle which kills idealism and

The Coming Struggle

ROTTEN BOROUGH: **The success of the Left in taking over not just many constituency Labour parties and the national executive committee but also some of the major union delegations (notably the huge engineers and transport workers) must rank as the most remarkable piece of political engineering since 1945.**

The parading at Brighton of constituency votes based on minuscule (and often fabricated) memberships, alongside union block votes bearing little relation to Labour support (but merely bought at a 32p affiliation for each union member that the union wants to buy a vote for), is an illustration of the party's illegitimacy. There seems scant concern in the Labour Party over this, its status as the last bastion of the pre-1832 rotten borough.

THE ECONOMIST

HUMBUG: *This is the humbug about the whole "movement."*

The trade union caucus wield about six million votes at the conference but their leaders and delegates are, largely, elected by trifling handfuls of people in branch meetings.

What Tony Benn sees as the heart and soul of the party, the 600,000 constituency party votes, are a trivial minority of increasingly Left-Wing activists, Trotsky and Communist sympathisers determined to seize control of the party.

The average nationwide paid-up constituency membership is 457. There are, for example, precisely 40 of the faithful in a once-safe Labour seat, Edgehill, Liverpool; 21 with fewer than 300 members, and only 16 with more than 2,000.

Ian Waller
in the SUNDAY TELEGRAPH

ROVING BANDS: **The ostentatious disciplining or replacing of MPs in a small number of constituencies, is easily within the capacity of the Left.**

It has been seen how such operations can be carried out. The Labour Party has such a small and apathetic local membership that seats may be picked off one by one by roving bands of militants.

They are usually students, "social workers", pressure group employees, or something similar in the vagabond line. They can literally move residence from constituency to constituency, taking out local party membership and then voting each other and appropriate allies on to key committees.

Andrew Alexander
in the DAILY MAIL

PURGE: *The secret Marxist group—the party within a party—is working in up to a dozen constituencies to oust the sitting MP for someone more amenable to their views.*

They have their own newspaper, their own full-time regional organisers. It is reckoned that they probably already control ten per cent of the Labour activist vote and hold a decisive influence on who should be the candidate in up to 60 seats.

Denis Healey, Shirley Williams, Eric Varley—even Jim Callaghan himself—are deeply worried at how far the extremists have penetrated.

Gordon Greig
in the DAILY MAIL

SINISTER: **The trade union leaders who are behind the reformist thrust are talking grandly about rebuilding a "mass party." But I doubt whether a mass party can exist in an age in which people watch on average 20 hours of television per week.**

As I listened to the debates about what Mr Ian Mikardo called "democratisation" of the party I wondered what television viewers might make of it. What, I wonder, was their gut reaction to the spectacle of Mr Mikardo talking about democracy? What did they make of Mr Eric Heffer's cheeky attack on other people's "double standards" in a speech which was itself a masterpiece of tendentiousness? Most of us tell little white lies from time to time. Mr Heffer tells little red ones.

Here, we were supposed to think, was an example of democracy in practice, but a good many of the champions of candidate selection were people elected to their offices for life—such as Mr Moss Evans of the TGWU. And a good many of the champions of democracy were delegates who had come to Brighton under the false pretence of casting a vote on behalf of a thousand members when their local party can be numbered in dozens. The decisions—whichever way they went—were about as democratic as the block voting system. Did the viewers and the voters realise, I wondered, that

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will certainly drive the Tory dog back into Labour's manger and the public into growing hostility.

PERHAPS THE MAIN PROBLEM with these policies isn't ideological at all but our British reluctance to accept that "National Interest" can be a mainspring of policy. We have always played by the rules: whether these involved maintaining a world role long after we could afford it (assuming a

for Power

they were watching blows being struck for democracy? Or did the proceedings leave them with a different and more sinister impression?

Peter Jenkins
in THE GUARDIAN

THE LAST THING: *Mr Callaghan suspects that this enthusiasm for new constitutions is because the NEC wish to dump on his doorstep what he calls "full-blooded Socialism." He is reported to have told Mr Eric Heffer, a most influential Leftist, that the proposed changes would lead, in the event of a Labour victory, to an Eastern European Communist style of government. Tactfully—or perhaps ironically, who is to say?—Mr Callaghan added that he was sure this was the last thing Mr Heffer desired.*

Even though it be a shadow no bigger than a man's hand, there lurks in the background a thought that dare not speak its name. Who says the next General Election will be in 1984?

Brian Walden
(former Labour MP) in NOW!

THE GULF: **We are now dominated not only by the Left, but by an ugly Left which has displayed a degree of intolerance and extremism that has not only shocked many long-standing Party members but which also underlines the extent to which organised Trotskyism has succeeded in penetrating significant sections of the Party.**

I was shocked by the inability of Mr Frank Allaun, one of the old-time Left-wingers to control what was going on. The Communist presence is more influential than I can ever remember. I was bewildered by those who continued to pretend that meaningless appeals for unity can somehow patch up the gulf between Marxists and Social Democrats. Frankly I am fed up with being one of the few in the front line of a battle, while MPs who should be in there fighting alongside the rest of us, hang back because they haven't got the courage to stand up and be counted.

The Labour Party is not beyond redemption. I am not in favour of quitting the Party for that means giving it to the Left and depriving millions of working people of the chance of fighting for democratic socialism.

Frank Chapple
General-Secretary of the Electricians Union

NEW ELITE: *The explanation lies in what can be termed the Rise of the Polyocracy. We may admit the influence of Entryism, Trotskyism, the Militant Tendency and whatever. They do not fully account for the change that has occurred in local parties. Of course these always ramshackle bodies were traditionally "middle-class", which is one reason they were distrusted by the trade unions. But their class nature took a different form from today's. Today the expansion of higher education, together with the consequent rise of the supposedly "caring" professions, has produced a new race of activists. They tend to be rancorous, to employ a sub-Marxist terminology and to take the women's pages of the* Guardian *seriously. And what cannot be emphasised too strongly is that they also constitute an élite.*

Alan Watkins
in THE OBSERVER

GOOD-BYE: **When party numbers are few (and in the Labour Party they are becoming fewer every year), a handful of active members can take control if they are sufficiently skilful and determined.**

In Newham, a Mr Kelly popped up as secretary of the party after a few months' residence in the borough. Having led the campaign to get rid of Reg Prentice, he disappeared.

Newham is a model only too easy to copy, and from now on it is going to get even easier because every moderate Labour MP, who is not secure in a Right-Wing majority in his management committee, can be a target for Left-Wing activists.

So goodbye to the party of Attlee and Gaitskell and indeed Callaghan. Never in Britain will we see a social democratic party which has been so successful in Germany under Schmidt or in Austria under Kreisky. Our hard men of the Left prefer a more Eastern European model and will see that our MPs in the future toe the line.

Dick Taverne
(former Labour MP)

VISION: **"Everything's changed from now on", exulted a Left-Wing MP, accosting me at the back of the hall and contemplating the new changes. "A terrible beauty is born", he added (twice) in a somewhat alarming recollection of Yeats's vision of strife and bloodshed.**

Andrew Alexander
in the DAILY MAIL

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greater defence-and-aid burden in proportion to GNP than most of our competitors), or maintaining a free trade for the benefit of German and Japanese exporters with a higher standard-of-living than ours. So it is difficult for us now to grasp that North Sea Oil gives us the opportunity to behave with the same altruism as Germany (defending its huge surplus as a sign of virtue), Japan (with its well-known propensity to import), France (for whom the sacrifice of national interest has not exactly become a hallmark of policy), or the USA with its long and (for us) agonising devaluation and its inconsiderate habit of being able to outbid the world for oil imports just because it has the economic strength to do so. If it isn't used to finance manufactured imports, or pay for Market membership, North Sea Oil gives us the opportunity, briefly, to ride out balance-of-payments problems, to go for growth, and to behave with the same self-interest as everyone else. Our economic situation gives us a desperate imperative which they never had.

Marquand may be correct in claiming that Social Democracy has come to a turning-point. If there is no growth, if indeed there is decline, this may involve the kind of reconsideration he envisages, in which "redistribution" is ended as too difficult, blanket provision is cut, and the Right of the Labour Party, which everyone seems to want to chip away from the Left as though there was some dividing line, transform themselves into the Howleyites—a new species of Butskellites, middle-of-the-roaders who can contrast themselves with the extremist follies of the loony Thatcherites. Yet apart from the fact that the middle-of-the-road where we're supposed to stand is a very dangerous place, it also has to be clear that such an act is an abandonment of the central tenet of "Revisionism": that growth is the agency of redistribution and betterment. It will also have to be quick. The ground on the middle Right will have to be occupied and settled before the U-turns begin. The experience of recent times is that they begin earlier with each successive government, and at the pace Mrs Thatcher has set herself she may end the honeymoon period in months not years.

MORE REALISTICALLY, I would assume that Marquand, because he is out of touch with the party he was always in but not of, has simply identified the wrong turning-point. Our aim is still the same, an improving standard-of-living and expanding social services fairly shared in a pluralistic society. The techniques for getting them have entirely changed. Those of the 1950s are no longer relevant to the tougher, colder world of the '80s. Yet they are still techniques to the same end: growth. Willingness to envisage such a possibility depends both on how important the goal is and on the degree of openness-of-mind to techniques which cut across Boy-Scout dogmas inessential to Social Democracy.

David Marquand may want neither the goal nor the techniques. Yet if he rejects them it is his own past commitments and his credentials as a card-carrying Social Democrat (as distinct from a self-appointed coroner) which must be questioned.

First thing

Adam was on horseback leaping the streams,
The fish surfacing to see him;
All the beasts nervous and new
Were grouped in friendly herds, fidgeting.

The birds flew up
In alarums of song
When Eve from behind the tree,
Where all afternoon she had combed her hair
Admired by angels,
Stepped out to speak to him.

Towards evening the animals withdrew
Except for one that crept at Adam,
Its untamed looks coming off the ground
Eying the fruit half-eaten in his hand.

Patrick Hare

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

Astrology—Science or Superstition?

By H. J. Eysenck

ASTROLOGY has never been more popular; practically all newspapers and popular monthlies have columns or even whole pages devoted to earnest discussions and predictions of people born under Pisces or Capricorn or Libra. Yet, equally obviously, scientists are almost unanimous in declaring the subject nothing but superstition, and completely outside the realm of rational discourse. Recently 186 well-known scientists, including many Nobel-Prize-Winners, signed a declaration to the effect that astrology was a fraud and a delusion, and presented a real danger to modern society.[1] People who believed in it were called upon to consider the evidence, and to get rid of their superstitions.

Actually the behaviour of the scientists who signed this declaration was as unscientific as they believed that of the astrologers to be. Few, if any of them, were familiar with the empirical literature, and consequently their condemnation was based on *a priori* reasoning, and possibly prejudice, neither of them a good counsellor in matters of fact. They may, of course, be perfectly right in their condemnation of astrology; but ignorance is not a firm basis from which to advance accusations of unscientific doctrine or conduct.

The question of whether or not a particular discipline is, or is not, scientific is in point of fact a very difficult one. The question of demarcation between science and non-science has bothered philosophers for a very long time, with Bacon (arguing for the wholesale amassing of facts, and the formation of theories based upon these facts) being the first in a long line of philosophers to give thought to this problem. The Vienna School of "Logical Positivism" suggested theory formation and the verification of theories[2] by empirical research as the major criterion—only to be criticised in turn by Karl Popper, who suggested that theories can never be verified because we can only empirically study a very small sample of the predictions to which they give rise; that being so, we can never be sure that some of the predictions we haven't tested might not disprove the theory! Popper suggested instead the doctrine of falsification, i.e. any theory is scientific which enables it to be falsified.[3] This was accepted by many scientists, but it encounters the same difficulty as that of verification. If we can't verify a theory, we also cannot falsify it—there may be some hidden error in our deduction, which inevitably takes into itself far more than the simple theory under investigation, and also rests on certain axioms, presuppositions, assumed facts, etc. Thus, there is still considerable argument about how to recognise a science when we see it.

THIS *is the third in a series of columns planned by Arthur Koestler, for which he acts as an editorial adviser; his article "Horizons in Space" inaugurated the series in the October issue.*

It could be that "the new frontier" lies not between the sciences and the humanities, but on the peripheries of contemporary science itself. This department will be mainly concerned with those border areas, from cosmology to psychology, which are of special relevance to both cultures.

[1] *The Humanist*, Sept-Oct 1975.
[2] F. Suppe (ed.), *The Structure of Scientific Theories* (1974).
[3] Karl R. Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (1959, n.e. 1977).

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Karl Popper chose as his examples of pseudo-sciences Freudianism, Marxism, and astrology. In all of them, he declared, the theory was so complex and so devoid of factual content that it was impossible to make any kind of falsifiable prediction. Up to a point this is certainly true of Freudian psychoanalysis and Marxian sociology; I believe, counter to Popper, that they can in fact be made to generate predictions, and these predictions have in general been disconfirmed. However, what usually happens is that followers of a prophet come up with some rather lame excuse for the failure, and thus try to argue it away. This certainly is not the method of science, but it is typical of these two disciplines.

AS FAR AS ASTROLOGY is concerned it would indeed pass the Popperian test.[4] It makes many quite firm predictions, and these can certainly be tested.

Let me give one example of such a firm prediction, and of a test I myself carried out of that prediction. I shall not for the moment discuss whether this is a sensible prediction, whether it follows from any more general theory, or whether it is simply based on long-continued observation; for Popper it would be sufficient that a firm prediction has been made. The prediction in question states, very simply, that people having an extraverted temperament would be born under those sun signs which have an odd number (Aries, Gemini, Leo, Libra, Sagittarius, Aquarius), while more introverted people will tend to be born under the even numbered signs (Taurus, Cancer, Virgo, Scorpio, Capricorn, Pisces). This prediction appeared in several astrological textbooks, long before the test was carried out, and is quite definite in what it says. How does it stand up to investigation?

I was approached by an astrologer, Mr J. Mayo, who had made precisely this prediction in one of his books (actually in some form or other it goes back over something like 2,000 years); and he wanted to collaborate with me in a study to confirm or disprove this hypothesis. Using a well-standardised questionnaire of extraversion-introversion I had been developing over many years, we tested 916 male and 1,407 female adults and ascertained their birth-dates. To be born under a particular "sign of the Zodiac" simply means to be born at a given time of the year, because as the earth circles the sun, this approaches and then recedes from various stellar congregations which to the ancients seemed to resemble the symbolic figures which make up the circle of the Zodiac. I did not expect a positive outcome, of course, being thoroughly convinced that astrology had very little factual material to support it, and being rather sceptical of all psychological theories and predictions in any case made no exception of this one!



However, the results did seem to go in the right direction; figure *1* shows the outcome for the 2,323 people tested. The saw-tooth pattern expected on the basis of the theory is clearly evident; and it will also be seen that the extraversion scores of people born under the six odd-numbered signs are all above the average, while the extraversion scores of people born under the even numbered signs are all below the average, just as predicted. Such a very positive outcome is rather rare in psychological experiments. So when the study was published [5] it produced quite a good deal of excitement, in spite of the fact that the size of the effect was not very large. People born under the odd-numbered signs were more extraverted than those born under the even-numbered signs, but the difference between the two groups was relatively small. Astrologers would explain that in terms of the multiplicity of astrological influences which determine a person's character and temperament; the position of the sun signs at birth is only one of many such influences, and they all have to be taken into account in making a prediction.

SEVERAL OTHER INVESTIGATORS have since repeated the experiment, and reported a positive outcome. Replication in psychological experiments is often unsuccessful, and the second experiment often fails to show the same results as the first. Consequently, this series of successful replications could be regarded as establishing the result even more firmly, and make it more credible. There was, however, one alternative hypothesis that might have produced these results without implicating any stellar or planetary influences.

Suppose that people born under the various sun signs have some degree of knowledge of what their personality is supposed to be like—might it not be that they would then answer the questionnaire in part in terms of what they think they ought to be

[4] See J. A. West and J. G. Toonder, *The Case for Astrology* (1970); G. Dean, *Recent Advances in Natal Astrology: A Critical Review 1900-1976* (1977).

[5] J. Mayo, O. White, and H. J. Eysenck, "An Empirical Study of the Relation Between Astrological Factors and Personality", *Journal of Social Psychology* (1978, No. 105, pp. 229-236).

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like? It would only need a relatively slight effect in that direction to produce the observed results. Mayo had actually asked the subjects of our experiments about their knowledge of astrology, dividing them into those who did and those who did not know anything about astrology; and found that there was no real difference between the two groups as far as the prediction was concerned.

This seemed to answer this particular criticism, but the test might not have been stringent enough. Knowledge of astrology can vary from "absolutely nothing" to being able to "cast a horoscope"; and there are all sorts of intermediate degrees of knowledge. Possibly the people who answered Mayo's question had assumed that he meant a high degree of knowledge. They had, therefore, said they did not know anything about astrology when, in actual fact, they had some smattering at least of the kind of personality that was associated with the different sun signs—after all, that kind of knowledge can be picked up very easily by just looking at the astrology columns in the daily newspapers.

Accordingly, the test was repeated, but this time asking much more detailed questions about knowledge of astrology. The hypothesis was put forward that people knowing "absolutely nothing" would not show the saw-tooth pattern, that those who knew a little would show it, but that those who knew a lot might again fail to show it, on the grounds that sun signs would not figure largely in their astrological assumptions about personality. This is roughly what we found. Only those who had a slight degree of knowledge of astrology showed the clear-cut saw-tooth pattern, as found in Figure 1, whereas those who knew nothing, and those who knew a lot, showed a much weaker pattern. Professor K. Pawlik in Germany also did a similar study,[6] and found the same kind of thing; those who knew nothing about astrology failed to show the predicted pattern. We went one step farther and tested children, who generally knew nothing about astrology; they, too, failed to show any evidence of the predicted relation between personality and sun sign. It seems pretty definite, therefore, that the observed effect was largely or perhaps altogether produced by the subject's knowledge of astrological beliefs about personality and sun signs being translated into their questionnaire responses.

ON THE VERIFICATION CRITERION of science, therefore, astrology has clearly not succeeded as far as these experiments are concerned. On the falsification test, however, clearly it has succeeded, because it has produced a clear-cut hypothesis which could in fact be falsified. We thus see how important it is to solve the demarcation problem before saying that astrology is or is not a science. My own feeling in this particular case is that the verification test is the more appropriate one; the *falsification* test is the better one for advanced sciences, but for those just struggling to be recognised *verification* is more important.

Actually, the test Mayo and I performed was one of which many astrologers disapprove. What they would say is that you cannot separate out from the large body of astrological knowledge certain aspects and hope to get very positive results. Personality, they would say, is determined by so many things—aspects and positions of the planets, of the moon, as well as of the sun, that any single element tends to be swamped by all the others. Hence, this kind of test is unfair to astrology. Is it possible to conduct a test which would be fairer?

PSYCHOLOGISTS have worked out a method for taking into account a large number of phenomena of this kind, called the Matching method, and a well-known experiment of this kind for astrology was carried out by Vernon Clark, an American psychologist working in the early 1950s.[7] He picked out 10 people, 5 male, 5 female, who were members of a well-defined profession—a musician, a book-keeper, a veterinarian, a herpetologist, an art teacher, an art critic, a puppeteer, a librarian, a prostitute, and a paediatrician. Their horoscopes were cast, and then sent to 20 astrologers who were told only the nature of the professions, their task being to match up the professions with the horoscopes, according to their order of likelihood, i.e. the astrologer was to select the horoscope most likely to be that of the prostitute, say, next most likely, and so on, down to the fifth most likely.

[6] K. Pawlik and L. Buse, "Selbst-Attribuierung als differentiellepsychologische Moderatorvariable", in *Zeitschrift fur Sozialpsychologie* (1979, No. 10, pp. 54-69).

[7] Vernon Clark, "An investigation of the validity and reliability of the astrological technique", *Aquarian Agent* (No. 1, 1970, pp. 2-5).

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The control group of non-astrologers (professional psychologists, and social workers) yielded "a chance return" on the test; but the astrologers did considerably better, their answers being at a high level of statistical significance above chance.

Vernon Clark went on to try his hand at prediction. Astrologers were given 10 pairs of horoscopes, each pair having an attested history attached, with dates of important events in the life of the persons concerned. The astrologers were told that one of the pair belonged to the history, while the other belonged to someone of about the same age and sex, born in the same vicinity, but whose history was different. The astrologers had to say which in each pair was the person whose history corresponded with the horoscope. Again, the astrologers scored well above the chance level, their success rate being highly significant statistically.

In a third test, one of each pair was the victim of cerebral palsy, while the other was someone with a quite similar chart who was above average in intelligence and in some way or other exceptionally gifted. The task of the astrologers was to determine which was which, and again the results were highly significant statistically. Here then we have three experiments, each of them apparently fool-proof, each of them giving astrologers a chance to show their capacities, and each giving positive results affirming the validity of the astrological method.

IT IS CURIOUS that in spite of the importance attached to this study there have been no replications, so that we still do not know whether the results are trustworthy—after all, Vernon Clark might have cheated, or invented the whole thing, or made errors in the analysis! I am not suggesting for a moment that he did in fact do any of these things, but until the experiment has been replicated several times, by several different people, it would certainly not be wise to put too much faith in it. Even in the hard sciences a single experiment, by a single investigator, however able, is not regarded as final, particularly when the outcome is very unexpected and counter to general beliefs in the nature of things.

MUCH THE MOST IMPORTANT BODY of data ever collected in an attempt to test astrological theories is that produced by Michel and Françoise Gauquelin, a married couple of French psychologists who have been working in this field for over 20 years. What they did can be described quite easily, because they repeated the same methodological scheme over and over again. First, they would define a given class of people in a perfectly objective manner. Thus they chose 2,089 sports champions, 1,409 famous actors, and 3,647 famous men of science. A person was considered "famous" if there was available in a particular Paris library a biography of him in print. Thus there is perfect objectivity in the definition of the sample in question.

Next, the Gauquelins looked up the place of birth and the exact time and date of birth; this was then translated into the exact positions of the various planets when the various people in question were born. They paid particular attention to the positions of Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn; they have also published data on Venus, the Moon, etc., but I will restrict myself to a discussion of a limited sample of their data only.

Simplifying things grossly, we may say that just as the sun seems to rise in the east, pass overhead, sink in the west, and then go round underfoot to appear in the east, so too do the planets appear to circle the earth once each day (i.e., as the earth makes its rotation once a day, so the apparent position of the planets alters). What the Gauquelins found was that there are four crucial positions when the position of the planet at birth becomes related to the particular profession of the people studied. The most important positions are just after rise and just after the upper culmination, i.e. just after the planet is seemingly overhead. The two other times are when the planet has just set, and its lower culmination, i.e. just after it is precisely underfoot.

Let us call these the critical positions, and we can then summarise the Gauquelins' findings very simply by saying that sportsmen tended to be born much more frequently when Mars was in these critical positions, actors when Jupiter was in these critical positions, and scientists when Saturn was in these critical positions. The results were extremely clear-cut and so significant statistically that there is no question whatsoever that the effects were produced by chance.

There was, of course, a good deal of commotion caused by these findings, and a Belgian Committee of "hard" scientists, led by an astronomer, repeated the study of sportsmen with an independent sample—only to get exactly the same results! Other replications have since been carried out with similar results, so that there seems to be no doubt about the replicability of the findings.

The Gauquelins went on to look at the personality descriptions given in the bibliographies of these various people, and found that there was a kind of "modal" personality, i.e. sportsmen tended to be energetic, aggressive, determined, while scientists tended to be withdrawn, shy, hardworking. This modal personality characterised the majority of people in each group, but not all; there were some scientists who were not shy and withdrawn, there were some sportsmen who were not aggressive, etc. The Gauquelins compared the

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modal scientists, actors, and sportsmen with those who deviated from the typical personality pattern in each group; and they found that it was only those who had the modal type of personality who showed the relationship with planetary position; those who did not show the right type of personality tended not to be born under the right type of planetary position! This suggests that it is personality that is influenced by the position of the planets at birth, not the particular profession chosen; this is chosen only because it accords, by and large, with the particular personality of the person in question.

My wife, working together with the Gauquelins on their material,[8] looked through all the nouns, adjectives and adverbs used by the biographers in characterising the sportsmen, actors, and scientists, and, from her long experience in questionnaire-construction and -evaluation, marked those which signified an introverted or an extraverted temperament, leaving those unmarked which were not clearly related to either of these two ends of this personality continuum. Taking all the sportsmen, actors, and scientists together in one large group, personality characteristics were then run through the computer against planetary position; and it became quite obvious that introverts (regardless of profession) tended to be born when Saturn was in one of the crucial positions, whereas extraverts were born when Mars or Jupiter was in one of the crucial positions. This seems to bear out the hypothesis that planetary position is related to personality, particularly as the significance levels of personality determination were much higher than those of profession.

THE GAUQUELINS found many other interesting things, such as that the planetary position at the birth of a child was similar to that at the birth of the mother—except for induced birth, where there was no correlation at all! There is a great deal more that could be said about the work of the Gauquelins, which combines extreme empirical rigour with outstanding competence in statistical analysis, and which has stood up to all critical onslaughts and attempts at replication to an exemplary degree. I cannot here go into any more details, but want finally to discuss one aspect of their work which from the point of view of astrology is a crucial one, namely whether and to what extent their results support astrology.

THE WORK of the Gauquelins is often quoted by astrologers nowadays as proof for the scientific nature of astrology, and in support of their claims for astrology. The Gauquelins do not see it that way at all.

They point out, quite rightly, that their results do not fall in line with any of the orthodox astrological beliefs and predictions, and that astrology would not have forecast their particular results. As a consequence, they suggest that their work is not, as it were, the coping stone for the ancient science of astrology, but rather the beginnings of a new science of cosmobiology, which they define as the relationship between planetary positions and psychological and physical events on the earth.[9] In a sense, therefore, the Gauquelins have placed themselves between two stools; they do not form an alliance with the astrologers, who therefore have severely criticised them for not coming over into their camp; and they also have failed to align themselves with the scientists who are so completely critical of astrology that they refuse to look at any data even remotely connected with their discipline. In all the exchanges between the Gauquelins, on the one hand, and astrologers and scientists on the other, it must be said that the Gauquelins have invariably got the better of their opponents. Opposition has often been ignorant, biased, and indicative of a high degree of prejudice; the Gauquelins have always replied in an open, factual, and scientific spirit, accepting criticisms and suggestions for improvement of their methods, and coming back with new results which strengthen their case. Readers must make their own choice whether they wish to consider the work of the Gauquelins as supporting astrology, or as the beginnings of a new science; they can hardly reject it.

Comparable in some ways to the Gauquelins' work in the psychological field is that of John H. Nelson in physics. Nelson, an electronical engineer, was hired by RCA to look into the possible connections between fluctuations in radio disturbances and celestial phenomena. Prediction of these disturbances is commercially very important, but success

[8] M. Gauquelin, F. Gauquelin, and S.B.G. Eysenck, "Personality and Position of the Planets at Birth: An Empirical Study", *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology* (1979, No. 18, pp. 71-75).

[9] Michel Gauquelin, *The Cosmic Clocks: From Astrology to a Modern Science* (London, 1969). See also his *The Spheres of Destiny: Your Personality and the Planets*, which J. M. Dent are to publish early in 1980.

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was at a rather low rate. Nelson did not improve things very much, until it was suggested to him that possibly the position of the planets might be important. There was no physical theory to explain any such influence, and Nelson was very doubtful. But finally he did look into it and found indeed that most magnetic storms (which cause radio disturbances) occurred when two or more planets were in conjunction (at the same side of the sun), or at angles of 180° or 90° from the sun. This completely unexplained and inexplicable influence of the planets, presumably on the sun spots, enabled him to predict radio disturbance with up to 93% accuracy, and his method is widely used to make such predictions.

Again, it is difficult to know whether to classify his work as astrology (which he himself would be loath to do) or cosmobiology.[10] Astrology does not pretend to predict fluctuations in radio disturbance, of course, but on the other hand the 90° aspect (the square) and the 180° aspect (the opposition) have always been held to be "disharmonious", or "maleficent", or "evil", or "difficult." It might be argued that there is some suggestion in this of radio disturbances as opposed to smooth operation; but to do that would probably be to exaggerate the historical relevance of these planetary configurations to modern physical conditions.

[10] J. H. Nelson, *Cosmic Patterns: Their Influence on Man and his Communication* (Washington, D.C., American Federation of Astrologers, 1974): *The Propagation Wizard's Handbook* (Peterborough, New Hampshire, 1979).

CAN WE CONCLUDE that astrology is a science, or should we conclude that it is superstition? Almost everybody who has written on the topic has come down on one side or the other; my own position would be that at the moment it would be unwise to do either. Clearly there are more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy; and to pretend that science is finite, and has all the answers, is obviously absurd. It is equally absurd to make exaggerated claims for astrology as a science when at best the evidence is very bitty, inconclusive, and mostly only suggestive. Under the circumstances what I think is required is much more and better research than we have had in the past. This kind of research is prevented both by astrologers who believe they already know all the answers, and don't need research to support their point of view (an attitude reminiscent of Freud's, who also felt that his system didn't need empirical support from experimental researches), and by "hard" scientists who will have nothing to do with investigations of what they consider "occult" phenomena. It is the work of such people as the Gauquelins, John Nelson, and Vernon Clark which ought to be supported, replicated, and made more widely known. There is no real difficulty in carrying out decent research in this field; the difficulty is to get good scientists interested in it!

At the moment the only feedback that most research workers in the field get is to be shouted down by both sides—by the astrologers for daring to have any doubts, and by the scientists for daring to look at the alleged phenomena of planetary influences on humankind at all. Until this position changes, we are unlikely to get any firm answers to our query.

Imaginings

A small plane is crossing the dome of my skull,
awake in a high room in an old house.
It is picking its way and mourning to itself of far horizons,
thickening the room's darkness till it drowns
whatever dawn has tinged the edge of the sky.

Or rooks at the window, talking morning-talk,
complain of black branches, the absence of leaves.
A clutch of harsh coroners, their verdict racks
the currents in a bedroom where your breath's
no longer in circulation.

And when the alarm wakes you I watch the mirror
record our touching,
the ceiling's heart turn to a stuccoed flower,
my coat on the chair's back, crouched like something else.

Frank Ormsby

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

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New York City

YAHOO CENSORS?: In Texas classrooms six dictionaries are banned because of their definitions of such verbal incendiaries as "hot" and "slut".

In some Missouri schools, the respected American Heritage dictionary is banned for its prurience in declaring that the word "bed" may be used as a verb.

In Georgia and California, parents' groups want biology teachers to give equal time to the Biblical theory of creation and Darwin's studies on evolution.

The sinewy fundamental puritanism that still grips much of this nation never ceases to amaze. With awesome zeal, more than 200 organisations are now dissecting school and college works, making the textbook probably the country's most scrutinised product. Most complaints concern texts that question the authority of parents, police, the State, and religion. They don't reflect the generation gap, they create it. Depending on your point of view, such guardians of young minds are either yahoo censors or champions of grassroot democracy.

DAILY MAIL

Boston

OBIT: *Since he has written about virtually everything else, million-dollar author Norman Mailer has finally penned his own obituary, in the new issue of Boston Magazine.*

"Norman Mailer passed away yesterday after celebrating his 15th divorce and 16th wedding. He was renowned in publishing circles for his blend of fictional journalism and factual fiction, termed by literary critic William Buckley 'Contemporaneous Ratiocinative Aesthetical Prolegomena.' Buckley was consequently sued by Mailer for malicious construction of invidious acronyms. 'Norman does take himself seriously,' was Mr Buckley's reply. 'Of course, he is the last of those who do . . .' When asked on occasion why he married so often, the former Pulitzer-Prize winner replied, 'To get divorced. You don't know anything about a woman until you meet her in court.' "

INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE

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CONFESSION: *Moscow Radio's new "World Service" broadcasts in English are becoming more and more daring. Recently, the programme featuring readers' letters read out one which said that Moscow Radio broadcast "only lies and propaganda."*

Now the programme has gone one better. It has quoted from a British listener living in Portugal who insisted that the programmes were censored by the KGB, the Soviet security police. The programme's presenter added after the quote:

"He doesn't know half of it. The fact of the matter is that in reality none of our scripts are censored by the KGB because, and now hear this, we are all members of the KGB"

DAILY TELEGRAPH

Frankfurt-am-Main

NON-PARTISAN: *The word "guerrilla", imported from Spain, has in the years since World War II taken its fighting place in the vocabulary of all our media. It is generally understood to mean "irregular troops" or "partisans", and we have watched them in combat in Korea, Viet Nam, Cuba, Algeria, and now in Nicaragua. Strategists who have been speculating about the possible American/European military intervention to seize Middle East oil fields speak of "commando troops" whose possible victory would be nullified by local "guerrillas."*

And yet the word itself is not semantically defensible. "Guerrilla" is the diminutive form of "guerra" or War, and so signifies a "small war"; and those who are involved in the military conduct of a "guerrilla" are "guerrilleros."

The confusion probably goes back to the early years of the 19th century, to the time of the Spanish "freedom fighters" against French domination. Indeed the first example of the confounding of "guerrillero" and "guerrilla" is dated 1820, the source being a book by Stendhal.

The lexicographers who should (and usually do) know better have capitulated a long time ago. Almost all dictionaries register and legitimise the contemporary usage. If there has been a muddying of our European languages, at least everybody is clear about who (or what) is shooting at whom.

FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG

Helsinki

ANIMAL FARM: *Finland's state-owned television will not be screening a BBC series depicting the political situation in Finland and other neighbours of Russia, Mr Pekka Silvola, programme director, said yesterday.*

"The very name of the series 'Neighbours of the Bear' was contentious," he said. REUTER

London

SOLECISMS: Churchill and the Generals, a whopping play ("the BBC's largest-ever single drama production"), uncoiled its slow length through half the night. It had everything going against it. Actors had to come on, pretend to be someone extremely famous, and go off. To help them create these characters they were given dialogue so peppered with anachronistic words that the sense of the past evaporated every time it formed.

By now the whole matter is a war of words. Instead of bombs dropping on German towns, we have the BBC dropping on the English language. I get sick of hearing myself say [Clive James writes] that there is no point spending thousands of pounds getting sets and costumes in period if the dialogue spends most of its time popping out of it. Everybody in the play said "massive" to mean "large"—a most unlikely usage for the 1940s.

Winston Churchill wrote and spoke English floridly, but with some precision. If he meant that things were tense, he would say "tense", not "fraught"—a slovenly usage which did not come in for another 20 years at least.

THE OBSERVER

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LETTERS

Poets & Messes

IF ONLY ON the mere question of fact, I feel I should take up Mr Alan Brownjohn's curious point (ENCOUNTER, August) that the so-called "Movement", which he identifies with the contributors to *New Lines*, had their attitudes determined by the supposedly restrictive or distortive life of "officers' messes."

This is, of course, in accord with the notion that *other people's* experiences (*a*) maim them for life, (*b*) are somehow "unreal."

Now, if one is to be literal, not much of Army life was spent in officers' messes—a couple of hours a day when a unit was both static and concentrated, i.e. sometimes. But anyway, on the point of fact, no doubt a fair proportion of poets of our generation, of whatever "school", served as officers. But the "Movement" in particular? Only *four* out of *nine* did so (one of whom, Donald Davie, authorises me to say that his brief wardroom service in the Navy had small effect compared with his long period below decks). Four were never in the services at all; and one did brief National Service after the War and was not commissioned!

Mr Brownjohn deduces from this (mythical) joint experience a "social" conservatism in these poets. In fact the New Liners spread over from fairly far Left to fairly far Right, though admittedly including none of the varieties of communism or fascism, surely not a serious omission. Their social origins were equally varied.

The one "conservatism" Mr Brownjohn has right is the poetic one—at least in the sense that, as Thom Gunn put it, we had nothing in common beyond what every English poet from Chaucer to Hardy had in common. Such principles—as against the rejection of more recent unprinciples—mean no more than that in the country of the blind the one-eyed men are similar: a similarity of contrast with others rather than some essential affinity.

No, it wasn't "artifice" we distrusted—indeed we were accused of excessive "artifice." It wasn't "sensitivity" but hyperaesthesia; it wasn't "experiment" but experimentalism. Above all it wasn't "seriousness" about art that we rejected—it was *pretentiousness*.

Mr Brownjohn writes with spirit and wit about the sad sight of middle-aged "conservatives" apologising for youthful extremism. True, but the sight of middle-aged "progressives" apologising for youthful conformism is at least equally common, and at least equally comic.

ROBERT CONQUEST

London

ROBERT CONQUEST has taken up—in a very fair and good-humoured way—my debating point rather than my general argument.

The case was: that experience of the Armed Forces during or after the Second World War delivered to the Movement poets of the 1950s a climate in which the practice of the imagination (sitting down and writing about love is something only the *women* actually manage to do in Kingsley Amis's splendid poem "A Bookshop Idyll") seemed harder to justify than the practice of action. And that military experience linked in the case of these poets with a literary conservatism (almost a philistinism at times) to lead them back to a social conservatism in the end. Bob Conquest makes a reasonable point about the time spent in mess or wardroom, but I would still have thought that four officers out of nine in *New Lines* (or out of the five who qualified for service) was quite a good score, even if you think the debating point unjust.

The next generation—the fifteen poets in *A Group Anthology* (1963)—boast nothing higher than a long-serving lance-corporal and a National Service sergeant. And the tone of that anthology *is* different.

ALAN BROWNJOHN

London

Arguing about Zion

IT MAY SEEM tiresome to continue the discussion about anti-Semitism, but when Max Beloff resorts to equating anti-Semitism with anti-Zionism, he is using an intellectually dishonest and repugnant trick. In his article ("The Anti-Semitic Persuasion" ENCOUNTER, August) he says that "a Jew ... cannot but feel that any wound inflicted on the Jews of Israel is also a wound inflicted on all Jewry." Leaving aside the problem of Jews whose support for Zionism is qualified or non-existent, this assertion is distasteful because it means that criticism (wounding?) of Israel is anti-Semitic if Jews feel it to be so. The nonsensical nature of this conclusion is readily apparent, for any ethnic group could, in the same way, describe criticism of a country made up of its members as racialist. For example, if Arabs cannot but feel that any wound inflicted on the Arabs of Egypt is also a wound inflicted on all Arabs, then they would be entitled to describe Israel, a country which has wounded Egypt several times, as racialist because it is anti-Arab. Surely Max Beloff believes that the terms "anti-Semitism" and "racialism" have a more objective meaning.

Anti-Zionism has undoubtedly been used as a front for anti-Semitism, notably in some Communist countries. Such prejudice should, of course, be ruthlessly exposed. However, it does not follow at all that anti-Zionism is anti-Semitic inherently. Max Beloff sees opposition to Israel as against the interests of all Jews and thus objectively (not his word) anti-Semitic. This sleight of hand distorts the meaning of anti-Semitism and grotesquely misrepresents opposition to Zionism. It is reminiscent of the Stalinist technique of wrapping the Soviet Union in the flag of socialism to further Russia's national interest. Indeed, many people believe that Israel has practised the "end justifies the means" doctrine with the same vigour and determination as Russia under Stalin. Max Beloff should not be surprised to see socialists opposing such thinking as they leave the Stalinist ghetto.

The case against Zionism is simple. The historic claim of the Jews to the land of Palestine has always been a totally inadequate justification for the establishment by force of the state of Israel. Defenders of Israel like Hyam Maccoby (Letters, August) and, apparently, Max Beloff consider it sufficient. Elsewhere in his article, Max Beloff refers disparagingly to the "*soi-disant* freedom fighters" in Southern Africa. But the black nationalists there are fighting for no more (and usually less) than rule by the blacks, whose land was wrested from them by force. It is hard to see any moral reason why Max Beloff and, indeed, the people of Israel do not praise them wholeheartedly for trying to emulate the success of the Israelis

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in displacing the invaders from their historic land. After all, the black claim to Southern Africa is much less ambiguous than the Jewish claim to Palestine, and the birth of Israel required violent action by terrorists (or, as apologists for men like Begin would say, "*soi-disant* terrorists"). Yet Israel, far from supporting black nationalism, has been one of the most reliable allies of the blatantly racialist government in South Africa! Apparently Israel and its defenders, such as Max Beloff, believe in double standards for deciding historic claims—one standard for the Israelis, and one for Africans. It is unpleasant to see a critic of prejudice turn a blind eye to such manifestations of racialism—for what is racialism, but different standards for different "races"? Max Beloff should heed the adage "Let he who is free from sin cast the first stone" before he accuses the left of racialism.

J. C. THORNTON

Oxford

MR THORNTON is no doubt right in theory. It is possible to deplore either the creation of the State of Israel or the subsequent policies of its government and not to be guilty of anti-Semitism in the crude racial sense. In practice however, since some degree of identification with Israel is important to many (if not most) Jews, freedom to Jews to voice their opinions includes the right to voice opinions favourable to the Zionist case. The denial, for instance, of the right of Jewish societies in some British Universities to frame their own programmes (which has happened, and always under pressure from the Left) must appear as anti-Semitic, since (to take Mr Thornton's own example) no such impediment has been placed on those voicing African aspirations. If Mr Thornton is unaware of what has happened, he can obtain full information in London from the Institute of Jewish Affairs (which is not a Zionist body).

I see no inconsistency myself in using quotes when I refer to "freedom fighters" since while they may well be genuine in wishing to substitute Black for White rule, it is not clear that this substitution would involve freedom for individual blacks greater than they have now. In some cases (not all, and not only in Africa) the end of Colonialism has meant less not greater security for the individual and without security of life and limb (and, I would add, property) there can be no freedom.

Self-determination is a tricky concept particularly when, as in southern Africa, one has a meeting of many streams of migration by land and sea. There might be something to be said for bringing in the felicific calculus.

MAX BELOFF

St. Antony's College
Oxford

THE HISTORIC CLAIM of the Jews to a national home in Palestine (no Zionist claim was made to the *whole* of Palestine) was never held to justify the establishment of a Jewish state by force.

On the contrary, the claim was made the basis of a peaceful campaign which produced the Balfour Declaration of 1917 (endorsed by the League of Nations in 1922) and finally the United Nations decision of 1947 creating both a Jewish and an Arab state in what was left of Palestine after the previous creation of the Arab state of Transjordan. This decision was accepted by the Jews but rejected by the Arabs, who launched a five-nation attack on the newly-formed state of Israel.

To fight in defence of a legally-established state against illegal attack is not to "establish it by force." Yet this distortion of history has become a canonised feature of anti-Zionist propaganda.

HYAM MACCOBY

Leo Baeck College
London

"Incunabula"

IN HIS MOSCOW reportage Melvin J. Lasky [ENCOUNTER, August] refers to "slips that pass in the night." One must have just slipped right by him in the Russian dark when he looked at the manuscript of the censored *Metropol* anthology and was reminded of "incunabula out of pre-Gutenberg Times." But there aren't any such animals, Incunabula began with Gutenberg and the very first printing presses, and is generally used to refer to all printed books before 1500.

For the rest, may I say how deeply moved I was, heart and brain, by the account of the whole journey; I found it original and thought-provoking, and in its way it summed up what ENCOUNTER is all about.

ELIAS M. SCHWARZBART

New York City

"Many Reasons" for Viet Nam

TO ANYONE who visited Viet Nam during the American involvement, Professor Michael Howard's article in the May ENCOUNTER, temperate though it was, left a somewhat bitter taste.

"The Americans came home", he writes, "leaving behind a society destroyed as much by their generosity and good intentions as by their bombs." In the din of recrimination which is likely to continue for some time, many facts are in danger of being obscured.

I visited Viet Nam in 1965 and 1967. During the first visit I lectured in Saigon and Hué; during the second, based on the huge defence perimeter of Da Nang, I visited the combat zone. It is often forgotten that despite the fact that Hué and its university were destroyed during the Tet rebellion, the university was speedily rebuilt and started functioning again with great success. In the course of both of my visits I observed, not the steady demoralisation of the US Army, but its high morale. When I visited American troops in outlying CAPS (Combined Action Platoons, in which small units of US Marines were integrated with Vietnamese), I noticed the civilised use they made of such leisure time as they enjoyed. Many were taking the trouble to find out about the Vietnamese people, with whom (so far as my observation went) they were on very good terms, and the reading matter at their disposal was of a high quality. The atmosphere was totally different from that conveyed by the original *M*A*S*H**, which, though concerned with Korea, has been taken by many to represent America's new way of conducting herself in war. As an independent witness, I could dwell on many other neglected facts of this kind. The Viet Nam war was lost on the home front; it was a propaganda defeat.

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To talk back home with some of our own anti-Viet Nam demonstrators, e.g., in Grosvenor Square, was a chastening experience, since it was soon clear that many of these young men and women, mindlessly bawling out "*Ho-Ho-Ho-Chi-Minh*", had no idea where Viet Nam was. But it enabled one to gauge something of the mentality of the hordes led by "intellectuals" in American cities.

The legacy of the Viet Nam *débâcle* includes not merely the Boat People but the situation in Cambodia. Few articles in ENCOUNTER have exceeded in horror that by Jean Lacouture, who set out to ascertain the truth and found it. About these, the silence of the intelligentsia has its own tale to tell, but I see from your issue of October (p. 92–93) that some conscience-stricken voices are at last being raised.

E. W. F. TOMLIN

Morwenstow
Cornwall

Dark Lady

IN YOUR July review of my *Only Begotten Sonnets* you omitted to mention the simultaneously published second volume—a paperback entitled *Shakespeare's Sonnets Edited as a Continuous Sequence* (£1.95, also from Bell & Hyman).

It was a high pleasure to be reviewed by J. I. M. Stewart. I can take the joke about Mr Campbell's camp, though I would just comment that 1) I am a lady; 2) the only hostile review of my book has been one in *Gay News*.

S. C. CAMPBELL

Cambridge

AUTHORS

Laurence Lerner is Professor of English Literature at the University of Sussex, and author, among other books, of *The Uses of Nostalgia* (Chatto, 1972), *An Introduction to English Poetry* (Edward Arnold, 1975), and a volume of poems, *A.R.T.H.U.R.* (Harvester, 1974). His most recent work of literary criticism, *Love and Marriage,* was published this autumn by Edward Arnold.

George Urban's articles in ENCOUNTER include "Conversations with" Manuel Azcarate (March 1979), Luigi Barzini (May 1978), Altiero Spinelli (January 1978), Lucio Lombardo Radice (May 1977), and George Kennan (September 1976). He is academic consultant to Radio Free Europe, and recorded his conversation in Belgrade with Milovan Djilas on their behalf. Among his other publications are *Détente* (1976) and *Hazards of Learning* (Temple Smith, 1977).

Peter Scupham's latest book of poems is *Nature* (Gruffyground Press, 1979).

D. M. Thomas's most recent volume of poems, *The Honeymoon Voyage,* was published by Secker in 1978; his novel *The Flute-Player* was brought out this year by Gollancz.

Sir Alfred Ayer is Wykeham Professor of Logic, University of Oxford, and a Fellow of New College. Among his works are *Language, Truth and Logic* (1936, n.e. Penguin, 1971), *The Problems of Knowledge* (1956, n.e. 1971), *Probability and Evidence* (Macmillan, 1972), and *The Central Questions of Philosophy* (Weidenfeld, 1973). A volume of autobiography, *Part of My Life,* was published last year by Oxford University Press.

Bryan Wilson is Reader in Sociology, University of Oxford, and a Fellow of All Souls. His most recent publication is *Contemporary Transformations of Religion* (Oxford University Press, 1979); other works include *Sects and Society* (1961, n.e. Greenwood Press, 1978), *Religious Sects* (1971), and *Magic and the Millennium* (Heinemann, 1973).

Eric Rhode, chiefly known to ENCOUNTER readers as a writer on film (for example, his book *History of the Cinema from its Origins to 1970,* Allen Lane, 1976), is a psychotherapist. He is working on a study of the feelings, fantasies and suppositions that have always surrounded the subject of birth: this will include a series of conversations with women who suffered acute breakdown after their children were born.

Roger Scruton is Reader in Philosophy at Birkbeck College, University of London, and the author of *Art and Imagination* (1974) and *The Aesthetics of Architecture* (1979), both published by Methuen.

Martin Hollis is a Senior Lecturer in Philosophy in the School of Economic and Social Studies at the University of East Anglia, and editor of *Ratio.* His books include *Models of Man* (Cambridge University Press, 1977), and, with E. J. Nell, *Rational Economic Man* (Cambridge, 1975). He is co-editor of *Philosophy and Economic Theory* (Oxford University Press, 1979) and a contributor to *Philosophical Disputes in the Social Sciences* (ed. S. C. Brown), recently published by Harvester Press.

H. J. Eysenck is Professor of Psychiatry, University of London, and Director of the Psychological Department at the Maudsley Hospital. Among his numerous books are *Uses and Abuses of Psychology* (n.e. Penguin, 1970), *The Scientific Study of Personality* (Routledge, 1952) and, with S. B. G. Eysenck, *Personality Structure and Measurement* (Routledge, 1969). His most recent books, as co-author, are *Covert Conditioning* (Pergamon, 1979) and *The Psychology of Sex* (J. M. Dent, 1979).

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

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